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Abstract
I present a one-channel model of informal hiring in Chapter 2, a two-channel model with
additional formal hiring in Chapter 3, and incorporate a more explicit networking scenario into
the informal channel in Chapter 4. I consider a CRS industry in which a single firm weighs
the relative gain from a high-quality worker against the odds of a given applicant being low-
quality. In the informal channel, the firm is able to condition on two available sources of
information: noisy signalling through the endogenous arrival probability of applications, and
an exogenous signal of quality through the report conveyed by the application itself. I find that
the informal channel may be used in equilibrium to signal high-quality, improve connection
between potential workers and the firm, or, either due to insuﬃcient benefit, social norms, or
incompatible worker and firm incentives, may not be used at all. I also find complementarity
between the report screening power and the composition of the pool of applicants. When used
alone, I show that the informal channel is able to endogenously generate a more favourable pool
of applicants, with or without homophily eﬀects present in referrals. When used in combination
with formal hiring, I show that an inferior pool of informal applicants is also possible, as is
sometimes noted empirically. The addition of the formal channel generally aﬀects the informal
channel adversely, causing it to shut down in some cases. I find that existence of equilibria
and comparative static results are sensitive to the specification of informal arrival costs. Under
the more explicit networking scenario, I provide conditions on networking costs for the use of
informal hiring in equilibrium. When networking costs increase, any bias in the composition
of the informal pool of applicants is intensified. I also find typically non-monotonic eﬀects of
parameters on the informal pool composition and profits. My results highlight how informal
hiring patterns and equilibrium outcomes depend on the costliness and informativeness of job
contacts, and are aﬀected by the firm’s need for quality and its ability to discern quality through
formal versus informal sources.
Keywords: signalling, networking, selection, formal hiring strategies, informal hiring
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There are many diﬀerent ways in which workers approach firms to apply for jobs and by which
firms advertise job openings and recruit new employees. Informal sources such as referrals
have accounted for as much as 80% of hires in blue-collar occupations and 50% in white-
collar occupations (Rees, 1966), although empirical estimates of the use and success of dif-
ferent search and recruiting methods vary.1 Ioannides and Loury (2004) observe that the use
of personal contacts in job search has been increasing over time, and also that diﬀerences in
method use do not fully account for all demographic diﬀerences in job search productivity.
However, it is diﬃcult to understand the response of job search and hiring strategies to changes
in the environment such as reduced communication cost and through the internet and other
technology. Although variation in the use and success of diﬀerent methods has been studied
by demographic, by market conditions, and across industries and countries, there is relatively
little theoretical grounding to give understanding to the underlying causes.
Of particular interest in many studies are the advantages or disadvantages which may be
associated with the use of diﬀerent search methods, such as the question of whether or not
1For comparisons of the use and productivity of diﬀerent search methods according to gender and race, career
stage and employment status, aggregate employment conditions, and country, see for example Corcoran et al.
(1980), Reid (1972), Blau and Robbins (1990), Osberg (1992), Weber and Mahringer (2008), Addison and Portu-
gal (2002), and Pellizzari (2010).
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informal methods lead to better-quality applicants and hires. Most theoretical models assume
or predict advantages of network-based informal search methods, particularly in the form of
generating a more favourable pool of applicants. This is usually explained as a result of “ho-
mophily” eﬀects in networks, by which people are more likely to share connections with others
whose attributes are similar to their own.2 Thus a referred candidate, whose qualities may be
unobserved, is expected to be similar to the person making the referral, whose qualities may
be observed. Although the prevalence of homophily in networks has been widely observed
and is well-supported by theoretical models of network formation, including within the job-
market setting, it is not empirically clear whether or not referrals provide firms with either
more favourable candidates or better matches in terms of quality or tenure, or whether there is
a wage premium or penalty associated with referral.3
This is not entirely surprising given that homophily eﬀects should lead to higher quality
in referrals only when the attributes associated positively within the social network are also
attributes which are relevant to the desired job skills. Furthermore homophily in networks
is not the only determinant of the pool of applicants generated by referrals, neither does the
quality distribution of candidates comprise the only source of value in referrals. In particular,
information passed through personal contacts can be directly useful.4 5
In general, direct information provided by informal search methods need not be the same
2For an overview of homophily in social networks, see McPherson et al. (2001).
3Referrals are found by Fernandez and Weinberg (1997) to generate a more appropriate pool of applicants in
retail banks, and by Burks et al. (2015) to provide better matches in terms of lower quit rates and higher match-
specific skills. Dustmann et al. (2016) and others report similar results reflected in a wage premium for referral
use. In contrast, Bentolila et al. (2010) find referrals generate poor matches and reduced wages. Antoninis (2006)
finds a wage premium in manufacturing only when referrals shared direct experience, and a wage penalty for
unskilled workers. Pellizzari (2010) finds that personal contacts can lead to a wage premium or penalty, both
occurring with similar frequency in Europe and correlated with the eﬃciency of formal search channels.
4Informed contacts can reduce uncertainty for firms (Simon and Warner, 1992) and increase opportunities for
workers (Calvo-Armengol and Zenou, 2005). Workers may use referrals either to find better jobs or as a last
resort (Loury, 2006). Related benefits include decreased length and/or cost of search, see Ullman (1968), DeVaro
(2005), and a stream of benefits from future referrals as in Montgomery (1991).
5Another potential benefit is decreased cost of monitoring employees. Kugler (2003) points to a reduction in
firms’ eﬃciency pay when using referrals, but referrals may also encourage low-quality workers to shirk (Duran
and Morales, 2014). Fafchamps and Moradi (2015) found referred recruits more likely to desert or be dismissed
from the British colonial army in Ghana.
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as information provided by other methods. The attractiveness of a search method to firms or
workers should depend on the nature of the information it provides. Rees (1966) points to the
importance of qualitative dimensions of information such as whether the information provides
more detail about a prospective firm/worker (“intensive” information) or whether it increases
the scope of known opportunities (“extensive” information). Search methods which eﬀectively
yield intensive rather than extensive information should be more valuable as more heterogene-
ity is present in the pool of search. Of course, the ability of formal and informal sources to
convey diﬀerent types of information need not be the same across all job settings.6 In their
survey of personnel economics, Oyer and Schaefer (2011) point to a lack of understanding of
the firm’s optimal hiring strategies. Marsden and Gorman (2001) also note a lack of research
addressing firm-level heterogeneity, and reason that job contacts should have greater impor-
tance for firms and industries where relevant job skills are more diﬃcult to observe through
formal or impersonal credentials, and/or where hiring stakes are high.
If the use of a particular search or application method diﬀers by worker type, the use itself
can also become a new source of information to the firm about the suitability of the applicant.
If for a particular search method the directly transmitted information is very informative, high-
quality workers should have greater incentive to use this method, and it should provide the firm
with better candidates. Meanwhile equilibrium eﬀects may be important because the benefits
to firms and workers of a given search method are influenced by the others’ use of it.
Therefore, in order to better understand the use of diﬀerent job application methods, I anal-
yse a two-sided job-application and hiring equilibrium which takes into account the informa-
tional environment and skill sensitivity of the industry. My model, while compatible with the
presence of homophily eﬀects in informal search, shows for example that informal hiring chan-
nels may generate a better or worse pool of applicants, depending on the relative importance
to the firm for hiring a skilled versus unskilled worker and depending on the informational
6For example, referral by friends and family may be preferred by non-profit and religious organizations be-
cause valued attributes such as motivation and shared ideology are more diﬃcult to assess through formal methods
(Mosca and Pastore, 2009).
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diﬀerences between search methods.
1.1 One-Channel Hiring in Chapter 2
In Chapter 2 I study a model with a single application channel. I introduce a constant returns
to scale industry in which a single firm chooses a hiring policy by weighing the relative gain
from a high-quality worker against the odds of a given applicant being low-quality.7 I study
Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous move game. At a cost, workers endogenously determine
the probability that the firm sees their application. When calculating the odds of an applicant
being low-quality, the firm is able to condition on the “report” which is an exogenous noisy
informative signal conveyed by a worker’s application. The firm is also able to condition on
the event of the application’s arrival. The event of arrival can be viewed as an endogenous
noisy signal of quality, because the relative strategies chosen by low and high types adjust the
quality composition of the pool of applicants relative to that of the general population. This
hiring channel will correspond to the “informal” hiring channel in Chapter 3. In this setting,
the increase in arrival probability can be interpreted as arising from activities such as asking
friends and relatives for help, attending networking events, or building stronger relationships
with influential people. When connecting a worker to the firm, it may not always be the case
that social contacts provide noisy information to the firm. However as found by Pallais and
Sands (2016), referred workers may be of higher than average productivity. Therefore the
“report” received by the firm may be the strength of homophily as discussed in Section 3.1.1, or
any other eﬀect (apart from chosen eﬀort) through which applicants reaching the firm through
the informal channel have a systematically higher quality.
Daley and Green (2014) also study a model in which a costly action providing information
about the sender’s type is accompanied by a second source of exogenous information. In
7I will take the wage as given. A fixed wage may be due to limitations such as might be imposed by a union,
internal pay structures, legislation, or competition with other industries. I consider the eﬀects of adjusting the
wage in Section 2.3.2.
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particular, they consider a variation of the unproductive education model of Spence (1973) such
that a public but imperfect “grade” is also available to potential employers. Related adaptations
include Feltovich et al. (2002) and Weiss (1983). The endogenous and exogenous sources of
information considered in my model diﬀer from these because the worker is able only to choose
a probability of arrival, rather than a fixed observable quantity of education, and the noisy report
of a worker’s quality is observed only if his application successfully arrives, rather than a grade
being publicly available regardless of a worker’s education choice.8
Although I do not assume any diﬀerence in arrival costs for high- and low-quality workers,
I find that endogenous arrival leads to positive selection in general. That is, whenever arrival
is non-zero, the quality composition of the applications received by the firm either coincides
with the quality composition of the general population, or is more favourable. For all situations
of “absolute” hiring, in which the firm will indiscriminately accept all applications it receives,
both worker types have identical marginal benefit from arrival. For all situations of “selective”
hiring, in which the firm will accept only some applications which arrive and reject others, the
probability of being accepted with a high report must be strictly higher than the probability
of being accepted with a low report, because reports are informative. Therefore the marginal
benefit of arrival must be higher for high types, and they will be willing to put more eﬀort into
arrival than low types. Thus informative screening with reports can induce positive selection
into the pool of applicants. Similarly, Michelacci and Suarez (2006) show that an improved
pool of applicants can also arise as a result of wage bargaining when the firm observes the
quality of workers. As in my model, this gives high-productivity workers a higher expected
return conditional on arrival.
Unlike standard separating equilibria in which one type may engage in the costly action
while the other type does not, I find that the arrival probabilities chosen by worker types are
either both zero or both non-zero.9 This is because unlike wasteful education, arrival has
8Noisy signalling models have been considered in Matthews and Mirman (1983) and Carlsson and Dasgupta
(1997). Jeitschko and Normann (2012) study the relationship between deterministic and noisy signalling models.
9Jeitschko and Normann (2012) find a similar property in their noisy signalling model, that both types choose
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intrinsic value for any worker whenever the firm follows a non-zero hiring policy, so that any
worker type will find it worthwhile when the marginal cost is not too high, and it is because
worker incentives will diﬀer only when the firm rejects some applications. This means that
low types can not be discouraged from arrival if the firm believes applications only arrive
from high-quality types, because this would lead the firm to accept all applications received
regardless of report.
I describe the hiring environment in terms of the profitability of the industry, which I de-
termine by comparing the firm’s relative gain from a high- as opposed to low-quality worker
against the quality composition of the general population. This is an indication of the firm’s
sensitivity to quality, which comprises an important dimension of firm heterogeneity next to
screening ability because a firm’s ability to discern quality is only important to the extent that it
has a need to correctly identify quality. Even when outliers are rare, correct identification may
be crucial, depending on the nature of the job and skill in question. Firms may be more sensitive
to worker quality for example in innovative industries where product payoﬀ has high variance
(Andersson et al., 2009) or when filling positions which are strategically critical to the business
(Huselid and Becker, 2006). Consistent with Rees’ prediction, in a perfectly mixed population
with equal arrival probabilities, report accuracy (“intensive” information) has a greater impact
on the expected value per hire the greater is the variation between high and low productivities.
Additionally, the firm will tend to ignore reports in its hiring decision when there is a strong
enough prevalence of one worker type in the general population, which signifies an eﬀectively
homogenous skill level in the population.
I provide conditions for the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria according to the
profitability of the industry and screening power of reports. Brencˇicˇ (2012) also identifies
sensitivity to quality and ability to discern quality as important factors in the firm’s choice of
wage determination method. She observes that wage-posting is more likely for jobs with low-
level or easy-to-measure skills, high firm search costs (and therefore less selective standards),
a strictly positive level of action.
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or when applicants will be screened by agencies. She interprets these factors as evidence that
the firm is not very concerned about an adverse pool of applicants, which wage-posting is likely
to generate according to Michelacci and Suarez. I find that pure strategy equilibria may not
always exist, but mixed equilibria generally exist except when the profitability of the industry
is very low. I provide a characterization of equilibria and show that the quality composition
of the pool of applicants is generally less favourable the more permissive is the firm’s hiring
policy.
Within equilibria with selective hiring, I find complementarity between the screening power
of reports and the quality composition of the pool of applicants. That is, I find that when the
firm’s screening technology improves, the positive selection eﬀect of applications is stronger.
This is due to the fact that the informativeness of reports is the source of the divergent marginal
benefits of arrival for high- and low-quality workers. In contrast, Daley and Green show that
education is used by high types to substitute for grades when grades are insuﬃciently infor-
mative. A change in report error influences the firm’s hiring policy, both directly and through
its eﬀect on the pool of applicants. Due to its complementarity with the pool of applicants,
improved screening power can encourage the firm to hire high-report applicants. This may
lead to more or less permissive hiring overall; in an industry with very low profitability the
firm may become willing to accept more applicants based on their high report, whereas in an
industry with a suﬃciently high general profitability, improved screening will lead the firm to
reject more low-report applicants.10
I relate the use of applications in equilibrium to the types of value they provide, as a means
of connection (a “door”), as a source of direct information (a “report”), or as a source of indi-
rect information through endogenous selection (a “signal”). I find that for industries with high
profitability applications have primary value as a door; all applications are accepted by the firm
regardless of any direct information transmitted, and no indirect information is conveyed by
10Dineen and Williamson (2012) find evidence that worker awareness of firm screening may induce a better
pool of job applicants through self-selection.
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applications because they are used equally by all workers. For industries with intermediate
and low levels of profitability, I find that the firm does makes use of direct information to hire
selectively and that workers do not use applications equally. Although both industry scenar-
ios exhibit similar patterns in the use of applications, they are qualitatively diﬀerent in their
functions. For a low profitability firm applications have primary value as a signal, because
in the absence of any endogenous selection bias, the firm would not be willing to accept any
applicants. For a firm with intermediate profitability, selective hiring could persist on the basis
of direct information conveyed by reports alone.
Finally I present comparative static and welfare results for parameter changes. In particular
I find that increased wages aﬀect the firm’s profit directly due to the increased cost of labour,
and also indirectly due to changes in worker incentives. This indirect eﬀect comprises not only
an eﬀect on the volume of applicants (and the subsequent volume of hires) but also an eﬀect on
the relative volume of high- and low-quality applicants. I explore how the latter is aﬀected by
the cost of accessing the firm, and additional results on this are provided in Chapter 4. Finally
I show that alternative timing of the model leads to qualitatively similar equilibrium patterns in
the use of applications according to the profitability of the industry and screening technology.
1.2 Two-Channel Hiring in Chapter 3
In Chapter 3 I extend the model to two hiring channels; one, the “informal” channel, has costly
endogenous arrival of applications with an exogenous noisy signal as in Chapter 2. The other,
the “formal” channel, is equally available to all with an exogenous connection probability, and
conveys an exogenous noisy signal of worker quality which is distinct from that of the informal
channel.
Although an endogenous or exogenous arrival probability may be descriptive of either for-
mal or informal search methods depending on the specific situation, I will study the worker’s
choice of informal arrival and assume exogenous formal arrival. Access to the formal channel
Introduction 9
may be equally available to all by law (for example in the public sector), or it could be that di-
mensions in which eﬀort can be applied do not aﬀect arrival rates (such as polishing a resume).
I discuss the issue of interpretation of these channels in Section 3.1.1. Equal availability is
also consistent with the common interpretation of the formal channel as search through “hir-
ing intermediaries,” for example public or private agencies such as the Public Labor Exchange
(Plesca, 2010) or online outsourcing agencies (Stanton and Thomas, 2016) and job boards
(Faberman and Kudlyak, 2016). The exogenous noisy signal in the formal channel can be
interpreted for example as the assessment of the candidate by a human resource professional
based on the interview and presented credentials. I assume that formal and informal hiring
decisions are made separately from each other, with no comparison of information. Such sepa-
ration does occur in some contexts, for example in hiring public school teachers (Naper, 2010)
and workers for retail chains (Deller and Sandino, 2016). Addressing a joint hiring decision
results in a significantly more complicated model and is discussed in Section 3.4.3.
Similar to the complementarity exhibited in the single-channel model, the quality compo-
sition of informal applicants improves when the screening power of informal reports improves.
However, there is an adverse eﬀect on the quality composition of informal applicants when
formal reports increase in screening power. This is because the screening power of formal re-
ports gives a relative advantage to high-types in the chance of being hired formally, relatively
reducing their reliance on costly informal arrival. Thus formal information can substitute for
signalling through the noisy informal channel, as grades can substitute for signalling in Daley
and Green (2014).
Given this conflicting influence of formal and informal information on the quality composi-
tion of the informal channel, I find that the informal pool is not necessarily favourable (or even
neutral).11 To illustrate, suppose the firm hires selectively in both formal and informal chan-
nels. If the formal application arrives with certainty, the informal pool will be unfavourable
11These results could explain the existence of diverse findings regarding quality of referred applicants men-
tioned previously (Fafchamps and Moradi, 2015; Duran and Morales, 2014; Fernandez and Weinberg, 1997;
Bentolila et al., 2010; Burks et al., 2015).
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when the informal report has weaker screening power than the formal report. If the formal
application is not certain to arrive, the informal pool will be unfavourable when the screening
power of the formal report is suﬃciently stronger than that of the informal report.
Given how the informal pool responds to diﬀerent combinations of formal and informal hir-
ing patterns, I characterize the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria according to diﬀering
use of the informal channel. I find that when the formal report screening power is high, hiring
equilibria with an unfavourable informal pool can be sustained provided that the incentive for
high types to use the informal channel is not too weak relative to low types. I also find that not
all formal and informal hiring patterns are compatible with each other. Whenever hiring can
not be supported in the formal channel, the informal channel can not sustain absolute hiring.
This is because an industry in which formal hiring is not used must have very low profitabil-
ity. Yet absolute informal hiring necessarily induces a weakly unfavourable pool composition,
which can not be tolerated for an industry with low profitability. Also, selective hiring in one
channel can occur alongside absolute hiring in the other channel only when the other channel
has inferior reports.
In a related model, Casella and Hanaki (2008) study the eﬀect of adding a second channel
with potential for signalling to the referral hiring model introduced by Montgomery (1991).
In their expanded model, endogenous signalling occurs through the formal channel rather than
the informal channel, and the two channels also operate with sequential timing; if a worker
does not receive an oﬀer through referrals in the informal channel, at a cost he has the option
to attempt certification before entering the open market. Success is more likely for high types
so obtaining certification is a noisy indication of quality. In contrast to my model, wages are
endogenous and all workers will be given a job oﬀer eventually. In this setting endogenous
signalling has informational value only, and makes no diﬀerence in achieving a connection
with the firm.12
12I am not aware of any other papers with asymmetric information and heterogeneous workers with enodgenous
use of the informal channel. Other related literature will be discussed in Section 1.4.
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The addition of formal certification has no eﬀect on the pool of informal applicants in
their model, because connection with the firm through referrals in the informal channel occurs
deterministically according to homophily eﬀects. However, if certification is suﬃciently infor-
mative, Casella and Hanaki find that the addition of formal certification can shut down the use
of referrals when the cost of attempting is within a restricted range. In my model, informal
hiring can similarly disappear in equilibrium in the presence of selective formal hiring when
formal reports are suﬃciently informative relative to informal reports. These similar findings
have diﬀerent underlying causes. In Casella and Hanaki, productive types expect higher wages
on the formal market than what they can be oﬀered through referrals, whereas in my model the
quality of the pool deteriorates too much as productive types save on search costs.
Although they find that certification can eliminate use of referrals, Casella and Hanaki argue
that the use of referrals is resilient to the presence and informativeness of formal certification,
and that use of certification can increase referral hiring in equilibrium. They also show that
in many cases firms strictly prefer to hire through referrals when homophily eﬀects are strong,
even when certification is a perfectly informative signal. In my model, because the addition of
the formal channel lowers the volume and quality composition of informal applicants, use of
the formal channel generally leads to decreased use of the informal channel and does not clearly
improve profit for the firm. Similarly, since improved formal screening has an adverse eﬀect
on the pool of informal applicants, it tends to reduce the firm’s hiring in the informal channel.
Restrictions on informal hiring have also been predicted to have adverse welfare eﬀects by
Igarashi (2016) in the context of random search, since the resultant increase in formal job
postings can be outweighed by a greater number of unemployed workers in the job queue and
increased search frictions.
The assumption that the firm delegates hiring to independent hiring departments leads to
the issue that the objective of the decision-makers is not always perfectly aligned with the
objective of the firm.13 I discuss this assumption and also the welfare and comparative static
13Hoﬀman et al. (2016) provide empirical evidence of this issue with human resource managers.
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implications of the availability of a second hiring channel. I find that non-monotonicity in the
parameter eﬀects of this model is common, and the nature of the specific relationship between
cost and arrival probability is a significant factor in the technical conditions for comparative
static and welfare predictions.
1.3 Applying Job Contacts in Chapter 4
In order to understand the relationship between cost and informal arrival probability and gain
intuition for its eﬀect on equilibrium outcomes in the context of job contacts, Chapter 4 models
this relationship explicitly as the outcome of a networking process and applies it in the two-
channel model. The worker invests in costly networking, the intensity of which determines
his application’s probability of arrival. I study in particular the case where each contact in
a worker’s network gives access to the firm with equal independent probability. This arrival
probability is similar to the form of the arrival probability arising from models of information
transmission with endogenous job contact network formation based on graph theory such as in
Calvo-Armengol (2004) and in Galeotti and Merlino (2014).
I find that networking costs have an intensifying eﬀect on the pool of informal applicants;
in situations where the informal pool is favourable, increased networking costs improve the
informal pool composition further, whereas in situations where low-quality workers network
more, increased networking costs exacerbate this imbalance. This amplification of the pool
composition occurs because although increased costs reduce the incentive to network for both
worker types, the reduced incentive has a relatively greater eﬀect at lower levels of networking.
This means that as technological advances or social innovations decrease networking costs,
the informal channel loses value as a signal, and for low profitability industries which rely
primarily on the value of networking as a signal, the informal channel may cease to function
entirely.14
14Emergence of online social networks, such as LinkedIn, have likely reduced the costs of networking, but also
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Although I focus on a particular class of arrival function, I find that this amplification eﬀect
of the cost of networking holds additionally for any networking scenario which has a loga-
rithmically concave marginal probability of arrival, which means that the marginal returns to
networking do not diminish too rapidly relative to the arrival probability. Although I show that
an amplification eﬀect of networking costs is not universal, I find that it does appear to be sat-
isfied even more generally for some distributions where this suﬃcient condition of logarithmic
concavity does not hold.
I apply the cost and arrival structure arising from this networking scenario to the existence
conditions and comparative static and welfare results of the two-channel model. Due to the
amplification eﬀect of the cost of networking, in order to support equilibria in which the in-
formal channel’s primary value is based on the report, the cost of networking must not be too
high. In order to support equilibria in which the informal channel has primary value as a signal,
the cost of networking must be suﬃciently high as well as not too high. My results suggest
the importance of separating diﬀerent types of job contacts and referrals in empirical studies
which diﬀer substantially in the cost of their development and use, such as friends and family
versus professional connections, which are typically grouped together.
In the case where contacts provide access to the firm with equal independent probability, I
find that reduced networking costs improve profits in high-profitability industries and reduce
profits in low-profitability industries. This is because lowered costs increase the volume of
informal applicants but reduce the ability of informal arrival to signal quality, which is only an
acceptable trade-oﬀ when the firm does not need to watch quality very closely.
In contrast to the eﬀect of networking costs, I find that wages have a moderating eﬀect on
the informal pool composition; when the informal pool is favourable, increased wages worsen
the quality of informal applicants. In particular, the eﬀect on the pool composition of an in-
crease in wages is opposite and proportional to the eﬀect of an increase in networking cost.
improved the firms’ screening abilities, implying an overall ambiguous eﬀect on viability and eﬀectiveness of
informal hiring (Garg and Telang, 2016).
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Since wages aﬀect profits both directly through the increased cost of labour and indirectly
through the volume and composition of the informal pool of applicants, the eﬀect of wages
on profits is ambiguous. However, in the case where contacts provide access to the firm with
equal independent probability, higher wages lead to reduced profit for the firm overall for low-
profitability industries due to the adverse eﬀect through the pool of applicants and the negative
direct eﬀect.
1.4 Additional Related Literature
There is a growing amount of research incorporating the use of informal methods into search
and matching models of the labour market in order to better understand the eﬀects of referrals
and social networks. In the context of equally productive workers, Mortensen and Vishwanath
(1994) introduce the possibility of receiving indirect oﬀers through employed workers in addi-
tion to direct oﬀers in a search market. Their model generates higher wages and longer tenure
for jobs obtained through contacts. Although connections are not modeled explicitly, higher
wages are also predicted for those workers who are “better connected” when referral arrival
rates are taken to be heterogeneous. The recent model by Arbex et al. (2016) is similar and
accounts for the complexity of explicit network structure, although each worker’s network size
is determined exogenously.
Addressing direct versus indirect job oﬀers in a matching model, Galenianos (2014) re-
lates diﬀerences in referral use to variations in aggregate matching eﬃciency across industries.
Within a similar framework Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2005) consider a more involved pro-
cess of job information transmission through referrals in order to relate job matches to network
size, as additional contacts both increase opportunities and introduce rivalry.15 In both cases,
workers are also homogenous in productivity and networks. Galeotti and Merlino (2014) and
Galenianos (2017) allow for endogenous networks. The former studies the eﬀect of labour
15This is consistent with the networking dynamic introduced in Calvo-Armengol (2004).
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conditions on the use and eﬀectiveness of symmetric networks. In the latter, workers also have
diﬀerent productivities, but types are known to the firm.16
Following the graph-theoretic network formation literature, Calvo-Armengol (2004) relates
network structure to information flow and aggregate unemployment and analyzes equilibrium
with non-cooperative network formation. Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2007) also apply en-
dogenous networks in the context of the labour market. Allowing for formation and dissolution
of links over time, they find that diﬀerences in initial network states can lead to wage inequal-
ities. While these models account for endogeneity in referral use, the firm’s perspective is not
modelled in the labour market, as wage oﬀers are exogenous and there is no heterogeneity in
the productivity of workers.
Lester andWolthoﬀ (2012) study hiring strategies for firms with diﬀerent screening abilities
when worker skill is heterogeneous and DeVaro (2005) proposes a wage-posting game in which
the firm trades oﬀ hiring speed and match quality in its decision to use formal versus informal
recruitment methods.17 However, the eﬀect of informal channels and endogenous networks on
the firm’s hiring decision has received less focus in general.
16See also Stupnytska and Zaharieva (2015).
17See also Board et al. (2017).
Chapter 2
One-Channel Model of Hiring
In Section 2.1 I introduce a constant-returns-to-scale industry in which a single firm decides
whether or not to accept workers whose applications arrive. I focus on a simultaneous move
game between this firm and workers. To maximize profits the firm compares the relative gain
from a high-quality worker against the odds of a given applicant being low-quality when mak-
ing its hiring decision. When calculating the odds of an applicant being low-quality, the firm
may use its prior belief (based on the quality composition of the general population) or also
condition this prior on other information if it is available. I consider two diﬀerent sources of
information by which the firm can update this prior. First, I suppose the firm is able to condi-
tion the odds of an applicant being low-quality on the event of the application’s arrival. This
is useful if for any reason applications from high- and low-quality workers do not arrive to the
firm in the same proportions relative as the proportion of high- and low-quality workers in the
population (as may occur in equilibrium). I describe the composition of the pool of applicants
as being “favourable” or “unfavourable” in comparison to the composition of the general pop-
ulation. Second, I suppose the firm is able to condition on the “report” which is an exogenous
noisy informative signal conveyed by a worker’s application. I describe the hiring environment
in terms of the “general profitability” of the industry, determined by the relative gain from high
workers and quality composition of the general population, and the “decisiveness” of an ap-
16
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plication’s report information, determined by the screening power of reports in relation to the
industry’s general profitability.
In Section 2.2 I introduce the application decision of workers. At a cost, workers choose the
probability that the firm sees their application. Therefore arrival can be viewed as an endoge-
nous noisy signal of quality, because the diﬀerences in the choices by low and high types lead
to adjustment in the quality composition of the pool of applicants relative to that of the gen-
eral population. Thus workers choose the arrival probability of their applications in response
to the firm’s hiring strategy, while the firm chooses its hiring strategy in response to the ap-
plication arrival probabilities of workers. Allowing for the firm to simultaneously incorporate
information about both the endogenous noisy signal determined by worker strategies and the
exogenous noisy signal determined by application reports, I show how arrival costs together
with the hiring environment determine hiring patterns and application arrivals in equilibrium.
I look at mixed strategy Nash equilibria with non-zero arrival probabilities. I show that
for industries with high general profitability, applications function as a simple “doorway” to
the firm, with the firm accepting all applications which arrive, and applications arriving from
high and low-quality workers in proportion identical to the composition of the population. I
find that for all situations of selective hiring, in which the firm accepts only some applicants,
the quality composition of the pool of applicants is favourable relative to that of the general
population. I show that for intermediate levels of general profitability selective hiring patterns
can be supported on the basis of the screening power of reports alone. I show that selective
hiring patterns can also be supported for low levels of general profitability, provided that there
is a suﬃciently favourable adjustment of the composition of the pool of applicants.
Although in both situations of selective hiring the direct information conveyed by reports
is useful to the firm, and the arrival of an application is itself a signal of quality, I interpret the
function of applications diﬀerently. When reports are decisive, applications are inherently a
useful “source of information.” This means that although the firm certainly benefits from an
improved pool of applicants, the report itself would enable the firm to hire even if the pool
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quality were neutral. In contrast, when general profitability is very low the firm is able to
use selective hiring to promote high-quality workers to “signal” through arrival, owing to the
advantage given to high-quality workers by the firm’s use of reports.
In Section 2.3 I investigate the eﬀects of parameter changes in this model on equilibrium
outcomes and welfare. I find complementarity between the screening power of reports and the
quality composition of the pool of applicants within equilibria with selective hiring. Due to
conflicting influences on the cost of labour, the volume of hires, and sometimes also the quality
composition of hires, I find that higher wages may increase or decrease firm profits. Finally, I
discuss alternative wage-setting and timing with commitment model variations.
2.1 Basic Hiring Framework
I consider a constant-returns-to-scale industry with a population of workers seeking employ-
ment with one representative firm. The firm’s profit from a worker depends on that worker’s
quality type q ∈ {h, ℓ}. This reflects his skill within that industry, high or low, and is pri-
vate information. However, the proportion of high-quality workers in the general population,
s ∈ (0, 1) is exogenous and known to all.
The value to the firm of a worker of quality q is vq, with vh > vℓ and vℓ > 0. I suppose
that the firm pays a fixed wage w > 0, so the profit from a high-quality worker is vq−w and
the profit from a low-quality worker is vℓ−w. The fixed wage may be due to limitations such
as might be imposed by a union, internal pay structures, legislation, or competition with other
industries not modelled here. I will take w ∈ (vℓ, vh), in which case hiring a high-quality worker
is a gain to the firm and hiring a low-quality worker is a loss.1 The firm’s expected profit from
a worker which it believes to be high-quality with probability µ ∈ [0, 1] is
1If w ≥ vh hiring can never be profitable for the firm whereas if w ≤ vℓ, the firm maximizes profit by accepting
every application.
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Eq[vq − w] = µ(vh−w) − (1−µ)(w−vℓ). (2.1)
Let d ∈ {0, 1} indicate a hiring decision for the firm when it considers an individual application,
so that d = 1 represents a decision to accept the applicant, and d = 0 represents a decision to
reject the applicant. I assume constant returns to scale technology for the firm, thus there is no
competition between individual workers and the firm is willing to accept a given applicant as
long as the expected profit from hiring that applicant is not negative. Thus d = 1 is (weakly)
optimal for the firm if and only if
µ(vh−w) − (1−µ)(w−vℓ) ≥ 0 (2.2)
And d = 0 is (weakly) optimal for the firm if and only if
µ(vh−w) − (1−µ)(w−vℓ) ≤ 0. (2.3)
For any strictly positive belief µ > 0 we may instead write
d = 1 if and only if
vh−w
w−vℓ ≥ O(ℓ:h) (2.4)
and
d = 0 if and only if
vh−w
w−vℓ ≤ O(ℓ:h), (2.5)







Thus the firm’s decision follows a cutoﬀ rule. We see that the firm can have positive ex-
pected profits from hiring if and only if the relative gain to the firm from hiring a high-quality
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worker exceeds the odds that a given applicant is low-quality. If the firm’s belief µ is updated
by conditioning on some new information, then the prior odds in inequalities (2.4) and (2.5)
are also updated according to Bayes’ Rule. It is then the case that the firm’s conditioned ex-
pected profits from hiring are positive if and only if the relative gain from a high-quality worker
exceeds the conditional (posterior) odds that the applicant is low-quality. I will now consider
three situations: first when the firm has no additional information, second when information
can be deduced from the relative arrival of applications from high- and low-type workers, and
third, when applications themselves bear explicit reports of information.
2.1.1 Hiring from the General Population
In the absence of any additional information and assuming that all workers are equally likely
to have their application reach the firm, the firm’s belief that a given applicant is high-quality
will match the probability that a random worker drawn from the population is high-quality,
µ = s. In this case the odds that an applicant is low-quality, O(ℓ:h), correspond to the quality
composition of the general population,
1−s
s












Given vh, vℓ,w and s for a particular industry setting, the resulting relationship between the
firm’s relative gain from a high-quality worker and the quality composition of the population
defines an important industry characteristic in my model, because it gives an indication of how
profitable the industry would be in general if the firm were to employ all workers.
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When the industry is “generally profitable,” the firm would profit in expectation by hiring
workers drawn randomly from the population. When the industry is “generally unprofitable,”
the firm would make negative profit in expectation by hiring workers drawn randomly from
the population. Therefore, in the absence of any additional information about applicants, it
is strictly optimal for the firm to choose d = 1 when the industry is generally profitable, and
strictly optimal for the firm to choose d = 0 when the industry is generally unprofitable.
Two factors influence the general profitability of the industry. First, the industry may be
generally profitable because the industry wage is close to the productivity of the low-quality
workers. This reduces the loss of profit from employing a low-quality worker, w−vℓ, while
increasing the gain from a high-quality hire, vh−w. Second, the industry may be generally
profitable the more abundant are high-quality workers in the population, so that s is higher and
1−s is lower. High-quality workers may be more prevalent in the population when the relevant
job skills are common, for example, or when training is easily accessible.
2.1.2 Information About the Pool of Applicants
Suppose that the firm is not automatically aware of individual workers and makes a hiring
decision only upon receiving an application. Suppose in addition that worker’s application
reaches the firm with some probability which may vary according to type, pq. I call this the
“arrival probability.” Arrival probabilities may diﬀer by type for a variety of reasons, including
diﬀerences on either the transmitting or receiving end, and these diﬀerences may or may not be
endogenous. One worker type may be more likely to know how to apply, or be willing to devote
more eﬀort to apply, or one type’s application may be less likely to become lost or go unnoticed
(eﬀorts more likely to result in the firm becoming aware of interest/availability). I will develop
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my model with endogenous arrival probabilities, and later link them to an underlying network
structure. Whatever the underlying reasons, whenever arrival probabilities diﬀer by type, the
firm’s hiring decision will be influenced not only by the proportion of high- and low-quality
workers in the population, but also by ph, and pℓ.
Provided that the arrival probability for high types is not zero, ph > 0, the firm can update
the odds that a given application comes from a low-quality worker according to Bayes’ Rule,
by conditioning the odds on the event that the application has arrived. Let A denote the event
of the application’s arrival. The updated conditional (posterior) odds are equal to the prior
odds times Bayes’ factor, O(ℓ:h|A) = O(ℓ:h) · Λ(ℓ:h|A). The prior odds will correspond to the
population-based odds, O(l:h) =
1−s
s
, while Bayes’ factor will be determined by the relative





















I will refer to Bayes’ factor in this case,Λ(ℓ:h|A) = pℓ
ph
, as the “pool adjustment factor” because
it determines the quality composition bias of the pool of applicants relative to the general
population.
Definition 2. The pool of applicants is “neutral” if pℓ
ph
= 1.
When the pool of applicants is “neutral,” the quality composition of the pool of applicants
exactly matches the quality composition of the general population because high- and low-
quality applicants arrive with equal probabilities. When the pool is neutral, the firm can deduce
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no new information based on the event of an application’s arrival and the firm’s optimal strategy
is determined entirely by the general profitability of the industry.
Definition 3. The pool of applicants is “favourable” if pℓ
ph
< 1.
When the pool of applicants is “favourable,” its quality composition is superior to the qual-
ity composition of the general population, and the posterior odds of an applicant being low-
quality are lower than the prior population-based odds. The improved pool composition allows
hiring to be optimal for a greater range of industry settings, in the sense that inequality (2.8)
can be satisfied for lower relative gain ratio
vh−w
w−vℓ than inequality (2.6). In particular, a firm
may hire despite the general unprofitability of the industry if applications from low-types arrive
with suﬃciently less probability than applications from high-types. In a generally profitable
industry, a favourable pool adjustment factor makes no diﬀerence to the firm’s hiring decision
because the relative gain from a high-quality worker is already high enough that the firm profits
from hiring even if the pool of applicants were no better than the general population. This is
seen from the fact that inequality (2.8) implies inequality (2.6) when
pℓ
ph
< 1. Although the
firm’s hiring decision itself is not aﬀected in this case, the firm’s expected profits are of course
higher when low-quality workers are less likely to send applications than when ph = pℓ.
Definition 4. The pool of applicants is “unfavourable” if pℓ
ph
> 1.
When the pool of applicants is “unfavourable,” its quality composition is inferior to the
quality composition of the general population. The posterior odds of an applicant being low-
quality are higher than the prior population-based odds. This deters the firm from hiring in as
wide a range of industry settings, in the sense that inequality (2.8) cannot be satisfied for quite
as low relative gain ratio
vh−w
w−vℓ as inequality (2.6). In particular, if
pℓ
ph
is suﬃciently high the
firm may not hire even when the industry is generally profitable. Given an unfavourable pool
bias in a generally unprofitable industry the firm will, of course, remain unwilling to hire.
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2.1.3 Noisy Reports of Quality




= 1, but that the firm gains information from the content of the ap-
plication. Suppose that applications carry a report which is a noisy signal of worker quality,
R ∈ {H, L}. Rather than altering the composition of the pool of applicants, this allows the
firm to make separate hiring decisions for each report realization, choosing dH ∈ {0, 1} given
R = H and dL ∈ {0, 1} given R = L. In each case, the posterior odds that the worker is low-
quality are obtained by conditioning the prior odds on the realization of the report received,
O(ℓ:h|R) = O(ℓ:h) · Λ(ℓ:h|R).
Bayes’ factor in this situation, Λ(ℓ:h|R) = Pr(R|ℓ)
Pr(R|h) , is determined by the relative probability
that the realized report came from a low-quality worker. For R = H it is the relative probability
that the report is an error, while for R = L it is the relative probability that the report is true.
Assuming that type I and type II errors occur with the same probability ε ∈ (0, 12 ), we will have
Λ(ℓ:h|H) = ε
1−ε and Λ(ℓ:h|L) =
1−ε
ε
. If the firm’s prior odds are based on the composition
of the general population, O(ℓ:h) =
1−s
s
, then it is optimal for the firm to accept high-report
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Since reports are positively correlated with type, due to ε <
1
2
, a high report lowers the
odds that the applicant is low-quality, while a low report increases those odds. Therefore a
high report may decrease the posterior odds of low-quality suﬃciently for the firm to hire
high-report applicants in a generally unprofitable industry, as long as the probability that the
report is true, 1−ε, is high enough. Similarly a low report may increase the posterior odds of
low-quality suﬃciently for the firm to reject low-report applicants in a profitable industry, as
long as the probability that the report is true, ε, is high enough.
Note also that because the odds of an applicant being low-quality are always higher given
a low report than given a high report, inequality (2.10) is always satisfied if inequality (2.12) is
satisfied, so it can not be optimal for the firm to hire low-report applicants if it is not optimal to
hire high-report applicants. Therefore the firm’s optimal hiring decision follows one of three
patterns:
(i) “Absolute Hiring:” the firm hires all applicants regardless of report, dH = dL = 1,
(ii) “Selective Hiring:” the firm hires only applicants with high reports, dH = 1, dL = 0,
(iii) “No Hiring:” the firm rejects all applicants regardless of report, dH = dL = 0.
For an industry with a given relative gain ratio
vh−w
w−vℓ and neutral composition of applicants
1−s
s
, the report error ε determines when selective hiring is optimal for the firm (that is, when
the firm will hire according to the indication of the report) and when the firm will ignore the
report and hire according to the pattern it would adopt in the absence of any report.
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When the report is “decisive,” it is strictly optimal for the firm to hire high-report applicants
and rejects low-report applicants. The realization of R sways the firm’s decision relative to
the decision the firm would make when hiring from the general population; either the firm
hires high-report applicants when it would otherwise hire no applicants (such as in a generally
unprofiatble industry), or the firm rejects low-report applicants when it would otherwise accept














generally unprofitable generally profitable
R not decisive R decisive R not decisive
Figure 2.1: General Profitability and Report Decisiveness
The industry setting is described according to the firm’s relative gain ratio, report error, and general
population composition.
When the report is “not decisive,” its realization does not aﬀect the firm’s decision. The
firm will hire all applicants or none based solely on whether or not the industry is generally






1−ε , the firm will reject both applicants with R = H and applicants with R = L. When the







w−vℓ , the firm will
accept both applications with R = H and applications with R = L.
Assuming arrival probabilities are non-zero and do not diﬀer by type,
pℓ
ph
= 1, the firm’s
hiring strategy is chosen according to the region in Figure 2.1 in which the firm’s relative gain
ratio,
vh−w
w−vℓ , falls. When reports are not decisive and the industry is generally unprofitable, no
applicants are hired; dH = dL = 0 (“no hiring.”) When reports are decisive, the firm hires only
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high-report applicants; dH = 1 and dL = 0 (“selective hiring.”) When reports are not decisive
and the industry is generally profitable, all applicants are hired; dH = dL = 1 (“absolute
hiring.”) Since a larger report error reduces the extent to which the firm can rely on the report,
an increase in ε decreases the range for which the report is decisive, and therefore decreases
the range in which selective hiring is optimal.
2.2 Model Analysis
I now endogenize the application arrival probabilities of workers and examine the possible
equilibrium outcomes of the simultaneous move game when firms gain information about ap-
plicants from both endogenous diﬀerences in high- and low-type workers’ arrival probabilities
and from noisy reports of quality. I will first develop the firm’s best response given worker
choices of ph, pℓ, and then develop high- and low-type workers’ choices of ph, pℓ as a best
response to the firm’s hiring strategy. I will then discuss the existence and interpretation of
equilibria with hiring. I focus primarily on the simultaneous move game here because it is
often plausible to think that neither the firm nor the workers can commit in advance to their
strategies. However an alternative timing in which the firm chooses its strategy first is consid-
ered in Section 2.3.4.
2.2.1 Best Response for Firm
The firm’s strategy specifies a hiring decision for both high-report applications and low report
applications given the workers’ chosen arrival probabilities ph and pℓ. Since applications carry
a report of quality in addition to application arrival probabilities potentially diﬀering by type,
the firm can update its beliefs and O(ℓ:h) to account for both the event of the application’s
arrival and the observation of the report (given that the application was received). Apply-
ing Bayes’ rule twice gives the posterior odds O(ℓ:h|A∩R) = O(ℓ:h) · Λ(ℓ:h|A) · Λ(ℓ:h|A∩R).
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and the report adjustment factor is
Λ(ℓ:h|A∩R) = Pr(R|A∩ℓ)
Pr(R|A∩h) , which as before will be the relative probability that the report is
false when R = H and the relative probability that the report is true when R = L . The firm’s
best response, allowing for mixing when the firm is indiﬀerent between hiring and rejecting, is
characterized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Given ph ! 0 and R = H,

























Given ph ! 0 and R = L,




























For ph = 0 and pℓ > 0, the firm’s best response is dH(ph, pℓ) = dL(ph, pℓ) = 0. For ph = pℓ = 0,
any dH(ph, pℓ) ∈ [0, 1] with any dL(ph, pℓ) ∈ [0, 1] is optimal.
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When ph ! 0 so that the firm does receive applications from high-quality workers, the firm’s
best response given either report is unique except when
vh−w
w−vℓ = O(ℓ:h|A∩R) and the expected
profit of an applicant with report R is exactly zero so that the firm is indiﬀerent between hiring
and not hiring.
It is always the case that dH(ph, pℓ) ≥ dL(ph, pℓ) for ph ! 0, so in any equilibrium where
ph > 0, the firm’s hiring strategy can be summarized by d ∈ [0, 2] where d = dH(ph, pℓ) +




, the firm becomes more willing to hire the greater the relative gain
from a high quality worker. For very high
vh−w
w−vℓ the firm will hire all applicants, dH = dL = 1,
so d = 2. I will refer to this hiring pattern as “absolute hiring.” For moderate values of
vh−w
w−vℓ ,
the firm will hire high-report applicants only, dH = 1 and dL = 0, so d = 1. I will refer to
this hiring pattern as “selective hiring.” For very low
vh−w
w−vℓ , the firm will adopt a pattern of



















the firm is indiﬀerent concerning high-report applicants, the firm will mix accordingly between
















d = 0 d = 1 d = 2
d = α ∈ [0, 1] d = 1+β ∈ [1, 2]
Figure 2.2: Firm Hiring Patterns
The firm’s hiring strategy, summarized by d = dH + dL for a given pool adjustment, increases from “no
hiring” d = 0, to “selective hiring” d = 1, to “absolute hiring” d = 2, as the relative gain from a high
worker increases, through mixed hiring patterns in each transition.
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The information gained from adjustments to the pool of applicants aﬀects the firm’s hiring
decisions diﬀerently than information gained from a noisy report of quality. A reduction in the
relative arrival of low-quality applications
pℓ
ph
lowers the odds that both high- and low-report
applications are truly low-quality, whereas a reduction in report error lowers the odds that a
high-report applicant is truly low-quality, while raising the odds that a low-report applicant is
truly low-quality.
With a neutral pool adjustment factor,
pℓ
ph
= 1, the firm’s optimal hiring pattern would























Figure 2.1. A favourable pool adjustment factor
pℓ
ph
< 1 will shift (and in fact com-
press) the region of selective hiring to the left relative to the region of selective hiring given
ph = pℓ (> 0). In contrast, an unfavourable pool adjustment factor
pℓ
ph
> 1 will shift (and
spread) this region to the right. Similarly, a favourable pool adjustment factor will also expand
the region of absolute hiring to the left relative to neutral, while an unfavourable pool will
compress it to the right.




with ph, pℓ > 0, can be characterized by
d(Λ) =
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The firm’s optimal hiring correspondence d(Λ) is weakly decreasing in Λ.
2.2.2 Best Response for Workers
Now the workers’ arrival probabilities ph and pℓ (and therefore the direction of the pool ad-
justment) will be determined endogenously by workers in best response to the hiring pattern
chosen by the firm, according to their own expected utility maximization problem. Suppose
that there is some way workers may improve their application arrival probability, but that it is
costly. Let γ : [0, 1)→ R+, γ(p) denote the cost to a worker whose choice results in a probabil-
ity p of reaching the firm. I will assume γ is increasing, strictly convex, and twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, with γ(0) = 0. If a worker is hired he receives a wage w, and if not he receives
an unemployment benefit b < w. Therefore the expected utility of a worker of type q is
wΦq + b(1−Φq) − γ(pq) (2.21)
where Φq denotes the probability that a worker of type q is hired, which depends on the
worker’s arrival probability and the firm’s hiring strategy, so that Φq = Φq(pq, dH, dL). Pos-
sible alternatives to modelling the common unemployment benefit b and cost function γ(p) are
that a worker’s arrival costs or outside option may be type-dependent, such as γq(p) and bq. In
Chapter 3, I introduce the existence of a second hiring channel which I show can be considered
a special case of a type-dependent outside option for workers.
We obtain the probability of worker q being hired by multiplying the probability that his
application arrives to the firm, pq, by the probability that his application is accepted given that
it was received. This conditional acceptance probability, denoted φq(dH, dL), is the worker’s
expectation of the firm’s hiring decision. For a high-type worker,
φh(dH, dL) = dH(1−ε) + dLε (2.22)
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and for a low-type worker,
φℓ(dH, dL) = dHε + dL(1−ε). (2.23)
Substituting Φq(pq, dH, dL) = pq · φq(dH, dL) into equation (2.21) for q ∈ {h, ℓ} and rearranging,
we see that high-quality type chooses ph to maximize
(w−b)ph(dH(1−ε) + dLε) + b − γ(ph) (2.24)
and the low-quality type chooses pℓ to maximize
(w−b)pℓ(dHε + dL(1−ε)) + b − γ(pℓ). (2.25)
Therefore since γ is increasing and strictly convex, whenever limp→1 γ ′(p) is suﬃciently high
the high-quality worker’s optimal choice of ph must satisfy
(w−b)(dH(1−ε) + dLε) ≤ γ ′(ph), (2.26)
with equality if ph > 0, and the low-quality worker’s optimal choice of pℓ must satisfy
(w−b)(dHε + dL(1−ε)) ≤ γ ′(pℓ), (2.27)
with equality if pℓ > 0. Then, taking wˆ ≡ w−b, and denoting ψ ≡ γ ′−1, Lemma 3 characterizes
the best responses of workers.





wˆ(dH(1−ε) + dLε)) if wˆ(dH(1−ε) + dLε) > γ ′(0)
0 otherwise.
(2.28)
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wˆ(dHε + dL(1−ε)) if wˆ(dHε + dL(1−ε) > γ ′(0)
0 otherwise.
(2.29)
Therefore when worker best responses are non-zero, we may also express the composition
of the pool of applicants as a function of firm strategy d, as follows:
Lemma 4. Whenever ph(d), pℓ(d) > 0, the composition of the pool of applicants resulting from











(1−ε)d if d ∈ (0, 1]





εd if d ∈ (0, 1]
(1−ε)d − (1−2ε) if d ∈ [1, 2].
(2.32)
Since workers’ probabilities of acceptance φh(d) and φℓ(d) are increasing in d, both workers
have incentive to devote more eﬀort to application for higher d. However, the degree to which
eﬀort increases for each type (and the eﬀect this has on the pool composition) is aﬀected by
the given initial arrival probability of that type. Therefore depending on the curvature of γ,
the resulting pool composition may improve in response to greater hiring by the firm, or it
may degrade. This is formalized in the following Lemma and suﬃcient (but not necessary)
conditions are given under which the pool becomes more unfavourable when d increases.
Lemma 5. For d ∈ (0, 2] when ph(d), pℓ(d) > 0, Λ(d) may increase or decrease in d.
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(i) Suppose ψ is logarithmically concave. Then for d ∈ (1, 2), we have dΛ
dd
> 0




Consider mixed strategy Nash equilibria. A trivial equilibrium certainly always exists with
d∗H = d
∗




ℓ = 0. If no applications arrive to the firm, any firm strategy is a
best response; also choosing non-arrival is a best response for workers if the firm accepts no
applications.
Non-arrival can also be supported in equilibrium with other firm strategies, provided that
it is suﬃciently expensive for workers to increase the probability of their application’s arrival.
An equilibrium with d∗H = 1, d
∗




ℓ = 0 can also be supported whenever
wˆ(1 − ε) ≤ γ ′(0), because for either worker type, given the selective hiring pattern chosen by
the firm, the benefit from an increased chance of having their application arrive is not enough
to compensate for the cost. Similarly, if wˆ ≤ γ ′(0) then even absolute hiring, d∗H = d∗L = 1, can
be supported in equilibrium with p∗h = p
∗
ℓ = 0. I will now suppose that pq is not prohibitively
expensive and focus instead on equilibria in which at least some applications are received (p∗h
and p∗ℓ are not both zero).
Lemma 6. In any equilibrium in which hiring occurs, p∗h ≥ p∗ℓ > 0.
Proof. There can be no equilibria with hiring in which applications arrive to the firm from
only one worker type. If applications only arrive to the firm from low types, then dH = dL = 0,
which is incompatible with pℓ > 0. If applications only arrive to the firm from high types, then
dH = dL = 1, which is incompatible with pℓ > 0. Therefore any such equilibrium has p∗h > 0
and p∗ℓ > 0. Since from Lemma 1 we have that dH(ph, pℓ) ≥ dL(ph, pℓ) whenever ph > 0, then
we know that d∗H ≥ d∗L. By equations (2.28) and (2.29) this implies that p∗h ≥ p∗ℓ .
Chapter 2. One-Channel Model of Hiring 35
From now on I focus on equilibria in which hiring occurs. Therefore such equilibria must
have a favourable or neutral pool adjustment factor,
p∗ℓ
p∗h
≤ 1 and either absolute or selective
hiring (d∗H = d
∗
L = 1 or d
∗
H = 1, d
∗
L = 0) in pure strategies, or mixed hiring with dH = α ∈ (0, 1]
and dL = 0 or with dH = 1 and dL = β ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 1. Absolute Hiring in Equilibrium. An equilibrium in which p∗h, p∗ℓ > 0 and the
firm accepts all applicants, d∗H = d
∗
















This proposition describes the (non-trivial) equilibrium which arises in suﬃciently prof-
itable and suﬃciently noisy environments. In this equilibrium both types choose equal arrival
probabilities because for d∗H = d
∗
L = 1 both types are equally likely to be accepted conditional
on the arrival of their application. By equations (2.28) and (2.29), the arrival probability of
high and low types in such an equilibrium will be p∗h = p
∗
ℓ = ψ(wˆ). Thus the first condition,
wˆ > γ ′(0), ensures that indeed workers are willing to choose non-zero arrival probabilities, p∗h,
p∗ℓ > 0. The second condition ensures that the firm is willing to hire low-report applicants (and
therefore also high-report applicants) given that p∗h = p
∗
ℓ > 0. It reflects the requirement that








Proposition 2. Selective Hiring in Equilibrium. An equilibrium in which p∗h, p∗ℓ > 0 and only
high-report applicants are accepted, d∗H = 1, d
∗
























In any equilibrium with selective hiring and non-zero arrival probabilities, we will have
p∗h = ψ(wˆ(1−ε)) and p∗ℓ = ψ(wˆε). Since γ is convex, γ ′ is increasing. Therefore ψ is also
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increasing and p∗h > p
∗
ℓ . The condition wˆε > γ
′(0) ensures that both arrival probabilities will
indeed be strictly positive. Inequality (2.33) ensures that the firm’s selective hiring strategy is
compatible with the pool adjustment factor it generates; the relative gain from a high-quality
worker is enough to exceed the odds of a high-report applicant being low-quality, but not
enough to exceed the odds of a low-report applicant being low-quality.
Corollary 1. Multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria with non-zero arrival cannot co-exist.
This follows directly from Propositions 1 and 2. Workers have a unique non-zero best
response to any firm strategy, and the levels of relative gain
vh−w
w−vℓ for which absolute hiring can
be supported in equilibrium are disjoint from those for which selective hiring can be supported.
Corollary 2. A non-zero arrival pure strategy Nash equilibrium may fail to exist.
This also follows directly from Propositions 1 and 2. Taken together, they show that no
pure strategy Nash equilibrium with ph, pℓ > 0 can be supported for industries with a very low
























. For such industries the only pure
strategy equilibrium is the trivial equilibrium in which no hiring occurs. This is somewhat
unsurprising in the former case, that is for industries with very low relative gain, because of
their very low general profitability. For some forms of γ it may be possible that this region
of non-existence is very small, with
ψ(wˆε)
ψ(wˆ(1−ε)) ≈ 0 so that selective hiring induces a pool of
applicants that is suﬃciently favourable to outweigh the extreme general unprofitability of the
industry. But for general γ there will typically be a range of industries for which the relative
gain is simply too low for any hiring. Now in the latter case, the inability to sustain selective
or absolute hiring in equilibrium comes from the incompatibility of firm and worker strategies.
The firm’s relative gain is too high to support selective hiring in equilibrium (because given
the favourable pool factor resulting from selective hiring, the firm would deviate to hiring all
applicants) while at the same time the relative gain is not quite high enough to support absolute
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hiring in equilibrium (given the neutral pool factor that absolute hiring would generate). Since
profit is positive in any equilibrium with non-zero hiring, such a firm would certainly benefit
from hiring selectively if it could commit to such a strategy regardless of how attractive the
resulting pool would make it to hire absolutely. Some commitment cases are discussed in
Section 2.3.4. To some extent, the firm may be able to alleviate these problems and increase
the range of relative gain
vh−w
w−vℓ for which it can hire in equilibrium through the use of mixed
strategies.
Proposition 3. Mixing Between Selective and Absolute Hiring. An equilibrium in which p∗h,
p∗ℓ > 0 and d
∗
H = 1, d
∗


















ψ(wˆ((1−ε) + εβ)) .













Λ ≡ infβ∈(0,1) ψ(wˆ(ε + (1−ε)β))
ψ(wˆ((1−ε) + εβ)) .
Proposition 4. Mixing Between Selective and No Hiring. An equilibrium in which p∗h, p∗ℓ > 0
and d∗H = α, d
∗









































1−εΛ, where Λ ≡ infα∈(0,1)
ψ(wˆεα)









































Figure 2.3: Existence of Equilibria
An example of the range of pure strategy Nash equilibria with non-zero hiring is shown. An example
range of mixed equilibria existence for logarithmically concave ψ is also given.
Taking the results of Propositions 1-4 together, the following statements can be made regarding
the general existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria with non-zero arrival.
Corollary 3. Existence. Suppose γ′(p) > 0 for all p > 0. A Nash equilibrium with non-zero






1−εΛ where Λ = infα∈(0,1)
ψ(wˆεα)
ψ(wˆ(1−ε)α) .
Corollary 4. Uniqueness. Suppose a Nash Equilibrium with non-zero arrival exists. The































Λ and ψ is logarithmically concave, or
(iv) ψ has decreasing elasticity,
where Λ ≡ supα∈(0,1) ψ(wˆεα)ψ(wˆ(1−ε)α) , and Λ ≡ infβ∈(0,1)
ψ(wˆ(ε + (1−ε)β))
ψ(wˆ((1−ε) + εβ)) .
Assuming workers choose non-zero arrival probabilities, that is, assuming that ψ(wˆε) > 0,
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the range of existence for equilibria with selective hiring and absolute hiring can look diﬀer-
ent in diﬀerent cases. Figure 2.3 depicts the qualitative case where selective hiring can occur
when reports are decisive. In contrast, the range of existence for an equilibrium with selective
hiring could lie entirely within the industry region that is generally unprofitable with R not
decisive. This occurs in the case where the pool of applicants under selective hiring is suf-






. In this case there can be no pure strategy
hiring in equilibrium for any industry with decisive reports. Figure 2.3 also depicts a possible
qualitative range of existence for mixed strategy equilibria in cases when ψ is logarithmically
concave, assuming non-zero arrival probabilities. Only a possible range is shown as there can
be some variation depending on the specification for the cost function γ. To see this, consider
the following two examples which each follow directly from Propositions 1-4 for the given
functional forms of γ(p).
First, consider the case of quadratic arrival costs or for other powers greater than 2, such
that γ(p) = cpx (with constant c > 0).
Example 2.2.1. The characterization of non-zero hiring equilibria for γ(p) = cpx for x ≥ 2









x−1 then there exists no equilibrium with d∗H, d
∗
L > 0.










(iii) There exists an equilibrium with d∗H = 1, d
∗




















(iv) There exists a β ∈ (0, 1) such that d∗H = 1, d∗L = β is an equilibrium with some p∗h, p∗ℓ > 0
















(v) There exists an equilibrium with d∗H = d
∗
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Note that in this case the interval of existence for equilibria with d∗ = α is collapsed to a
























so the pool composition is






Second, consider γ(p) = −c ln(1−p) with constant c chosen such that first order conditions
in the worker’s optimization problem remain valid.2
Example 2.2.2. The characterization of equilibria for γ(p) = −c ln(1−p) with c < wε is as
follows:








(ii) There exists an equilibrium with d∗H = 1, d
∗


























)2 wˆε − c







(iv) There exists an equilibrium with d∗H = d
∗












For this γ it is the case that Λ = 0 and Λ = Λ1, so uniqueness holds on the whole range of
vh−w
w−vℓ . We have ψ(y) = 1 −
c
y
so the workers’ best responses are given by p∗h = 1 −
c
wˆφh(d)
and p∗ℓ = 1 −
c
wˆφℓ(d)
. The resulting pool composition is Λ(d) =
φh(d)
φℓ(d)
· wˆφℓ(d) − c
wˆφh(d) − c which is
increasing in d.
2Note that for both of these functional examples, ψ is logarithmically concave.
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2.2.4 Use and Function of Applications in Equilibrium
The previous section established that the equilibrium pool of applicants is always weakly
favourable, and showed which hiring patterns can be supported in which industry settings.
However there are qualitative diﬀerences between equilibria. In this section, I discuss the use
and usefulness of applications in equilibrium. First I discuss what constitutes higher use of ap-
plications in equilibrium, and then I identify the underlying function which applications serve
in diﬀerent settings.
The extent to which applications are used in equilibrium can be examined from three per-
spectives; the equilibrium use of applications by the firm, the equilibrium use of applications
by workers, and also the overall use of applications in equilibrium. In this model hiring occurs
solely through the application process, so we can understand the overall use of applications to
be the actual hiring that occurs in equilibrium.
For the firm, “using” applications can be understood as accepting applications when they
arrive. The firm’s use of applications in equilibrium is directly reflected in its hiring strategy;
greater acceptance corresponds to greater d∗. Note that the firm’s use of applications is distinct
from the usefulness of applications to the firm, which need not be associated with greater d∗.
For the workers, the use of applications is indicated by the worker’s application arriving
to the firm; greater equilibrium arrival probabilities p∗h, or p
∗
ℓ correspond to greater use of




for the overall use of applications in equilibrium because it influences the use of applications
by the firm. Meanwhile the absolute levels of use, p∗h and p
∗
ℓ , directly aﬀect the actual level of
hiring in equilibrium because only applications which arrive can be accepted.
The actual hiring of workers in equilibrium is the combined eﬀect of the extent to which
worker applications arrive to the firm p∗h and p
∗
ℓ , together with the extent to which the firm ac-
cepts applications, d∗. Although the absolute levels of use of applications by workers depend
on the particular shape of γ, the overall use of applications in equilibrium will increase with d∗
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for a given γ because each worker’s use of applications is increasing in the firm’s use of appli-
cations. To the extent that industries with higher relative gains have greater hiring strategies by
the firm in equilibrium, we can say that higher profitability industries have higher actual hiring.
However, applications are not necessarily more useful in their function nor lead to greater
profits when the general profitability of the industry is high. Next I will discuss the diﬀerent
qualitative functions that applications can be seen to serve in this model, and welfare compar-
isons will be made in the next section.








In the equilibria described by Proposition 1 the firm hires absolutely, and this hiring pattern
requires high noise in reports and is made possible essentially on the basis of the high general
profitability of the industry. The loss from employing low-quality workers or the proportion of
low-quality workers in the general population is suﬃciently low that the firm may hire blindly
without “sifting” through applications by report. Assuming arrival is not prohibitively costly,
such absolute hiring leads to all workers choosing the same arrival probability. Because reports
are not decisive and the pool adjustment factor is neutral, applications yield no useful infor-
mation to the firm. Applications have value purely in their primitive function of connecting
unemployed workers to the firm, and such connection is desirable for all. Therefore in this
setting applications are merely a “door” to the firm.
The equilibria in Proposition 2 demonstrate two other functions applications may serve in
addition to merely connecting the firm to workers. Therefore these equilibria can be grouped
into two qualitatively diﬀerent types according to which of these additional functions is dom-
inant. The first additional function is linked to reports. The firm hires selectively in these
equilibria, which shows that the information the firm obtains from the application through its
report realization is helpful to the firm. Applications therefore oﬀer the firm a useful criterion
by which it can sift applicants. The second additional function is linked to the endogenous
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pool of applicants, and is complementary to the usefulness of reports. When reports enable
the firm to hire selectively, high type workers have more incentive to be seen by the firm and
therefore they choose a relatively higher arrival probability than low types. This makes appli-
cations helpful by allowing high types to signal quality through arrival, providing the firm with
a favourably biased pool from which to select its workers.
The equilibria in Proposition 2 can exist both for industries in which reports are decisive
and for generally unprofitable industries in which reports are not decisive. Both the report in-
formation and the favourable pool are helpful to the firm, but for industries in which reports
are decisive, the favourable pool is not critical to the firm’s hiring decision. Such a firm would
still hire selectively even if the pool of applicants were neutral. However, for generally unprof-
itable industries with non-decisive reports, the complementarity between the pool and reports
is crucial to the firm’s hiring decision. Although the firm would be unwilling to hire selectively
on the basis of a high report alone, together with the favourable pool which is induced by using
report information in the hiring decision, equilibrium hiring can be sustained.











and the pool of applicants must not be too favourable.
When reports are decisive, the explicit information conveyed by the application hiring gives
the application inherent value. Hiring would be worthwhile on the basis of the reported infor-
mation alone when drawing from a neutral pool of applicants, provided that the hiring decision
diﬀers according to the report realization, d∗H > d
∗
L. This use of reports helps the firm improve
the quality of its hires (relative to hiring randomly form the general population), and is de-
sirable for high-quality workers but not low-quality workers. When sustained in equilibrium,
hiring with d∗H > d
∗







< 1. However, if it is too
favourable the firm will deviate to absolute hiring. Thus applications functioning primarily
through their value as a “report” can be observed in equilibrium with a selective or mixed hir-
ing pattern with d∗H > d
∗
L and a favourable pool of applicants, as long as the pool is not too
favourable. Thus applications have primary value as a report for moderate levels of industry
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profitability and moderate noise in reports.






1−ε and the pool of applicants must be suﬃciently favourable but not too
favourable.
A firm in an industry for which the relative gain
vh−w
w−vℓ is too small to justify hiring even
high-report applicants under population parameters may be able to hire on the basis of the en-
dogenously improved pool of applicants, if it is suﬃciently favourable. Such hiring is worth-
while by virtue of the favourable diﬀerence in high- and low-quality workers’ choices of arrival
probabilities. The very presence of an application functions as a signal of quality to the firm.
However, although applications have value primarily as a signal of quality, the report retains
importance even though they are not decisive themselves. In order to support this signalling
value in such a setting, the firm must use the report and engage in selective hiring, otherwise
high types will not have incentive to maintain a higher arrival probability than low types and
applications will not be able to signal quality at all. To prevent the firm from deviating from
selective hiring to absolute hiring, it is also necessary that the arrival probability of high types
is not too much greater than the arrival probability of low types. Therefore this functional value
of applications can be observed in equilibrium with a selective hiring pattern and a favourable
pool of applicants, as long as the pool is suﬃciently favourable, but also not too favourable.3
Applications can have value as a signal when the industry has low general profitability but there
is low noise in reports.
2.3 Comparative Statics and Welfare
In this section I restrict attention to equilibria with non-zero hiring. I will discuss the eﬀects of
parameter changes on equilibrium outcomes (strategies d∗, p∗h, p
∗




3In contrast to the signalling environment in Daley and Green (2003), “signalling” quality to the firm through
applications is not inherently wasteful, since the arrival of applications also aﬀects the volume of hires.
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as well as firm profits and payoﬀs of the workers. Recall that since workers choose p∗h = ψ(wˆφ
∗
h)
and p∗ℓ = ψ(wˆφ
∗
ℓ) in response to d
∗ = d∗H + d
∗
L, the quality composition of the pool of applicants
in equilibrium is given by Λd∗ =
ψ(wˆφ∗ℓ)
ψ(wˆφ∗h)
, the firm’s profit is given by
π∗ = (vh−w)sψ(wˆφ∗h)φ∗h − (w−vℓ)(1−s)ψ(wˆφ∗ℓ)φ∗ℓ (2.36)
and worker utilities are given by
uq = wˆψ(wˆφ∗q)φ
∗
q + b − γ(ψ(wˆφ∗q)) (2.37)
where φ∗h = (1−ε)d∗H + εd∗L, and φ∗ℓ = εd∗H + (1−ε)d∗L.
I will focus on changes to the report error and wage. Changes to the unemployment benefit
b are directly relevant only to workers and aﬀect p∗h, p
∗
ℓ and the pool of applicants in a manner
opposite to that of the wage, so changes to b will be discussed in Section 2.3.2. Changes to
vh, vℓ, and s do not aﬀect worker strategies or pool composition in equilibrium, but concerning
firm strategy d∗ it is straightforward to see that an increase in vh, vℓ, or s increases the firm’s
general profitability, and d∗ has already been discussed in relation to the general profitability of
the firm. Concerning welfare, changes to vh, vℓ, and s are directly relevant to firm profits only,
although to the extent that these parameters influence the existence of equilibria with diﬀerent
hiring patterns, worker welfare can be aﬀected.
I will address both parameter changes which occur within a given type of equilibrium,
such that the firm’s hiring strategy remains the same throughout the parameter change, and
also parameter changes for which the firm is not able to maintain the same hiring strategy in
equilibrium.
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2.3.1 Changes in Report Error
Changes in report error have an eﬀect only within equilibria in which d∗H > d
∗
L. In any such





L, and ψ is increasing in its argument. The degree to which the pool is favourable
will also be greater the lower the report error is. If reports become more accurate (ε becomes
smaller) the pool composition improves,
dΛd∗
dε
< 0. This is because high-quality workers
become more likely to be accepted and low-quality workers become less likely to be accepted
when reports become more accurate. This gives high-quality workers incentive to put greater
eﬀort into being seen by the firm,
dph
dε




> 0. This complementarity between the report error and pool composition is
stated formally as follows.
Lemma 7. Report and Pool Complementarity. Restrict attention to non-zero arrival in equi-
























































Within a given equilibrium with firm strategy d∗ > 0 and non-zero arrival, an investment
which improves the firm’s screening technology such that the report error ε decreases is gen-
erally beneficial for high-quality workers,
duh
dε
≤ 0 but not for low-quality workers, duℓ
dε
≥ 0.
This result, shown in Lemma 30 (Appendix A) is unsurprising due to the fact that report real-
izations are correlated with true type, and the inequalities are strict unless d∗H = d
∗
L such that
reports are not used in equilibrium. Due to the complementarity between reports and pool
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≤ 0. This result is shown in Lemma 31 (Appendix A). Again, the inequal-
ity is strict in equilibria where reports are used. In equilibria where the firm ignores reports
and treats high- and low-report applications in the same way, d = 0 or d = 2, there is clearly
no eﬀect within the equilibrium of a change in ε.
Now allowing for movement between equilibria with diﬀerent firm strategies, the eﬀect of
a change in ε on welfare is not clear. This is because an improvement in the firm’s screening
technology can lead to a new equilibrium with either increased or decreased hiring. Since an
improvement in report screening technology both lowers the odds that a high-report applicant
is low quality and improves the pool composition, d∗H is weakly increasing in the power of the
report 1−ε (thus weakly decreasing in ε). However, since an improvement in report screening
technology increases the odds that a low-report applicant is low quality, d∗L may increase or
decrease in ε depending on the strength of the complementarity between reports and the pool
composition.







, a suﬃcient decrease in ε could make the report become decisive and cause
the firm to reduce its hiring to some d∗ ∈ [1, 2). For generally unprofitable industries, if the
report error decreases suﬃciently to make reports decisive, the decisiveness of the report can
have the opposite eﬀect on the firm’s decision, and cause the firm to begin accepting high-report
applicants, d∗ ∈ (0, 1], when previously it would not accept any.
2.3.2 Changes in the Wage and Unemployment Benefit
Within any equilibrium in which hiring actually occurs, d∗ > 0, an increase in the wage is
strictly beneficial for both worker types,
duq
dw
> 0, as shown in Lemma 32 (Appendix A). Since
the wage is higher, both types have incentive to increase their eﬀort to be seen by the firm. Thus
the volume of the pool of applicants increases, although its quality composition may change.
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Whether this composition change is favourable or not within an equilibrium with d∗ > 0 is
characterized by the following:
Lemma 8. Restrict attention to non-zero arrival in equilibrium and suppose ψ is logarithmi-




























































Thus when workers have identical incentives, that is when d∗ = 2 so that φ∗h = φ
∗
ℓ , the
pool composition is unaﬀected by a change in wage. Meanwhile, within any class of equilibria
with d∗ = 1 it is possible for the pool to become either more favourable or less favourable,
depending on the nature of γ. Since φ∗h > φ
∗
ℓ under selective hiring, the equilibrium pool of
applicants Λ1 will necessarily worsen with an increase in wage,
dΛd∗
dw
> 0, for any γ which has
ψ ′
ψ
increasing. For twice continuously diﬀerentiable γ, this suﬃcient condition is equivalent to
the logarithmic convexity of ψ.
On the other hand, when d∗ = 1, in order for the pool to be improving with an increase in
wage it is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition that
ψ ′
ψ
be decreasing. For twice continuously
diﬀerentiable γ, this necessary condition is equivalent to the logarithmic concavity of ψ. Again
although not exclusive, all concave functions satisfy logarithmic concavity and we can have ψ
concave as long as γ is suﬃciently convex.4 With this condition satisfied, it is also possible that




need not be monotonic.
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the composition of the pool of applicants is constant with respect to the wage. For example,
when arrival costs increase according to a power function, such as γ(p) = cpx for x > 1, it will









How a wage increase aﬀects the profit of the firm is partly determined by whether the wage
has a positive or negative eﬀect on the quality composition of the pool of applicants. However,
the eﬀect of a wage increase on the profits of the firm is unclear due to the presence of multiple
eﬀects which are conflicting. Consider first an equilibrium in which the firm hires absolutely;
in this case the quality composition of the pool of applicants is unchanged relative to that of





d∗=2 = −ψ(wˆ) + [(vh−w)s−(w−vℓ)(1−s)]ψ ′(wˆ). (2.39)
The first eﬀect is negative and in proportion to the arrival probability of workers, −ψ(wˆ).
This is due to the fact that an increase in wage increases the cost of each unit of labour for the
firm. The second eﬀect is due to the increased wage’s eﬀect on the volume of hires; the term
(vh−w)s − (w−vℓ)(1−s) corresponds to the expected profit per hire and the term ψ ′(wˆ) corre-
sponds to the change in volume. This eﬀect is positive because ψ is increasing and because this
equilibrium exists only when the industry is generally profitable, which implies that additional
volume of hires from a neutral pool is desirable to the firm. Whether or not an increase in wage
is beneficial to the firm therefore depends on which of these eﬀects is stronger for a given ψ.
For an example with quadratic arrival costs, take γ(p) = cp2 (with constant c > 0). In this
case the expression for π
∣∣∣
d∗=2 is maximized at w2 =
1
2 [(vh+b)s+ (vℓ+b)(1−s)]. For w < w2, the





d∗=2 > 0. For w > w2 the increased
labour costs of a higher wage outweigh the value of a greater volume of hires. A similar result
holds with γ(p) = cpx for other powers x > 2, with diﬀerent values of w2.
For equilibria in which the firm does not hire absolutely, an increase in the wage has a
further complicated influence on profits because the composition of the pool of applicants will
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change, rather than merely the volume. For example, with selective hiring in equilibrium, the







s · ψ(wˆ(1−ε))(1−ε) + (1−s) · ψ(wˆε)ε]
+ (vh−w)s · ψ ′(wˆ(1−ε))(1−ε)2 − (w−vℓ)(1−s) · ψ ′(wˆε)ε2.
(2.40)
In this case, whether or not a wage increase is beneficial to the firm depends on whether
the eﬀect of labour costs, as adjusted according to the eﬀect of the wage on the composition
of applicants, is stronger than the eﬀect of the increased volume of hires, also as adjusted
according to the eﬀect of the wage on the composition of applicants, for a particular ψ. In the
example of quadratic arrival costs, π
∣∣∣




(vh + b)s(1−ε)2 + (vℓ + b)(1−s)ε2
s(1−ε)2 + (1−s)ε2 , (2.41)
and decreasing for all wages w > w1.
As previously noted, an increase in the unemployment benefit b has the opposite eﬀect
on worker strategies and the pool of applicants as an increase in the wage. Thus an increase
in b causes both worker types to reduce their arrival probabilities, as shown in Lemma 33














within any class of equilibria with d∗ = 1, and
dΛd∗
db
= 0 within any class of equilibria with
d∗ = 2, while we also have
dΛd∗
db
= 0 within any class of equilibria with d∗ = 1+β with
β ∈ (0, 1) (see Lemma 35, Appendix A). As with the wage, an increase in the unemployment
benefit is beneficial to workers, as shown in Lemma 34 (Appendix A). However, unlike the
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wage, the unemployment benefit aﬀects firm profits only indirectly through the altered choices

















Thus when d∗H = d
∗





an increase in unemployment benefit decreases firm profits because such an equilibrium can









= 0 when φ∗h = φ
∗
ℓ = 1, and so the equal reduction in the arrival prob-
abilities of both high- and low-type applications results in lower profit for the firm. However,
for equilibria in which the firm does not treat all applications the same, such that d∗H > d
∗
L, it
is possible for an increase in unemployment to increase firm profits provided that the relative
gain from a high-quality worker is suﬃciently low.
2.3.3 Optimal and Long Run Wage Determination
Now in this model firms and workers move simultaneously and best-respond to each other
for a wage given exogenously. Since for every w there is an equilibrium (dˆ(w), pˆh(w), pˆℓ(w))





where πˆ(w) is the firm’s profit given dˆ(w), pˆh(w), and pˆℓ(w). That is, each wage results in a par-
ticular relative gain to the firm from high-quality workers,
vh−w
w−vℓ , which dictates the hiring equi-
librium (if there exist any with non-zero hiring) which can be sustained in the simultaneous-
move game. According to the balance discussed above between the tradeoﬀs the firm faces
due to a change in wage, for each hiring strategy there is a maximum profit attainable through
setting the wage within the range of wages for which this equilibrium can exist. By comparing
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these profits, the firm will wish to select a wage which will lead to the highest profits in a
subsequent simultaneous move equilibrium.
Since the firm makes profit in any equilibrium with hiring, the firm will not choose a wage
such that dˆ(w) = 0. Neither will it choose a wage such that dˆ(w) = α for any α ∈ (0, 1) since
the firm would have to be indiﬀerent about every applicant hired, making profit in any such








1, and the resulting optimal hiring strategy will be dˆ(w∗) ∈ [1, 2].
However, beyond this nothing can be said in general about which wage and resulting hiring
pattern will be chosen optimally in equilibrium.
When there is no co-existence of equilibria with dˆ(w) = β for β ∈ (0, 1) with either dˆ(w) = 1
or dˆ(w) = 2, such as the case with quadratic arrival costs or ψ log concave, there will be
a unique (non-zero) hiring strategy possible for each wage below w. Then without loss of
generality taking dˆ(w) = 0 for any wages equal to w or higher, it will be the case that
dˆ(w) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2 if w ≤ wa
1 + β(w) if wa < w < wb
1 if wb ≤ w < w
0 if w ≤ w
(2.45)


























wˆ(ε + (1−ε)β)) .
Although it is diﬃcult to present a closed-form solution even for a particular γ(p), focusing
on pure strategies it is easy to see that the firm will indeed favour diﬀerent wages for diﬀerent












d∗=1 given in equation (2.40) is increasing up to the wage w1 and thereafter










wb if w1 < wb
w1 if wb ≤ w1 < w
(2.47)
Taking b = 0, s = 12 , and vℓ = 0, the firm would optimally choose w
∗ = w2 = 14vh and
the resulting equilibrium hiring strategy would be dˆ(w∗) = 2 when the report error is moderate
to high, ε > 14 ; whereas for very low report errors, ε <
1
10 , the firm can be shown to prefer
w∗ = wb = 12vh and selective hiring in equilibrium rather than setting w = argmaxw≤wa πˆ(w).
Another alternative to modelling a given exogenous wage is for the wage to evolve in the
long run depending on the firm’s profits. Now in any mixed strategy Nash equilibrium with
α ∈ (0, 1) the firm is indiﬀerent with every hire and makes zero profit. For any other Nash
equilibrium with non-zero arrival and d∗ ! 0 the firm will make positive profit. Therefore in
the long run, the wage may rise to reflect this profit and the general profitability of the industry
will decrease. This wage adjustment may be due to either pressure from the workers or a
union for higher wages, or from entry into the industry leading to more intense competition
for workers. If the wage adjusts fully and rises such that the firm makes zero profit, absolute
hiring can not be sustained as an equilibrium over the long run. This is because in any situation
in which absolute hiring can be supported the firm makes strictly positive profit. The highest








although at this wage the firm makes zero expected profit from accepting low-report applicants,
it makes strictly positive expected profit from the high-report applicants it accepts.5 Since for
any hiring pattern to be sustained in equilibrium with zero profit in the long run wages must be
low enough that the firm does not make any expected profit from any of the workers it hires,






of reports (or if reports were completely noise, ε = 12 ).
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d∗ = 1+β is also not sustainable.
However, when wages adjust fully and long run profits are zero, non-zero hiring can










where as defined previously Λ = infα∈(0,1)
ψ(wˆεα)
ψ(wˆ(1−εα)) , and Λ =
supα∈(0,1)
ψ(wˆεα)
ψ(wˆ(1−εα)) . Selective hiring d










2.3.4 Commitment to a Hiring Strategy
Section 2.2 analyzed the equilibrium arrival and hiring patterns in a model where the workers
and firm simultaneously choose their arrival probabilities and hiring strategies respectively.
An alternative timing is for the firm to choose hiring strategies with commitment, and for
workers to then make their choices of arrival probabilities. Note that with this alternative
timing with commitment, the firm need not resort to mixed strategies to resolve the strategy
compatibility issues identified in the discussion of Corollary 2. Although selective hiring will
lead to a too-attractive pool of applicants and absolute hiring will eliminate the favourable bias
of the pool of applicants, the firm will not be left with zero profits unable to sustain hiring in
equilibrium. Instead, the firm need only decide whether selective or absolute hiring will lead
to greater profits, and maintain this hiring strategy when workers best-respond. The following
two propositions characterize the pure strategy equilibria for two example functional forms of
the arrival cost γ.
Proposition 5. Suppose γ(p) = cp2 for c > 0. The optimal pure strategy for the firm in
equilibrium in the model with commitment is
































































for q ∈ {h, ℓ} where φ∗h = 1−ε and φ∗ℓ = ε.
Comparing this result with Example 2.2.1 parts (i), (iii) and (v) for x = 2, we can see how
the model with commitment diﬀers from the main model in the case of quadratic arrival costs.
The industry values of general profitability for which there can be no hiring in equilibrium
coincide, and the lowest relative gain
vh−w
w−vℓ for which selective hiring with non-zero arrival
is possible is also the same. However, the highest relative gain for which selective hiring can








lowest relative gain for which absolute hiring can be supported in equilibrium is also lower in









Proposition 6. Suppose γ(p) = −c ln(1−p) for c < wˆε. The optimal pure strategy for the firm
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for q ∈ {h, ℓ} where φ∗h = 1−ε and φ∗ℓ = ε.
Comparing this result with Example 2.2.2 parts (i), (ii) and (iv) we can see similar diﬀer-
ences between the model with commitment and the main model under γ(p) = −c ln(1−p). The
industry values of general profitability for which there can be no hiring in equilibrium coincide,
but the level of general profitability for which selective hiring with non-zero arrival becomes




wˆ(1−ε) − c < 1. In contrast, for
this γ(p) the level of general profitability beyond which absolute hiring occurs in equilibrium
coincides in the models with and without commitment.
Note that in both of these examples for γ(p), the firm can not gain from mixing with d∗ =
1 + β for β ∈ (0, 1). In the case of γ(p) = cp2, for any parameter setting where π(1) is greater
than π(2), it is also the case that π(1 + β) is lower than π(1). Similarly, π(1 + β) is lower than
π(2) wherever π(2) is greater than π(1). In the case of γ(p) = −c ln(1−p), for any parameter
setting where π(1 + β) is positive, π(2) ≥ π(1 + β).
Also in both cases, the range for which no hiring can be supported in equilibrium (that
is, for which d∗ > 0 is the unique equilibrium possible in mixed or pure strategies) is the
same in both the model with commitment and the model without commitment. This means
that although commitment here helps the firm avoid the strategy deviation problems associated
with Corollary 2, commitment itself has not improved the pool of applicants in such a way as
to allow the firm to begin hiring at lower levels of general profitability than it would have been
able to without commitment. Thus we expect for other specifications of γ the results and their
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properties to be also qualitatively similar to that of the simultaneous move model.
Chapter 3
Two-Channel Model of Hiring
In this chapter I extend the model to two hiring channels; one, the “informal” channel, is similar
to the model introduced in Chapter 2 in that it has costly endogenous arrival of applications
and an exogenous noisy signal of quality. The other, the “formal” channel, is equally available
to all workers at an exogenous rate and conveys a separate exogenous noisy signal of worker
quality.
I develop the two-channel model and provide a characterization of best responses for the
firm and workers in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2 I compare the informal channel arrival proba-
bilities of high-quality workers relative to low-quality workers and present some basic obser-
vations about the hiring outcomes which are possible in equilibrium. I show how the informal
pool responds to diﬀerent combined hiring patterns. I find that despite having complementarity
as in the one-channel model between the quality composition of informal applicants and the
screening power of informal reports, workers’ best responses do not always lead to a favourable
(or even neutral) pool of informal applicants. This is because the screening power of formal
reports gives a relative advantage to high-types in the chance of being hired formally.
I characterize the pure Nash equilibria of this model in Section 3.3 and relate the hiring
outcomes to the hiring environment, and to the screening power of formal applications ver-
sus informal applications. I find that when the formal report screening power is high, hiring
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patterns with an unfavourable informal pool can be sustained in equilibrium provided that the
incentive for high types to use the informal channel remains suﬃciently close relative to low
types. I also determine the compatibility of formal and informal hiring patterns in equilibrium
and compare the possible roles of informal applications (as a doorway, source of direct infor-
mation, or signal) in diﬀerent hiring environments. For example, informal applications can not
function primarily as a signal when general profitability is high enough for formal applications
to function as a door, or when formal applications have value as a suﬃciently strong source of
direct information.
In Section 3.4 I show the welfare and comparative static implications of the availability of
a second hiring channel. I also discuss the eﬀects of this two-channel model’s assumption that
the firm delegates hiring to independent hiring departments who maximize the expected profit
from their own hires.
3.1 Model of Formal and Informal Hiring
In this section I develop a benchmark model to study equilibrium hiring patterns when there
is a separate “informal” hiring channel through which applications may arrive to the firm,
in addition to a standard “formal” application channel. In particular, the application arrival
probabilities in the so-called “informal” channel are determined by each worker endogenously.
Thus the firm will choose a hiring pattern for both channels in response to the informal arrival
probabilities determined by workers, and workers will choose arrival probabilities in response
to the hiring pattern chosen by the firm.
3.1.1 Two Channels
Suppose there are two separate channels through which the worker applications may arrive to
the firm, denoted j ∈ {F, I}, which I will call “formal” and “informal” channels. In my model
Chapter 3. Two-Channel Model of Hiring 60
formal and informal applications diﬀer in two important ways; first, in the way in which they
reach the firm, and second, the informational content of their reports.
I consider the formal channel as an application route equally available to all, such that
any frictions which prevent a worker’s formal application from being transmitted or received
are assumed to aﬀect all workers equally. Therefore the probability of the firm receiving a
formal application from a given worker is type-independent. I will denote this common formal
channel arrival probability pF and I will take pF ∈ (0, 1). Applications sent through the formal




, according to the sources of information associated with formal applications and how
likely they are to fail to indicate the applicant’s true type.
In contrast, I suppose that the informal channel is accessed endogenously, such that the
arrival probability of a worker’s informal application may potentially diﬀer between types. I
denote the informal arrival probabilities for high- and low-quality workers pIh and pIℓ respec-
tively.1
Applications sent through the informal channel also carry a report of worker quality, RI ∈
{H, L}, which has error εI < 12, according to how likely informal sources of information fail
to indicate an applicant’s true type. I assume that conditional on the worker’s type the for-
mal and informal reports are independent from each other, as are their arrivals. One common
networking-based explanation for how informal applications can signal quality is based on the
principle of homophily. In models such as Montgomery (1991), where the informal chan-
nel operates as a referral network, homophily suggests that applicants referred to the firm by
high-quality employees are more likely to be high-quality themselves. In such a situation the
referring employee’s own type is like a report which is indicative to the firm of the referred ap-
plicant’s type. Even when the informal hiring channel is specifically referral-based, homophily
is not the only rationale for how informal applications may carry a report of quality. For ex-
1Although in diﬀerent contexts access to either or both channels may be modelled as endogenous, I make the
association with informal hiring opportunities. In the next chapter, I will specifically model the informal channel
transmission probabilities as resulting from workers’ networking choices.
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ample, individuals who give referrals may possess personal knowledge of the applicant which
they are able to credibly convey to the firm.
Whatever processes generate the reports of quality in the formal and informal channels, it is
reasonable to suppose that the information conveyed to the firm by RI may be distinct from the
information conveyed by RF , such that the correlation with quality may diﬀer for reports in the
two channels, and εI ! εF . While they are generally distinct, it is conceivable that it is either
formal or informal reports which are the better indicator of quality. Which one is more accurate
will vary according to the skill characteristics of the job in question, due to the fact that formal
and informal sources may be diﬀerently suited to convey information about diﬀerent types of
skills. For example, a transcript may give an indication of study skills or work discipline, but
a letter of reference may be more informative about interpersonal skills and cooperativeness.
Given a similar level of accuracy among the skills assessed, a reference letter may not be
intrinsically more valuable than a transcript, however it is clear that the skills assessed by the
reference letter are more relevant for a customer service position versus a position in research.
If reference letters can only be obtained through networking while all workers can submit a
transcript, we may assume εI < εF in the context of customer service hiring, but for research
hiring the assumption εF < εI may be more appropriate. The relationship between εF and εI ,
that is, whether informal or formal reports are more reliable, will also be an important industry
characteristic in my analysis.
There exists a range of interpretations for what are considered “formal” and “informal” job
search methods. For example, methods classified as “informal” are often methods which in-
volve interpersonal networks, such as family, friends, and professional contacts.2 Many studies
also include methods such as direct application to the firm in their collection of informal meth-
ods, while reserving the term “formal” to describe methods which are non-personal and make
use of market intermediaries such as applying or posting through employment agencies and job
2This may be through referrals exclusively or may include hearing about opportunities or receiving help,
whether or not the contact is a part of the organization or makes a recommendation to the employer (DeVaro,
2008; Simon and Warner, 1992; Corcoran et al., 1980).
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advertising boards.3 Alternatively, direct application may be described as neither formal nor
informal.4 In my model, the key distinction between the two application channels is the cost or
eﬀort required to reach the firm with an application through this channel. Among all job search
methods, there is a wide variety of mechanisms for reaching the firm, and the mechanism’s de-
pendence on eﬀort is not necessarily associated with formal or informal methods for diﬀerent
categorizations. However for traditional job search categorizations in which the distinguishing
feature of so-called formal methods is the use of intermediaries such as job boards and em-
ployment agencies, access to this channel is usually equally available to everyone and there is
some standardized centralized way of relaying applications to the firm. For such methods it is
typically appropriate to assume that the probability of reaching the firm with an application is
not much aﬀected by a job seeker’s eﬀort. Meanwhile for many traditionally “informal” meth-
ods, including those not based on networking (such as direct application), the probability of
having one’s application reach the firm is more naturally seen as increasing in eﬀort. For this
reason I associate the endogenous channel with informal methods and the exogenous channel
with formal methods. However the model remains somewhat flexible in its interpretation. The
endogenous hiring channel could alternatively be interpreted as a formal hiring channel while
the exogenous channel is interpreted as an informal channel in a particular situation, if in the
given context some application method considered to be “formal” is more appropriately asso-
ciated with a dependence on eﬀort than some method considered “informal.” Additionally, two
methods considered both formal or both informal, but which diﬀer in dimensions of eﬀort and
information, could be compared with each other in this framework.
3.1.2 The Firm’s Problem
Now upon receiving an application through channel j ∈ {F, I} with report Rj ∈ {H, L}, the firm
must decide whether or not to hire the worker. In this model I will suppose that the firm dele-
3For example, Rees (1966).
4For example, Holzer (1988).
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gates this hiring decision to two independent departments, one handling applications received
through the formal channel and the other handling applications received through the informal
channel. While it is possible for a given worker to have both a formal and an informal appli-
cation reach the firm, under this delegation assumption such a worker’s formal and informal
applications will be considered in isolation. I assume that a worker will become employed as
long as he is accepted by at least one department, and whether the worker is accepted by one
department or the other or both is irrelevant to the worker’s payoﬀ.
Although hiring decisions are often made by a single agent, in some organizations they are
made by several distinct parties. In many areas educational contracts are between the teacher
and the school district so hiring and placement decisions are made by the school district’s
centralized human resources oﬃce, and yet in some districts the principal also has authority
to select hires for his or her own school. In such organizations it might be either hard for the
parties with hiring authorities to exchange information about applicants, or it may be that they
have diﬃculties in interpreting some types of information (for example a local manager may
have a hard time assessing a formal academic transcript). Alternatively, if the firm were able
to jointly observe a given worker’s available formal and informal information, together with
knowledge of the endogenous informal arrival rates, the firm would be able to make better
informed hiring decisions and achieve higher profits. This centralized formulation is much
harder to work with and will be discussed further in Section 3.4.3. However, taking into account
the cost and feasibility of a centralized endeavour, the firm may find it worthwhile to delegate.
Also, it is possible that even if the cost of such an endeavour is negligible, the centralized
oﬃce may have weaker screening ability. Thus it may be of suﬃcient overall benefit to the
firm to contract out the hiring decision to the oﬃces or agents who have the most expertise in
discerning quality through formal and informal reports.
Given that the formal and informal hiring oﬃces do not share data, I will also assume the
objective of each hiring department is to maximize the expected profit from its own hiring
decisions. This assumption is suitable for situations in which the agents delegated to make
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the hiring decisions value their own reputation in identifying and recruiting suitable applicants.
This private objective of the recruitment oﬃces is not without some cost to the firm. Delegating
the hiring decision to independent hiring departments which have their own reputational ob-
jective does in some cases result in more workers being hired than would be profit-maximizing
for the firm. It would be in the firm’s best interest for agents to be more cautious when hiring
applicants since hiring applicants who are expected to be profitable should only be counted
as increasing the firm’s profit to the extent that they are likely not to be accepted by the other
agent. Section 3.4.2 will examine the impact of delegation on firm profits in this model and
Section 3.4.3 will compare alternatives to this delegation model.
The firm’s strategy is a hiring decision for applications received in each department for
each report realization. The firm’s strategy is therefore d:{F, I}×{H, L}→{0, 1}4, so that d =
(dFH, dFL, dIH, dIL), where dji = 1 indicates a decision to accept an application in channel j
with report Rj = i, and dji = 0 indicates a decision to reject such an application, for j ∈ {F, I}
and i ∈ {H, L}.
Since the formal and informal departments act independently and do not share information,
each department’s calculation of expected profit from accepting an application conditions only
on the event of the arrival of the application and the observation of its report (given that it
was received). Therefore the optimal hiring decisions djH and djL chosen by each department
j ∈ {F, I} are determined as in the single-channel benchmark model in Section 2.2, for the
appropriate arrival probabilities and report errors in that channel. Following the notation of the
previous chapter, let Aj denote the event of an application’s arrival through channel j ∈ {F, I}.
For each department j ∈ {F, I}, an application which arrives with report Rj ∈ {H, L} will be
accepted according to whether or not the relative gain of a high-quality worker exceeds the
(posterior) odds that that applicant is low quality, O(ℓ:h|Aj∩Rj), calculated by updating from
the population-based prior, O(ℓ:h|Aj∩Rj) = O(ℓ:h) · Λ(ℓ:h|Aj) · Λ(ℓ:h|Aj∩Rj).
Lemma 9. For the formal department ( j = F) the best response is characterized by the follow-
ing:
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For RF = H,










For RF = L,












In the formal channel, the firm’s hiring decision is completely independent of workers’
networking strategies, so the firm’s best response in the formal department is in fact a dominant
strategy. The formal arrival probabilities for applications from high and low types do not diﬀer,
so the posterior odds of low-quality are not aﬀected by this factor in the formal channel as
Λ(ℓ:h|AF) = pFpF = 1. However, the low-quality odds are aﬀected by the realization of the
report according to the factor Λ(ℓ:h|AF∩RF) = Pr(RF |AF∩ℓ)Pr(RF |AF∩h) , which is
εF




when RF = L.
Since the inequality in condition (3.1) must be satisfied any time the inequality in condition
(3.3) is satisfied, the firm’s best response for the formal department will have dFH(pIh, pIℓ) ≥
dFL(pIh, pIℓ). As in the single-channel benchmark, this means that the formal department will
either hire all formal applicants, selectively hire only high-report formal applicants, or hire
no formal applicants. In this chapter “generally (un)profitable” industries and “(not) decisive”
reports are defined in a similar fashion as in the previous chapter. Since no information about
an applicant’s quality can be deduced from the event of the application’s arrival, (i) the range
of
vh−w
w−vℓ for which no hiring is optimal for the formal department coincides with the range
for which formal reports are not decisive while the industry is generally unprofitable (ii) the
range of
vh−w
w−vℓ for which selective hiring is optimal for the formal department coincides with
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the range for which formal reports are decisive, and (iii) the range of
vh−w
w−vℓ for which absolute
hiring is optimal for the formal department coincides with the range for which formal reports
are not decisive while the industry is generally profitable.
Lemma 10. For the informal department ( j = I) the best response is characterized by the
following:
For pIh > 0 and RI = H














For pIh > 0 and RI = L
















For pIh = 0 and pIℓ > 0, dIH(0, pIℓ) = dIL(pIh, pIℓ) = 0.
For pIh = pIℓ = 0, dIH(pIh, pIℓ) ∈ {0, 1}, and dIL(pIh, pIℓ) ∈ {0, 1}.
When the informal arrival probability of high types, pIh, is not zero, the posterior odds of
low-quality in the informal channel are aﬀected by both the pool adjustment factor, Λ(ℓ:h|AI) =
pIh
pIℓ
, and the report adjustment factor, Λ(ℓ:h|AI∩RI) = Pr(RI |AI∩ℓ)Pr(RI |AI∩h) , which is
εI
1−εI when
RI = H and
1−εI
εI
when RI = L.
When high-quality workers do not make use of the informal channel, pIh = 0 but low-
quality workers do, pIℓ > 0, the expected value of hiring any applicant through the informal
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channel is negative and the firm’s best response for the informal department must be to reject
all informal applicants. However when neither worker type networks, the firm never receives
applications through the informal channel so its decision is irrelevant and any informal hiring
strategy is a best response for the informal department.
Since the inequality in condition (3.5) must be satisfied any time the inequality in condition
(3.7) is satisfied, the firm’s best response for the informal department will have dIH(pIh, pIℓ) ≥
dIL(pIh, pIℓ) for any non-zero arrival probabilities pIh, pIℓ > 0, so that the informal department
will either hire all informal applicants, selectively hire only high-report informal applicants,
or hire no informal applicants. However, when workers do arrive in the informal channel, the
relative arrival probability does aﬀect the optimal hiring decision, and therefore the ranges of
vh−w
w−vℓ for which no hiring, selective hiring, and absolute hiring are optimal for the informal de-
partment do not necessarily coincide with the ranges for which reports are and are not decisive
and the industry is generally profitable and unprofitable.
Remark 1. For any firm best response and non-zero informal arrival probabilities, d ji is in-
creasing in vh, vℓ and s, and decreasing in w for j ∈ {F, I}, i ∈ {H, L}. Also, d jH is decreasing
in ε j, and d jL is increasing in ε j for j∈{F, I}.5
In both channels the hiring conditions for both high-and low-report applications, inequal-
ities (3.1)-(3.7), are each more easily satisfied with a higher relative gain ratio
vh−w
w−vℓ since
this increases the margin by which the profit from a high-quality hire outweighs the loss from
a low-quality hire (or decreases the margin by which the loss from a low-quality hire out-
weighs the profit form a high-quality hire) . Also in either channel j ∈ {F, I}, a decrease in
the firm’s screening ability in that channel, ε j, increases the chance that the report received is
false, which makes the firm less willing to hire high-report workers and more willing to hire
low-report workers, as in the case of the single channel analysis.
5I follow the convention of denoting weakly increasing or decreasing as simply “increasing” or “decreasing.”
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Remark 2. For any firm best response and non-zero informal arrival probabilities, dIH(pIh, pIℓ)




For the informal channel, a decrease in
pIℓ
pIh
decreases the odds that an applicant is low-
quality for both high- and low- report applications and the firm is more willing to accept both
high- and low-report applicants in the informal channel.
3.1.3 The Worker’s Problem
The probability that a worker of type q is hired in each channel depends on the probability
that his application arrives to the firm and the probability that the firm subsequently accepts
it. For a worker of type q, the arrival probabilities in the formal and informal channels are pF
and pIq respectively. Let φFq denote the probability that a type q worker’s formal application
is accepted conditional on the firm receiving it, and let φIq denote the probability that a type
q worker’s informal application is accepted conditional on the firm receiving it. Then the
(unconditional) probability of the worker being accepted by the formal department is pF · φFq
and the (unconditional) probability of the worker being accepted by the informal department is
pIq · φIq.
Now the conditional acceptance probabilities φFq and φIq depend on the firm’s hiring strat-
egy d, so that φFq = φFq(d) and φIq = φIq(d). When djH = 1, an application received in channel
j ∈ {F,H} is accepted with probability 1−ε j if the worker is high-quality, and with probability
ε j if the worker is low quality. When djL = 1, an application received in channel j ∈ {F, I}
is accepted with probability ε j if the worker is high-quality, and with probability 1−ε j if the
worker is low-quality. If djH = 0 or djL = 0, both worker types have zero probability of being
accepted in channel j ∈ {F, I} with report Rj = H or Rj = L respectively. Thus for a worker of
high quality q = h we have the conditional acceptance probabilities
φFh = (1−εF)dFH+εFdFL (3.9)
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and
φIh = (1−εI)dIH+εIdIL, (3.10)
while for a worker of low quality q = l we have the conditional acceptance probabilities
φFℓ = εFdFH+(1−εF)dFL (3.11)
and
φIℓ = εIdIH+(1−εI)dIL. (3.12)
Since a worker obtains the job if he is accepted by either department, but may possibly
have applications independently reach and be accepted by both departments simultaneously,
the probability that a worker of type q is hired, Φq, is equal to the probability of being accepted
by the formal department, plus the probability that the worker is accepted by the informal
department and not by the formal department:
Φq(d, pIq) = pF ·φFq + (1−pF ·φFq)pIq·φIq (3.13)
Rearranging equation (2.21) and substituting Φ(d, pIq) from above, we see that a worker of
type q with informal arrival probability pIq has expected utility
(w−b)(pF ·φFq + (1−pF ·φFq)pIq·φIq) + b − γ(pIq) (3.14)
where φFq = φFq(d) and φIq = φIq(d) are determined for q ∈ {h, ℓ} by equations (3.9)-(3.12) for




1 − pF ·φFq(d))φIq(d) ≤ γ ′(pIq), with equality if pIq > 0, (3.15)
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where wˆ = w−b.





wˆ(1 − pF ·φFq(d))φIq(d)) if wˆ(1 − pF ·φFq(d))φIq(d) > γ ′(0)
0 otherwise.
(3.16)
Although the networking choices of worker types aﬀect only the firm’s informal hiring de-
cision, worker types take into account both the formal and informal hiring strategies of the firm
when making their networking choices. For workers of either type, networking is more appeal-
ing when that type’s informal application has a high probability of being accepted conditional
on being received, φIq, but networking is less appealing when that type has a high probability
of being accepted in the formal channel, pF ·φFq. Thus pIq is increasing in φIq and decreasing in
pF and φFq, for q ∈ {h, l}. Note that for either worker type, if improving his arrival probability
is too costly, specifically if d is such that wˆ
(
1 − pF ·φFq(d))φIq(d) ≤ γ ′(0), then the worker will
not use the informal channel at all, pIq(d) = 0.
Comparing the worker’s problem in this two-channel model with the one-channel model of
the previous chapter, we see that given a particular formal hiring strategy of the firm, dFH and
dFL, the formal channel here serves as a type-dependent outside option for workers in a one-
channel model. For the worker, note that allowing the unemployment benefit b in equations
(2.24) and (2.25) to vary by worker type, worker utility in the one channel model would be
given by
uq = (w−bq)pqφq + bq − γ(pq). (3.17)
Therefore if we take bq = b+(w−b)pFφFq for a fixed dFH and dFL, equation (3.17) is equivalent
to equation (3.14) with pq = pIq and φq = φIq.
Also note that dFℓ ≤ dFh implies φFℓ ≤ φFh, which in turn implies bℓ ≤ bh. Hence the
presence of the formal channel provides a (weakly) greater outside option to the high type than
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to the low type.
3.2 Preliminary Results
3.2.1 Use of Informal Channel by Type
Section 3.1.2 showed how the odds of an applicant being low-quality aﬀect the firm’s hiring
decision, and how in the informal channel these odds are adjusted according to the relative











> 1, or neutral,
pIℓ
pIh
= 1, this section will investigate
whether high- or low-quality workers choose to use the informal channel more (or equally) in
best response to each possible firm strategy d.
For the following discussion I will suppose that the acceptance probabilities resulting from
the firm’s strategy d are such that use of the informal channel is not prohibitively expensive for
either worker type and pIℓ(d) and pIh(d) are both not zero.6
As in the single channel benchmark model, we know that whenever the arrival probabilities
of worker applications are not zero, the firm’s best response will follow a pattern of either
absolute hiring (djH = djL = 1), selective hiring (djH = 1, djL = 0), or no hiring (djH = djL = 0)
in each department j ∈ {F, I}. For notational ease, I will define dF = dFH+dFL and dI =
dIH+dIL. Thus we may refer to the patterns of “no hiring,” “selective hiring,” and “absolute
hiring” in channel j with dj = 0, dj = 1, and dj = 2 respectively. The firm’s strategy d can
be conveniently summarized by (dF , dI) ∈ {0, 1, 2}×{0, 1, 2} and the best response for worker q
may be denoted pIq(dF , dI) rather than pIq(d).
Since there are three diﬀerent hiring patterns which may be followed in each channel, there
6Lemma 37 in Appendix B shows that no equilibria can be supported where one worker type q chooses to use
the informal channel, p∗Iq>0, while the other type q˜ does not, pIq˜ = 0. Thus I present results only for cases where
both types actually do.
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are nine (3×3) possible firm strategies for which to consider whether high or low types will
choose to use the informal channel more. For the three strategy choices in which the firm adopts
a pattern of no hiring in the informal channel, it must be that pIh(dF , 0) = pIℓ(dF , 0) = 0; neither
worker type will network at all in response to a firm strategy with dI = 0, regardless of dF . This
is because arrival through the informal channel is costly, and there is no chance for either type
to be accepted in the informal channel upon arrival, φIq = 0 for q ∈ {h, ℓ}, when the firm adopts
a pattern of no hiring in the informal department. So this section will compare high- and
low-quality types’ best responses to the six remaining firm strategies, (dF , dI) ∈ {0, 1, 2}×{1, 2}.
As we have seen, the incentives for a worker of type q to use the informal channel increase
with his conditional acceptance probability in the informal channel, φIq, and decrease with
his probability of being hired in the formal channel, pF ·φFq. These incentives may or may not
diﬀer by type depending on the hiring patterns adopted by the firm. Equations (3.10) and (3.12)
show that according to each of the two possible (non-zero) hiring patterns adopted by the firm
in the informal department, dI ∈ {1, 2}, a worker’s informal application, if received, will either
be accepted with his type’s probability of generating a high informal report, or accepted with
certainty:
φIh(dI) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩ 1−εI if dI = 11 if dI = 2 φIℓ(dI) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩ εI if dI = 11 if dI = 2. (3.18)
Similarly, equations (3.9) and (3.11) show that according to each of the three possible hiring
patterns adopted by the firm in the formal department, dF ∈ {0, 1, 2}, a worker’s formal appli-
cation, if received, will either be rejected with certainty, accepted with his type’s probability of
generating a high formal report, or accepted with certainty:
φFh(dF) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if dF = 0
1−εF if dF = 1
1 if dF = 2
φFℓ(dF) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if dF = 0
εF if dF = 1
1 if dF = 2.
(3.19)
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For any fixed firm strategy (dF , dI) a high-quality worker has a conditional acceptance
probability advantage over a low-quality worker in both the formal and informal channels,
φ jh(dj) ≥ φ jℓ(dj) for j ∈ {F, I}. This is because in each channel high reports are realized
with higher probability for high-quality workers than for low-quality workers, and high reports
lower the odds of an applicant being low quality. The acceptance advantage is a strict advantage
for the high type in a given channel precisely when the firm hires selectively in that channel,
φ jh(dj) > φ jℓ(dj)⇔ dj = 1 for j ∈ {F, I}.
Unlike the single-channel benchmark, the high-quality type’s acceptance advantages in the
formal and informal channels may result in either the high type or the low type choosing a
greater arrival probability in the informal channel. Since the incentive to use the informal
channel increases with φIq but decreases with φFq, a strict acceptance advantage for the high
type in the informal channel creates incentive for the high type to choose a greater arrival
probability relative to the low type, whereas a strict acceptance advantage for the high type
in the formal channel creates incentive for the high type to choose a lower arrival probability,
relative to the low type. For arrival probability choices which are not zero, equation (3.15)
gives
pIh(dF , dI) ≷ pIℓ(dF , dI) if and only if (1 − pF ·φFh)φIh ≷ (1 − pF ·φFℓ)φIℓ. (3.20)
We see that the high type may potentially use the informal channel more than the low type
if the firm’s hiring strategy d gives him a suﬃcient strict advantage in the informal channel,
φIh suﬃciently greater than φIℓ, due to selective informal hiring, or may potentially use the
informal channel less than the low type, if the firm’s hiring strategy d gives him a suﬃcient
strict advantage in the formal channel, φFh >> φFℓ, due to selective formal hiring.
I first compare the arrival probabilities chosen by workers in response to strategies for
which the firm does not hire selectively in the informal channel, and then examine strategies
for which the firm does hire selectively in the informal channel. The resulting findings are
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dI = 2 dI = 1
dF = 0 pIh = pIℓ pIh>pIℓ
dF = 1 pIh<pIℓ pIh>pIℓ, pIh = pIℓ, pIh<pIℓ
dF = 2 pIh = pIℓ pIh>pIℓ
Table 3.1: Comparison of Worker Arrival Probabilities
When non-zero, the possible ranking of workers’ best-response arrival probabilities,
pIh(dF , dI) and pIℓ(dF , dI), is shown for each combination of formal and informal hiring
strategies.
summarized in Table 3.1.
Suppose the firm does not hire selectively in the informal channel. Since I exclude firm
strategies with dI = 0, this means the firm hires absolutely in the informal channel, dI = 2.
When all applications are accepted regardless of report, high- and low-quality types will have
an equal chance of being accepted in the informal channel, given that the firm received their
informal applications, that is, φIh(2) = φIℓ(2) = 1. If the firm also does not hire selectively in
the formal channel, following a strategy of either no hiring or absolute hiring dF = 0 or dF = 2,
then both worker types have equal conditional acceptance probabilities in the formal channel
as well, either φFh(0) = φFℓ(0) = 0 or φFh(2) = φFℓ(2) = 1. In this case both worker types have
identical incentives to use the informal channel so pIh(dF , 2) = pIℓ(dF , 2) for dF ∈ {0, 2}. On the
other hand, if the firm hires selectively in the formal channel, so that dF = 1, then high-report
applications are favoured, so high-quality workers have a greater formal conditional acceptance
probability, φFh(1) > φFℓ(1). In this case a high-quality worker does not benefit as much as a
low-quality worker does from the chance of reaching the firm informally, and so even though
all informal applications are equally likely to be accepted, over all the high-quality worker has
less incentive to use the informal channel than the low-quality worker, pIh(1, 2) < pIℓ(1, 2). We
see that the high worker type never chooses a higher arrival probability than the low type when
the firm adopts a strategy of absolute hiring in the informal channel, a result I state formally as
follows:
Lemma 12. Assuming best response arrival probabilities are non-zero, we have pIh(dF , 2) ≤
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pIℓ(dF , 2). The strict inequality holds if and only if dF = 1.
Now suppose that the firm hires selectively in the informal channel, dI = 1, so that in-
formal applications with high reports are favoured. Then the high-quality type has a greater
conditional acceptance probability in the informal channel than the low type, φIh(1) > φIℓ(1).
If both worker types have equal formal conditional acceptance probabilities φFh(dF) = φFℓ(dF),
such that the firm treats high- and low-report applications the same in the formal channel (ei-
ther with no formal hiring dF = 0 or absolute formal hiring dF = 2) then the high-quality
worker has more incentive to use the informal channel relative to the low-quality worker due
to his advantage in the informal channel. Therefore pIh(dF , 1) > pIℓ(dF , 1) for dF ∈ {0, 2}.
However, when the firm hires selectively in the informal channel, dI = 1, if the firm also
favours high-report applications in the formal channel, dF = 1, then the high-quality type has
an acceptance advantage in both formal and informal channels and it is not obvious whether
or not he will have more incentive over all to choose a greater arrival probability relative to
the low-quality type. This will depend on whether the high type’s added incentive to use the
informal channel due to an informal acceptance advantage outweighs his reduced incentive to
use the informal channel due to also having a formal acceptance advantage. Which advantage
has a stronger eﬀect will be determined by the magnitudes of formal and informal report errors,
εF and εI , and by the application arrival probability in the formal channel pF , as follows:
Lemma 13. Assuming best response arrival probabilities are non-zero, we have
pIh(1, 1) > pIℓ(1, 1) if and only if εI − εF < 1−pFpF (1−2εI),
pIh(1, 1) < pIℓ(1, 1) if and only if εI − εF > 1−pFpF (1−2εI),
pIh(1, 1) = pIℓ(1, 1) if and only if εI − εF = 1−pFpF (1−2εI).
This result follows directly from evaluating the direction of the inequality in condition
(3.20) for φFh(1, 1) = 1 − εF , φIh(1, 1) = 1 − εI , φFℓ(1, 1) = εF and φIℓ(1, 1) = εF . Intuitively,
given that the high-quality type is more likely to be hired through the formal channel, he will
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have more incentive to use the informal channel than the low type if and only if the informal re-
port error is not too much greater than the formal report error. Specifically, the informal report
error must not exceed the formal report error by more than the relative probability that formal
applications fail to reach the firm times the diﬀerence between high- and low-quality workers’
acceptance probabilities, φIh(1, 1)−φIℓ(1, 1) = 1−2εI . When the informal error is smaller than
the formal error, high-quality workers certainly will choose higher arrival probabilities. Other-
wise, if the informal error probability is too much greater than the formal error probability, the
high-quality worker’s acceptance advantage in the informal channel is not suﬃcient to induce
him to choose a higher informal arrival probability than the low-quality worker. How much
the informal error can exceed the formal error by in order for the high type to use the informal
channel more depends on the arrival probability of formal applications, pF . As this probability
approaches certainty, pF→1, the high-quality worker will have more incentive to use the infor-
mal channel according to whether or not informal reports are more precise than formal reports,
εI < εF . The lower the formal arrival probability pF is, the lower the error of informal reports
must be in order for the high-quality worker type to overall have more incentive to choose a
higher informal arrival probability than the low type.
In the one-channel model from the previous chapter we have seen that the informativeness
of the exogenous report and the quality of the pool associated with the endogenous signal were
complements. The above considerations suggest that this will continue to be the case in this
two-channel model with regard to the relation between the informativeness of the exogenous
informal report and the quality of the informal pool of applicants. However the relation be-
tween the informativeness of the formal report and the quality of the informal pool is likely
to be one of substitutes. This will be investigated and confirmed for the equilibrium pool of
informal applicants in Section 3.4.1.
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3.2.2 Equilibrium Basics
This analysis will be restricted to pure strategy Nash equilibria. In the equilibrium analyses
in the following sections, I will further restrict attention to pure strategy equilibria in which
p∗Ih > 0 and pIℓ > 0.
Definition 6. A pure strategy equilibrium consists of a firm hiring strategy d∗ = (d∗FH, d∗FL, d∗IH, d∗IL) ∈
{0, 1}4 and strategies for high- and low-quality workers p∗I = (p∗Ih, p∗Iℓ) ∈ R2+ such that:
1. Given workers’ strategies p∗Ih, p
∗




vq−w | Aj, Rj = i]·dji for i ∈ {H, L}.
2. Given the firm’s strategy d∗, worker q ∈ {h, l} chooses p∗Iq to maximize
(w−b)Φq(d∗, pIq)+b−γ(pIq),
where Φq(d, pIq) = pF ·φFq(d) + (1−pF ·φFq(d))pIq·φIq(d).
Before turning to the equilibrium analysis I will make the following basic observations
about equilibria in this model:
Observation 1. An equilibrium with firm strategy equal to (d∗FH, d∗FL, 0, 0) always exists for
some d∗FH ∈ {0, 1} and d∗FL ∈ {0, 1}.
Observation 2. If there exists an equilibrium with non-zero informal arrival and firm strategy






IL), then there does not simultaneously exist any other non-zero
informal arrival equilibrium with the same firm strategy.
Observation 3. An equilibrium with firm strategy (d∗FH, d∗FL, d∗IH, d∗IL) and an equilibrium with
firm strategy (dˆFH, dˆFL, dˆIH, dˆIL) where dˆFH ! d∗FH or where dˆFL ! d
∗
FL, can only coex-
ist for parameter settings such that the inequalities in conditions (3.1) or (3.3) hold as
equality.
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The first observation points out that non-use of the informal channel can always be sus-
tained in equilibrium. For any given vh, vℓ,w, s, εF , there will be some d∗FH, d
∗
FL which are
optimal, so an equilibrium with (d∗FH, d
∗





As in the single-channel benchmark, non-use of the informal channel is a best response for
both worker types if the firm never hires through the informal channel, and any informal hiring
strategy can be included in a best response for the firm if workers never arrive in the informal
channel. 7 Therefore non-use of the informal channel in equilibrium may always be explained
trivially, occurring perhaps as a social norm. The existence of such equilibria will not be the
focus of my analysis in the next section (in fact such a trivial equilibrium must always exist,
since non-use of the informal channel by workers and firms can always be paired with a choice
of hiring pattern in the formal channel appropriate for the given parameter setting), although we
will take interest in circumstances under which non-use of the informal channel is the unique
informal hiring pattern possible in equilibrium.
The second observation is that equilibria may be categorized according to the firm strategy
used. This observation does not suggest that equilibria are unique. For example, we know
from Observation 1 that if there is an equilibrium with firm strategy profile d∗ = (1, 1, 1, 0) it
must coexist with an equilibrium with firm strategy profile d∗ = (1, 1, 0, 0). However, there can
never exist two equilibria with the same firm hiring strategy. This is because for any given firm
strategy and parameter setting, there is a unique worker best response given by equation (4.3).
So equilibria may be categorized by the firm’s strategy.
The third observation is that for a given parameter setting, there will typically be only one
formal hiring strategy admissible for equilibrium. Again this is because the best response for
the firm in the formal channel is determined directly by vh, vℓ, s and εF , and is unique except
the knife-edge case when either of the inequalities in condition (3.1) or (3.3) holds as equality.
7As mentioned before, the optimal decision for the formal channel is independent of the strategy of the infor-
mal channel.
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3.3 Equilibrium Use of the Informal Channel
In this section I will investigate the existence of equilibria in which the informal channel is
actually “used.” This requires that the choice of informal arrival probability is strictly positive
for at least one worker type, and that the firm accepts at least some applications which it
receives through the informal department.
However, there can be no pure strategy Nash equilibria in which the informal channel
is used by one worker type and not the other. This is because use of the informal channel
by the firm is incompatible with the negative expected profit from informal hiring which is
guaranteed if only low types arrive in the informal channel, and also because the absolute
hiring pattern which the firm would follow if only high types arrive in the informal channel
is incompatible with non-use of the informal channel by low types. So in any equilibrium
in which the informal channel is used, we will have non-zero informal arrival probabilities
for both worker types, p∗Ih, p
∗
Iℓ > 0 (which I will refer to simply as “non-zero arrival” in
the informal channel). In the context of non-zero arrival, recall that we may use the reduced
notation (dF , dI) ∈ {0, 1, 2} × {1, 2} to express the firm’s strategy when convenient rather than
d = (dFH, dFL, dIH, dIL) ∈ {0, 1}4.
For any equilibrium in which the informal channel is used, the firm’s strategy d∗ must
satisfy the conditions (3.5)-(3.8) evaluated using the pool factor which must arise when workers
best-respond to d∗. I will denote the pool adjustment factor which results from the firm strategy
(d∗F , d
∗
I ) = (i, j) by the term Λ
i j ≡ pIℓ(i, j)
pIh(i, j)
for i ∈ {0, 1, 2} and j ∈ {1, 2}.
I will first focus on absolute use of the informal channel in equilibrium, that is, I will
examine equilibria in which d∗I = 2, and then I will address equilibria in which the informal
channel is used selectively, with d∗I = 1.
In each case, I will also address the qualitative aspects of the use of informal applications.
In both the one-channel and two-channel models, applications serve a purpose to the firm
and workers in diﬀerent dimensions; first, by connecting workers to firms so that they can be
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considered for hire, and second, by providing information to the firm concerning the quality of
the applicant. In particular, in addition to the direct information the application may contain in
the report, it may also convey indirect information endogenously through the composition of
the pool of applicants, as is the case with informal applications. Although an application may
have value in all dimensions simultaneously, they may not all be of equal importance depending
on the industry setting. For example, when the relative gain from high-quality workers is
very high, so that the profit from a high-quality hire easily outweighs the loss in profit from a
low-quality hire, informational contributions might be a less important aspect of applications
than their connective value. Recall that Section 2.2.4 outlined the circumstances under which
applications could be qualitatively interpreted as having primary value as a “door,” as a “report”
and as a “signal.” Here it will be shown in the two-channel model which (primary) functions
informal applications can serve when the formal channel has value as a door, as a report, or is
not used,8 and under what circumstances.
3.3.1 Absolute Informal Hiring in Equilibrium
In any equilibrium in which the firm hires absolutely in the formal channel, so that dIh+dIℓ = 2
and (d∗F , d
∗
I ) = (i, 2) for some i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, it must be the case that the relative gain from high-
quality workers exceeds the odds that a low-report informal applicant is truly low-quality when
workers are best-responding to (d∗F , d
∗









by Lemma 10, whereΛi2 ≡ pIℓ(i, 2)
pIh(i, 2)
as noted above. However, by Lemma 12 we know that any
equilibrium with non-zero arrival and absolute informal hiring will have pIℓ(i, 2) ≥ pIh(i, 2),
so the informal pool adjustment factor must be at least weakly unfavourable, Λi2 ≥ 1. This
8Note that formal applications can never have value as a signal, since the pool of formal applicants is ex-
ogenously determined and always neutral. For this reason formal applications also need no restriction on how
favourable the pool can be in order to have primary value as a report, in contrast to Chapter 2.
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unfavourable informal pool factor implies that the low-quality odds for low-report informal





. This means that condition (3.21), and therefore
absolute informal hiring, can only be satisfied in industries which are generally profitable and
for which reports are not decisive:









It follows from Lemma 14 that there can be no equilibrium with non-trivial use of the
informal channel which has absolute hiring in the informal channel but no hiring in the formal
channel, that is, which has (d∗F , d
∗
I ) = (0, 2), because a hiring strategy with d
∗
F = 0 can never be
optimal for the firm in a generally profitable industry.
There is also a further necessary condition for supporting absolute informal hiring together
with selective formal hiring in an equilibrium with non-zero informal arrival, namely that for-
mal reports must be more precise than informal reports:
Lemma 15. For the existence of any equilibrium with (d∗F , d∗I ) = (1, 2) and non-zero informal
arrival we must have εI ≥ εF.
Proof. Suppose (d∗F , d
∗




ℓ > 0. In order for selective
formal hiring to be optimal while absolute informal hiring is optimal, the firm must be will-
ing to accept low-report informal applicants,
vh−w
w−vl ≥ O(ℓ:h|AI∩L), while also rejecting low-
report formal applicants,
vh−w
w−vl ≤ O(ℓ:h|AF∩L). This is only possible when O(ℓ:h|AI∩L) <















However, the odds of an applicant being low quality can not be smaller in the informal channel
given a low report than in the formal channel given a low report, such that this interval is
non-empty, unless the quality composition of the pool of applicants is superior in the informal
Chapter 3. Two-Channel Model of Hiring 82










whenever εI < εF . Now by Lemma




> 1, so the interval in condition (3.22) can not exist in equilibrium if εI < εF .
The following proposition characterizes the equilibria in which the informal channel is used
absolutely with non-zero arrival.






. There are the following two kinds of equilibria
with d∗ = 2 and non-trivial use of the informal channel:
(a) (d∗F , d
∗













(b) (d∗F , d
∗




wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))), p∗Iℓ = ψ(wˆ(1−pFεF)).











wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))) ≤ vh−ww−vl s1−s εI1−εI . (3.23)
A formal proof is presented in Appendix B. The non-negativity conditions in each case,
wˆ(1−pF) > γ ′(0) and wˆ(1−pF(1−εF)) > γ ′(0), ensure that workers have strictly positive arrival
probabilities in equilibrium, while the conditions on the relative gain ratio
vh−w
w−vl in relation





, ensure that the formal
hiring strategy in each case is optimal. As seen in Table 3.1, when there is absolute hiring
in both channels, the pool of informal applicants will be neutral, Λ22 = 1. Therefore in (a),
absolute informal hiring can be sustained together with absolute formal hiring simply because







. However in (b), because selective formal hiring together with absolute
informal hiring must lead to an unfavourable informal pool, Λ12 > 1, an additional condition
is required in order to sustain this equilibrium. In this setting the firm would be willing to
hire absolutely in the formal channel given a neutral informal pool, but an unfavourable pool
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raises the odds that a given applicant is low-quality. Thus an equilibrium with (d∗F , d
∗
I ) =
(1, 2) requires additionally that the corresponding pool of informal applicants Λ12 be not too
unfavourable.
Qualitatively, in the equilibria described by Proposition 7 the industry is generally prof-
itable, informal reports are not decisive, and informal applications have primary value as a
“door.” Use of the informal channel reduces connection frictions between workers and the
firm, while the firm accepts any applicant it encounters through this channel. As described in
the one-channel model of the previous chapter, applications can have primary value as a door








. In (a) we see that informal applications can have primary value as
a door when formal applications also have primary value as a door. This is the case when the
industry is generally profitable but neither formal nor informal reports are decisive. When both
types of applications function as a door, the pool of informal applicants is neutral.












rect information conveyed to the firm by the application is accurate enough to dictate the hiring
decision when drawing from a neutral pool, and the application can have primary value as a
“report.” From (b) we see that in the two-channel model informal applications can have pri-
mary value as a door while the formal channel has value primarily as a report. When informal
applications have primary value as a report but formal applications do not, the pool of informal
applicants has a worse composition than that of the general population.
3.3.2 Selective Informal Hiring in Equilibrium
Selective use of the informal channel can also be supported in equilibrium with non-zero in-
formal arrival, again with some restrictions. First, it is impossible to sustain an equilibrium
with d∗I = 1 in a generally profitable industry when neither formal nor informal reports are
decisive. In such a setting we would certainly have d∗F = 2, and as discussed in Section 3.2.1,
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high-quality workers would have more incentive to use the informal channel than low-quality
workers. Thus the informal pool adjustment factor would be favourable and the informal chan-
nel odds of low quality,O(ℓ:h|AI∩H) andO(ℓ:h|AI∩L), would decrease. In particular, we would
have O(ℓ:h|AI∩L) < 1−ss
1−εI
εI
and the firm would not wish to reject low-report informal ap-
plicants. That is, if the relative gain in the industry is high enough that the firm is willing to
hire all informal applicants given a neutral pool, it must be also willing to hire all informal
applicants when the pool is adjusted favourably.
Secondly, an equilibrium with selective informal hiring can not be sustained together with
absolute formal hiring if εI ≥ εF . This is again because a hiring strategy (d∗F , d∗I ) = (2, 1) will
result in a favourable informal pool factor,
pIℓ(2, 1)
pIh(2, 1)
< 1. If reports have (at least weakly) larger
error in the informal channel, and the informal channel additionally receives a favourable pool
adjustment, then low-report informal applicants can not be rejected while formal low-report
applicants are accepted. These necessary conditions are formalized as follows:














Lemma 17. For any equilibrium with (d∗F , d∗I ) = (2, 1) and non-zero informal arrival we must
have εI < εF.
The following propositions give necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of
equilibria with non-zero informal arrival in which the informal channel is used selectively.
Propositions 8 and 9 examine the existence of equilibria with selective informal hiring when
informal reports are decisive, for informal reports which are and are not suﬃciently superior
to formal reports respectively. Propositions 10 and 11 examine the existence of equilibria with
selective informal hiring when informal reports are not decisive, for generally unprofitable and
generally profitable industries respectively.












and εI − εF ≥ 1−pFpF (1−2εI). There
is only one possible equilibrium with non-trivial use of the informal channel:
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(d∗F , d
∗




wˆ(1 − pF(1 − εF))(1 − εI)), p∗Iℓ = ψ(wˆ(1 − pFεF)εI).






wˆ(1−pF(1−εF)(1 − εI)) ≤ vh−ww−vl s1−s 1−εIεI . (3.24)
Here informal reports are decisive but the informal report error is large relative to the formal
report error, such that εI−εF ≥ 1−pFpF (1−2εI). Because this implies εI > εF , and because infor-












, it must be the case that













antees that selective hiring is optimal in the formal channel. It also means that selective hiring
would be optimal in the informal channel, given a neutral pool factor. By Lemma 13 this will be
the case when the condition εI − εF ≥ 1−pFpF (1−2εI) holds with equality, whereas the informal
pool composition will be unfavourable when the inequality is strict. However, condition (3.24)
ensures that this pool is not so unfavourable as to prevent the firm from being willing to accept
high-report applicants. Again, the non-negativity condition wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))(1−εI) > γ ′(0)
ensures non-zero arrival in the informal channel, and a full proof is presented in Appendix B.












and εI − εF < 1−pFpF (1−2εI). There
are the following three possible kinds of equilibria with non-trivial use of the informal channel:
(a) (d∗F , d
∗




wˆ(1−εI)), p∗Iℓ = ψ(wˆεI).













wˆ(1−εI)) ≥ vh−ww−vl s1−s εI1−εI . (3.25)
(b) (d∗F , d
∗




wˆ(1 − pF(1 − εF))(1 − εI)), p∗Iℓ = ψ(wˆ(1 − pFεF)εI).


















wˆ(1−pF(1−εF)(1 − εI)) ≥ vh−ww−vl s1−s εI1−εI . (3.26)
(c) (d∗F , d
∗




wˆ(1 − pF)(1 − εI)), p∗Iℓ = ψ(wˆ(1 − pF)εI).











wˆ(1 − pF)(1−εI)) ≥ vh−ww−vl s1−s εI1−εI . (3.27)
In this setting, informal report errors are either smaller than or not too much greater than
formal report errors, and informal reports are decisive. In each part (a), (b) and (c), the condi-
tions on the relative gain ratio
vh−w






, ensure that the formal hiring strategy in each case is optimal. In (a)
the industry is generally unprofitable and formal reports are not decisive, which corresponds
to no formal hiring, d∗F = 0; in (b) formal reports are decisive, which corresponds to selective
formal hiring, d∗F = 1; and in (c) the industry is generally unprofitable and formal reports are
not decisive, which corresponds to absolute formal hiring, d∗F = 2.
Now in each of these cases, the informal pool composition is favourable. We can see
from Table 3.1 that Λ01 < 1 and Λ21 < 1, while Λ11 < 1 by Lemma 13 because εI − εF <
1−pF
pF
(1−2εI). Since informal reports are decisive, we know the firm would be willing to hire
selectively given a neutral pool, and therefore it is willing to hire selectively given a favourable
pool, provided that it is not too favourable (otherwise the firm would deviate to absolute in-
formal hiring). Therefore the requirement in each part of this proposition that the informal
pool adjustment factor be not too high ensures that selective informal hiring d∗I = 1 is opti-
mal. In these equilibria, use of the informal channel must also not be prohibitively costly. This
is assured for low-type workers by the conditions wˆεI > γ ′(0), wˆ(1 − pFεF)εI > γ ′(0), and
wˆ(1 − pF)εI > γ ′(0) in (a), (b) and (c) respectively. Since pℓ(i, 1) < ph(i, 1) for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}
these conditions assure non-zero arrival by high-type workers as well.








, it is impossible to satisfy the conditions that Λ11 or Λ21
are “low enough” given that arrival is strictly costly.
Qualitatively, in the equilibria described by Propositions 8 and 9 informal reports are de-
cisive and informal applications have primary value as a “report.” Here the informal channel
has value to the firm not simply as a method of connecting with unemployed workers, but as a
way of helping the firm improve the quality of hires (relative to hiring randomly from the gen-
eral population). This is possible due to the fact that direct information conveyed by informal
reports suﬃciently indicates quality to the firm.9 These propositions show that when informal
reports are not too weak, informal applications may have primary value as a door while formal
applications have primary value as a door, as a report, or have no value (and are not used)
at all, depending on the level of general profitability of the industry. In each of these cases,
because the firm makes use of report information, high-quality workers have more incentive to
use the informal channel than low-quality workers. This means that although the firm is already
willing to hire high-report applicants on the basis of the report information alone, informal ap-
plications give additional benefit to the firm by increasing the expected profit per informal hire.
As in the one-channel model, this function of the informal channel requires that the informal
pool of applicants be not too favourable. On the other hand, when informal reports are suﬃ-
ciently weak relative to formal reports, informal applications may have primary value as a door
only while formal applications have primary value as a report. In this case, due to the strong
superiority of formal reports, high-quality workers may have less incentive to use the informal
channel than low-quality workers. In such a situation informal applications somewhat reduce
the expected profit per informal hire, although the firm suﬃciently benefits from the direct in-
formation of the reports to remain willing to hire high-report applicants. In contrast with the
one-channel model, informal applications can function as a report in this situation only if the
pool of informal applicants is not too unfavourable.
9In fact, the industry may be generally unprofitable in these propositions. In that case the only way connection
to workers is valued is if such connection comes in conjunction with report information.
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The following characterizes the existence of equilibria with non-zero informal arrival and
selective informal hiring when informal reports are not decisive and the industry is generally
unprofitable:





1−εI . There are the following two kinds of equilibria
with non-trivial use of the informal channel:
(a) (d∗F , d
∗




wˆ(1−εI)), p∗Iℓ = ψ(wˆεI).




























(b) (d∗F , d
∗




wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))(1−εI)), p∗Iℓ = ψ(wˆ(1−pFεF)εI).
































In this setting, the industry is generally unprofitable and reports are (at least weakly) not
decisive. In (a) formal reports are also (at least weakly) not decisive and the industry is gener-
ally unprofitable, therefore d∗F = 0 is optimal for the formal channel; whereas in (b) the formal
report is (at least weakly) decisive so d∗F = 1 is optimal in the formal channel. Since informal
reports are not decisive and the industry is generally unprofitable, the firm would not be will-
ing to hire any applicants given a neutral informal pool of applicants. However, in both cases
the pool of informal applicants must be favourable. Therefore the informal pool adjustment
factor must be suﬃciently favourable to induce the firm to accept high-report applicants, such
that
vh−w
w−vl ≥ O(ℓ:h|AI∩H). However in order for the firm to hire selectively in the informal
channel, the pool must also not be too favourable, such that low-report applicants are rejected,
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vh−w
w−vl ≤ O(ℓ:h|AI∩L). Therefore in each case the pool adjustment factor Λ
01 or Λ11, must not
be too high, but must also be high enough.
Qualitatively, in the equilibria described by Proposition 10 the industry is generally un-
profitable, informal reports are not decisive and informal applications have primary value as a
“signal.” Here successful functioning of the informal channel relies on the ability of endoge-
nous networking to generate a superior quality composition for the pool of informal applicants.
This does not mean that all informal applicants are hired indiscriminately, in fact as shown by
Lemma 12, an endogenously superior pool of applicants can not be maintained if all informal
applications are accepted. However, by using its informal screening technology to selectively
hire only high-report informal applicants, the firm enables high-quality applicants to use the
informal channel as a means of further “signalling” their quality through application arrival.
As found in the one-channel model, signal use of the informal channel requires a suﬃciently
favourable pool of applicants, but also the pool of applicants must not be too favourable. We
see that informal applications can have primary value as a signal when formal reports have
primary value as a report or when formal applications are not used at all. However, informal
applications can not have primary value as a signal when formal applications have primary
value as a door.
Remark 3. In a generally unprofitable industry where formal reports are decisive, it is impos-
sible to sustain equilibrium use of the informal channel when informal reports are not decisive
and the informal report error is too great.












1−εI . For a relative
gain ratio in this range, only Proposition 10(b) is relevant for existence of equilibria with use of
the informal channel, and such equilibria can not be sustained when εI − εF ≥ 1−pFpF (1−2εI).
In the one-channel model, mixed strategy Nash equilibria were considered, and shown in some
cases to be able to close the “gaps” in the regions of existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria,
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for example in regions where selective hiring could not be sustained because the favourable
pool would cause the firm to deviate to absolute hiring but absolute hiring could not be sus-
tained because the neutral pool would cause the firm to deviate to selective hiring. Although
mixed strategy equilibria have not been presented for the two-channel model, it can be shown
that the above remark holds true even when allowing for mixed strategy Nash equilibria.
Finally, the informal channel may be used in equilibrium with selective hiring in the pres-
ence of an unfavourable pool.






. There is only one possible equilibrium with
d∗I = 1 and non-trivial use of the informal channel:
(d∗F , d
∗




wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))(1−εI)), p∗Iℓ = ψ(wˆ(1−pFεF)εI).




























Here informal reports are not decisive and the industry is generally profitable. In order
to support selective informal hiring in this setting, the informal pool adjustment factor must
be suﬃciently unfavourable that
vh−w
w−vl ≥ O(ℓ:h|AI∩L). An unfavourable pool factor, that is
p∗Iℓ > p
∗
Ih, can only be supported with selective informal hiring for d
∗
F = 1 (as reviewed in Table
3.1), and requires εI > εF +
1−pF
pF





. The pool adjustment factor Λ11 must also not be too unfavourable otherwise the
firm will deviate to no hiring in the informal channel, d∗I = 0. A formal proof is given in
Appendix B.
Qualitatively this equilibrium shares some similarities to the equilibria with absolute hiring
in Proposition 7. The informal channel is used despite the fact that informal reports are not
decisive, because the industry is generally profitable and the informal channel oﬀers a way for
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the firm and workers to connect. As in Proposition 7(b), the informal channel is also used
despite its quality composition being worse than that of the general population. However, in
this equilibrium the firm also uses the informal report to “sift” applicants, which requires that
the unfavourable pool eﬀect is strong enough to make absolute informal hiring unattractive.
This may seem to contradict the existence of an equilibrium with (d∗F , d
∗
I ) = (1, 2) and p
∗
Iℓ >
p∗Ih > 0 observed under similar conditions in Proposition 7. It is worth noting that equilibria of
these two types may in fact coexist. The following Lemma establishes that the region in which
these two equilibria can exist is the only region in which two equilibria with non-zero use of
the informal channel may coexist within an open set. However, recall that the pool adjustment
factor does not exogenously determine whether d∗I = 1 or d
∗
I = 2 is optimal for the firm, rather,
both firm strategies can be compatible in equilibrium with the pool compositions they induce.




















1−εF , then this equilibrium is the unique
equilibrium with non-trivial use of the informal channel.







. Since non-zero use of the informal
channel in equilibrium requires d∗I ∈ {1, 2}, Propositions 7 and 11 cover all possible non-













, only the conditions of
Proposition 7(a) can be satisfied, so the equilibrium must have (d∗F , d
∗
I ) = (2, 2). Since there
can be at most one non-zero best response for workers to this hiring strategy, this equilibrium
is unique.







. Then by Lemma 14, any equilibrium with













, the firm can not be indiﬀerent in regard to any application received in the
formal channel, because no two conditions in Lemma 9 can be satisfied simultaneously. Since
there can only be one firm strategy which is optimal in the formal channel, and d∗I = 1 must be
optimal in the informal channel, and since there can be at most one non-zero best response for
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workers to this firm strategy, this equilibrium is unique. #
3.4 Additional Analyses
This section presents comparative statics and welfare results for the two-channel model, and
discusses the implications of the assumption that the firm delegates hiring to independent de-
partments.
In Section 3.4.1 I find complementarity as in the one-channel model between the informal
screening technology and the informal pool of applicants, while improvements to the formal
screening technology have an unfavourable eﬀect on the informal pool. I also find that the two-
channel model exhibits generally non-monotonic relationships between equilibrium outcomes
and parameters, such that equilibrium predictions and welfare eﬀects are sensitive to parameter
settings and the structure of arrival costs, γ(p). Accordingly, Chapter 4 will revisit this analysis
for particular cases where the structure of the relationship between cost and informal arrival
probability is based on networking activities. Section 3.4.2 discusses the eﬀect of the delegation
assumption on firm profits, and Section 3.4.3 compares equilibrium outcomes under alternative
delegation and centralized hiring assumptions.
3.4.1 Comparative Statics and Welfare
As previously, I will restrict attention to non-trivial use of the informal channel in equilibrium.
In accordance with Observation 2 from Section 3.2.2, I will classify equilibria with non-zero
arrival according to the firm strategy used. Within a given class of equilibria with firm strategy
(d∗F , d
∗
I ) = (i, j) ∈ {0, 1, 2} × {1, 2}, recall that the pool of informal applicants will be given






, where φ∗Ah = (1−ε)d∗AH + εd∗AL and φ∗Aℓ = εd∗AH + (1−ε)d∗AL for
A ∈ {F, I}.
As in the one-channel model, the pool of informal applicants will improve if there is an
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improvement in the firm’s ability to screen applicants in the informal channel (at least weakly;
if the firm does not make use of informal reports, d∗I ! 1, a change in screening ability is
irrelevant within that class of equilibria). However, a change in formal report error has the
opposite eﬀect on the informal pool of applicants. This is because the formal channel is like an
outside option for workers which is more attractive to high types than low types the lower its
report error. Thus we have the following result in the two-channel model:
Lemma 19. Within a given class of equilibria with firm strategy (d∗F , d∗I ) = (i, j) ∈ {0, 1, 2} ×
{1, 2}, it is the case that dΛ
i j
dεI




As in the one-channel model, for equilibria within a fixed firm strategy, improvements in
the firm’s ability to screen through informal reports are beneficial to the firm and high-quality
workers, but not for low-quality workers. However, the same can not be said for improvements
in the firm’s formal channel screening ability.
Lemma 20. Firm profits may be increasing or decreasing in εF.
It is intuitive that profit could decrease as a result of weaker formal screening technology,
because an increase in εF will lower the expected profits from hires made through the formal
channel. However, an increase in the formal report error will also improve the pool of appli-
cants in the informal channel, because a reduction in the advantage of high-quality workers
in the formal channel and increases their incentive to invest in informal application. Thus the
overall eﬀect on profits of an increased formal report error will depend on the size of these two
eﬀects. There can also be another eﬀect which arises due to the separate objectives of the two
channels, because both channels are aiming to maximize the expected profits from their own
acceptances rather than trying to maximize the overall profit of the firm. It is possible that a
change in formal report error can exacerbate or reduce the loss of profits from this delegation
eﬀect, when it exists. The extent to which this delegation issue aﬀects the firm’s profits in
general is discussed in Section 3.4.2.
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Lemma 21. The equilibrium pool of informal applicants may worsen or improve with an in-
crease in the wage;
dΛ∗
dw




ψ ′(wˆ(1−pFφFh)φIh) · (1−pFφFh)φIh ≷
ψ(wˆ(1−pFφFℓ)φIℓ)
ψ ′(wˆ(1−pFφFℓ)φIℓ) · (1−pFφFℓ)φIℓ . (3.31)
As in the one-channel model, increasing the wage may or may not improve the pool of
applicants. Condition (3.31) is very similar to the condition given in Lemma 2.38, except that
in this two-channel model it is not always the case that (1−pFφFh)φIh ≥ (1−pFφFℓ)φIℓ. There-
fore in the two-channel model it may be possible for
ψ
ψ ′
to be decreasing (ψ logarithmically
concave) and still have the informal pool improve with an increase in wage, if the equilibrium
is such that pool of informal applicants is unfavourable. Thus
ψ
ψ ′
decreasing implies that the
informal pool becomes worse with the wage in equilibria with p∗Ih > p
∗
Iℓ, such as when infor-
mal report errors are lower than formal report errors, and that it improves with the wage in
equilibria with p∗Ih < p
∗
Iℓ.
The influence of the wage on profits will comprise multiple eﬀects, as in the one-channel
model. First, there is a cost of labour eﬀect due to the fact that every hire must be paid the
diﬀerent wage. This eﬀect is negative and will be present when workers are hired through the
formal channel, while this and two additional eﬀects can be present when workers are hired
through the informal channel. There is a volume eﬀect because the overall number of workers
hired is aﬀected by a change in wage, since it changes workers’ arrival incentives. This eﬀect
will be generally positive, since the firm will generally make positive profit when it is willing to
hire, thus making additional volume desirable. There is also a pool composition eﬀect, because
the change in wage may not aﬀect high- and low-quality workers’ arrival incentives identically.
This eﬀect may be positive or negative because as previously shown, an increase in wage can
improve or degrade the composition of the pool of applicants. With two channels in operation,
a delegation eﬀect may also exist when the wage changes. As will be discussed in Section
3.4.2, the separate objectives of the formal and informal hiring oﬃces can sometimes lead to
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over-hiring and reduced profit for the firm. A change in wage and its subsequent eﬀect on
worker arrival probabilities can aﬀect the degree to which the delegation issue causes actual
hiring to be higher than optimal. Now although the eﬀect of wages on firm profit is unclear, for
both worker types higher wages are beneficial provided that the equilibrium hiring strategy of
the firm remains the same.
An increase in b is always good for workers, but it will cause both types to reduce their
eﬀort towards informal applications which may or may not be in such a way as to improve the
composition of pool of informal applicants. A change in b will have the exact opposite eﬀect
on the pool as a change in the wage, with
dΛ∗
db
≷ 0 if and only if
dΛ∗
dw
≶ 0. The firm is not
influenced directly by changes in the outside option of workers, but its profits will be aﬀected
to the extent that a change in b alters the volume and quality composition of its hires through
the informal channel.
Lemma 22. Firm profit may be increasing or decreasing in b, with dπ
∗
db













To illustrate this result, in the case of industries with high general profitability such that
(dF , dI) = (2, 2), workers have identical incentives to use the informal channel, so that we have
(1−pFφFh)φIh = (1−pFφFℓ)φIℓ. Therefore the firm’s profit decreases with an increase in b due
to the reduced volume of workers, and there is no eﬀect through the composition of the pool of
applicants.
Similarly, although the firm is not influenced directly by changes in the rate of accessibility
of the formal channel, pF , an increase in pF will aﬀect firm profits through the volume of
informal applicants and the quality composition of the informal pool.
Lemma 23. An increase in pF can worsen or improve the informal pool of applicants, with
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dΛ∗
dpF




ψ ′(wˆ(1−pFφFh)φIh) · φFhφIh ≷
ψ(wˆ(1−pFφFℓ)φIℓ)
ψ ′(wˆ(1−pFφFℓ)φIℓ) · φFℓφIℓ . (3.33)
Since φFhφIh ≥ φFℓφIℓ, improved access to the formal channel will necessarily improve
the informal pool of applicants when
ψ
ψ ′
is decreasing. However, if
ψ
ψ ′
is increasing the pool
may improve or worsen with an increase in pF . An increase in the formal arrival probability
is beneficial for workers but decreases their incentive to invest eﬀort in informal applications.
Depending on the eﬀect of the volume change and to what extent it is accompanied by an
improvement or degradation of the informal pool composition, a change in pF can either in-
crease or decrease firm profits. For industries with very high general profitability, such that
(dF , dI) = (2, 2) and φFh = φIh = φFℓ = φIℓ = 1, an increase in pF has no eﬀect on the compo-
sition of the informal pool of applicants. In this case only the change in the volume of workers




3.4.2 Delegation and Profits
As previously discussed, the hiring decision for each channel is made with the objective of
maximizing the expected profit from hires made through that channel, rather than the objective
of maximizing the firm’s overall profit. The expected profit from all workers accepted by the
formal channel is given by
πF(dF) = (vh−w)s·pFφFh(dF) − (w−vℓ)(1−s)·pFφFℓ(dF) (3.34)
and for the informal channel this expected profit is given by
πI(dF , dI) = (vh−w)s·pIh(dF , dI)φIh(dF , dI) − (w−vℓ)(1−s)·pIℓ(dF , dI)φIℓ(dF , dI). (3.35)
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Since a worker who happens to be accepted through both channels is hired only once, the actual
overall profit of the firm π(dF , dI) is not equal to πF(dF) + πI(dF , dI) because this would result
in double-counting profit in an amount equal to
πFI(dF , dI) = (vh−w)s·pFφFh(dF)·pIh(dF , dI)φIh(dI)
− (w−vℓ)(1−s)·pFφFℓ(dF)·pIℓ(dF , dI)φIℓ(dI).
(3.36)
This reflects the fact that from the perspective of the firm’s profit, an increase in expected profit
from one channel’s hires is only beneficial if it reflects “new” workers being hired, and not
workers which the firm can already gain profit from through the other channel’s hires. This
means that although the delegation of hiring to channels with these separate objectives may
sometimes lead to the same hiring decisions as would be reached with profit-maximization
as the common objective, it can sometimes lead to over-hiring. For example, suppose one
channel has high arrival rates and is very good at distinguishing quality, so that it is highly
likely to accept a great proportion of the high-quality workers in the population. Leaving each
channel to hire based on its own separate objective, the firm may not attain profit as high as it
would if it could induce the one channel to take into account the other channel’s likely hires.
In some cases this over-hiring problem may be severe enough that the firm would be better oﬀ
with only one hiring channel in operation.
Suppose that the firm has an established formal channel hiring process with dF ∈ {1, 2}. It
will be beneficial for the firm to also operate the informal channel with dI ∈ {1, 2} if and only
if πI − πFI > 0. After some algebra, this means it is beneficial to also operate the informal





· 1 − pFφFℓ(dF)












, the informal channel is beneficial to add, that is,
πI − πFI > 0.
Chapter 3. Two-Channel Model of Hiring 98
For dF = 2, the formal channel oﬀers both high- and low-quality workers an equally
valuable outside option, so
1 − pFφFℓ(dF)
1 − pFφFh(dF) =
1 − pF
1 − pF = 1. Thus on one hand, whenever





· pIh(dF , dI)
pIℓ(dF , dI)
· εI
1−εI the inequality (3.37) will be satisfied. On the other hand, the
inequality (3.37) will also be satisfied whenever the informal channel would find it strictly op-
timal to hire absolutely, dI = 2. This is because for (d∗F , d
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any generally profitable industry where formal reports are not accurate enough to be decisive,
so that the formal channel hires absolutely, the addition of the informal channel is beneficial.
However, for industries such that formal reports are decisive, such that dF = 1, it is possible
that if the industry is suﬃciently generally unprofitable, the over-hiring due to delegation may
cause the additional use of the informal channel to result in lower profits for the firm. If used,













· 1 − pFεF
1 − pF(1−εF) ·
εI
1−εI . (3.39)
Adding the informal channel will therefore be beneficial if the equilibrium is such that high-
quality workers network more that low-quality workers, that is, when εI − εF < 1−pFpF (1−2εI),
because in that case
1 − pFεF





. But when low-quality workers network


















the informal channel will hire selectively, dI = 1, if used. In this case, inequality 3.37 is






· 1 − pFεF







1 − pF(1−εF) > 1 for all εF <
1
2 , it will be the case that πI − πIF < 0 for industries
with suﬃcient low general profitability (such that the relative gain from a high-quality worker
is close enough to the left boundary of the interval in condition (3.40)) and the firm would be
better not to use the informal channel due to this delegation issue.
3.4.3 Delegation with Profit Maximization and Centralized Hiring
As mentioned previously, the most profitable hiring structure for the firm (ignoring imple-
mentation and organizational costs) would be obtained through complete centralization of the
hiring process. For each worker, the firm would receive either no formal report or a formal
report which suggests high or low quality, and in addition either no informal report or an infor-
mal report which suggests high or low quality. The firm would fully condition the odds of the
worker being low-quality on this combined information in best response to the workers’ arrival
probabilities, taking the resulting informal pool composition into account as well.
Alternatively, if implementing such a centralized hiring process would be costly or diﬃcult,
or if the firm finds itself in need of hiring expertise, the firm may choose to delegate either the
formal or informal hiring decisions, or both. In the model here, the firm has delegated the
decision to two separate hiring oﬃces which aim to maximize the expected profit of their own
hiring recommendations. Therefore although from the firm’s perspective this results in over-
hiring, in some cases it may be impossible to align each department’s independent objective
with the combined true profit of the firm. However, if it is possible, then instead of independent
objectives in the delegation model, the department hiring decisions could be profit-maximizing
for the firm. In a general model where the firm delegates hiring to two oﬃces with a profit-
maximizing objective, there may be more than one combination of hiring strategies (dF , dI)
which lead to the same level of overall firm profit, and it is also possible that multiple equilibria
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exist where the firm may achieve higher or lower levels of profit in equilibrium, depending on
how the oﬃces coordinate.
Now suppose the firm needed outside expertise in interpreting only one type of report and
were able to handle hiring through the other channel itself. Then the firm may be able to make
an appropriate adjustment to avoid any profit loss from delegation if the other delegated channel
makes its hiring decision first. For example, it may be that the formal channel is outsourced.
Then, knowing that dF will be chosen by the delegate in order to maximize πF as in equation
(3.34), when choosing dI the firm could maximize πI − πFI as in equation (3.36) given dF , pIh,
and pIℓ rather than maximizing πI as in equation (3.35), and this would resolve the problem
of over-hiring. If the firm were able to align the objectives of both departments, joint profit
maximization could also be achieved through coordination of the hiring strategies of the two
departments.
Adapting the model for delegation to separate oﬃces with a common profit-maximizing
objective is straightforward and tractable in the case where the formal hiring oﬃce makes its
hiring decision first and the informal channel follows. The formal department will use the same
decision rule as in Lemma 9, while the informal department will use the same decision rule as
in Lemma 10 whenever dF = 0 or dF = 2. Whenever dF = 1, the informal department will need
only a simple correction in the odds used in the cut-oﬀ decision rule in Lemma 10. Instead of
considering the odds that an informal applicant is low-quality conditional only on arrival in the
informal channel and the report received, the informal department must condition the odds on
the event that the applicant has not been accepted through the formal channel. Thus in place
of O(ℓ:h|AI ∩ RI) = O(ℓ:h) · Λ(ℓ:h|AI) · Λ(ℓ:h|AI ∩ RI) in conditions (3.5)-(3.8), the informal
department will compare the relative gain from a high-quality worker,
vh−w
w−vℓ , with
O(ℓ:h| AFc ∩ AI ∩ RI) = O(ℓ:h) · Λ(ℓ:h| AFc) · Λ(ℓ:h| AFc ∩ AI) · Λ(ℓ:h| AFc ∩ AI ∩ RI) (3.42)
where AFc is the event that the worker is not accepted through the formal channel, O(ℓ:h) is
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the prior odds of low quality, and the updating likelihood ratios are Λ(ℓ:h|AFc) = Pr(AF
c |ℓ)
Pr(AFc|h) ,
Λ(ℓ:h|AFc ∩ AI) = Pr(AI |AF
c ∩ ℓ)
Pr(AI |AFc ∩ h) and Λ(ℓ:h|AF
c ∩ AI ∩ RI) = Pr(RI |AI ∩ AF
c ∩ ℓ)
Pr(RI |AI ∩ AFc ∩ h) . Since




pFεF + (1−pF) . Since arrival in the formal channel is independent of infor-
mal arrival and informal reports, we have
Pr(AI |AFc ∩ ℓ)
Pr(AI |AFc ∩ h) =
Pr(AI |ℓ)
Pr(AI |h) and
Pr(RI |AI ∩ AFc ∩ ℓ)
Pr(RI |AI ∩ AFc ∩ h) =
Pr(RI |AI ∩ ℓ)
Pr(RI |AI ∩ h) as before. Thus with profit maximizing delegation when the formal channel
moves first, the only adaptation of the model presented is that when d∗F = 1, the informal
department uses the cutoﬀ
1−s
s
· pF(1−εF) + (1−pF)











1−εI in conditions (3.5) and (3.6), and the cutoﬀ
1−s
s
· pF(1−εF) + (1−pF)













in conditions (3.7) and (3.8). Since
pF(1−εF) + (1−pF)
pFεF + (1−pF) > 1, correct-
ing for formal channel hires increases the odds that any new applicant arriving to the informal
channel is low-quality. So as anticipated, this profit-maximizing adjustment has a conservative
influence on the informal department’s hiring decisions, but the main qualitative predictions of
the adjusted model are expected to be similar to the model analysed here.
Adapting the model for a completely centralized hiring process is more diﬃcult and will not
be done here. As an illustration of the diﬀerence in profit when the hiring decision is delegated
versus centralized, I will compare the centralized outcome and delegation in the special case




. The firm’s overall profit is equal to
π = (vh−w)sPr(hire|q=h) − (w−vℓ)(1−s)Pr(hire|q=ℓ), (3.45)
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where Pr(hire|q=h) and Pr(hire|q=ℓ) correspond to the probability that the firm actually hires
high-quality workers and low-quality workers respectively.
In the centralized decision framework, there are nine possible disjoint events (three possi-
bilities for each channel, namely that the report is high, is low, or does not arrive) which lead to
four diﬀerent outcomes. In any event where the firm receives a high formal report (regardless
of what is or is not received in the informal channel), the firm will hire the applicant, and simi-
larly in any event where the firm receives a low formal report it will not hire the applicant. This
is because the formal report fully reveals the type of the worker. For high-quality workers high
and low reports occur with the probability pF and 0 respectively, and for low-quality work-
ers these reports occur with the probability 0 and pF . If the firm does not receive any formal
report, but does receive an informal report, the firm may accept the applicant or not, but the
decision will not be contingent on the informal report because it is perfectly noisy. A worker of
type q will encounter this decision of the firm with probability (1−pF)pIq. Therefore overall,
this firm will hire high-quality workers with Pr(hire|q=h) = pF + (1−pF)pIh·z and low-quality
workers with Pr(hire|q=ℓ) = (1−pF)pIℓ·z where z ∈ [0, 1] is the firm’s decision of whether
to hire applicants who reach the firm through the informal channel but not through the formal
channel.
In contrast, suppose that the formal and informal oﬃces are separate. The formal hiring
oﬃce will accept all applications which arrive to it with a high report. This occurs for high-
quality workers with a probability of pF and for low-quality workers with a probability of 0.
The formal hiring oﬃce will reject all applications which arrive to it with a low report, which
occurs for high-quality workers with a probability of 0 and for low-quality workers with a
probability of pF . Meanwhile regardless of reports, the informal hiring oﬃce will either accept
or reject all applicants which reach it. A worker of type q will encounter this decision of the
firm with probability pIq. Let y ∈ [0, 1] denote the informal oﬃce’s decision of whether to
accept informal applicants. Then in the case of delegation, Pr(hire|q=h) = pF + (1−pF)pIh·y
and Pr(hire|q=ℓ) = pIℓ·y.
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When the firm chooses z in the centralized hiring oﬃce, it is known that the application did
not arrive in the formal channel, whereas when a separate informal hiring oﬃce chooses y, it
does not know whether or not the applicant has also arrived in the formal channel. If formal
arrival probabilities do not diﬀer by type, this will not aﬀect the prior used. However, this does
mean that some applicants who did arrive and had a low report in the formal channel may fail
to be rejected by the informal channel. Now when the informal oﬃce makes its choice of y, if
its objective is to maximize the profits from its own hires, it will care only about dF = 1 to the
extent that it aﬀects pIh and pIℓ. However, if the informal oﬃce’s objective is to maximize π
given dF = 1, it should generally choose y lower than it would if taking into account only the
arrival probabilities and population prior.
Note that choosing z = ywill result in identical pIh under both the centralized and decentral-
ized scenarios, but in a (weakly) lower piℓ under the centralized scenario. Then Pr(hire | q = h)
will be the same under the two scenarios but Pr(hire | q = ℓ) will be lower under the centralized
scenario, resulting in higher profits in that case.
In the delegation model with private objectives, complementarity was found between infor-
mal screening technology and the pool of informal applicants, while improved formal screening
technology had a negative eﬀect on the informal pool of applicants. It is possible for this neg-
ative influence to persist under a centralized hiring process. For example, consider a situation
in which it is optimal for the firm to accept applications which arrive only through one channel
with a high report, while if an applicant reaches the firm through both channels it is optimal for
the firm to hire if and only if at least one report is high. In this case we will have
Pr(hire|h) = pF(1−pIh)(1−εF) + pF pIh(1−εFεI) + (1−pF)pIh(1−εI) (3.46)
and
Pr(hire|ℓ) = pF(1−pIℓ)εF + pF pIℓ(1−(1−εF)(1−εI)) + (1−pF)pIℓεI . (3.47)
In this setting workers can increase their chance of being hired by increasing their arrival prob-




= (1−εI) − (1−εI)(1−εF)pF > 0 and ∂Pr(hire|ℓ)
∂pIℓ
= εI − εIεF pF > 0. In
the case of quadratic arrival costs, the optimal arrival for high-quality workers, p∗Ih, will be
proportional to (1−εI) − (1−εI)(1−εF)pF and the optimal arrival for low-quality workers, p∗Iℓ,
will be proportional to εI − εIεF pF . Thus an improvement in the formal screening technology
will lead high-quality workers to decrease their arrival probability,
dp∗Ih
dεF
> 0, while it will lead
low-quality workers to increase their arrival probability,
dp∗Iℓ
dεF
< 0, leading to an unfavourable








Networking in the Informal Channel
In this chapter I model the relationship between cost and arrival probabilities more explicitly as
the outcome of a networking process, in order to give structure to the arrival cost function and
obtain sharper comparative static results in the one- and two-channel models of the previous
chapters. The worker invests in networking, the intensity of which determines the probability
of his application’s arrival to the firm through the informal channel. I will consider in particular
the probability arising from a situation where each contact in a worker’s network gives access
to the firm with equal independent probability.
I find that networking costs have an intensifying eﬀect on the pool of informal applicants
in such a model; when the informal pool is favourable, increased networking costs improve the
informal pool composition further. The opposite is true for wages; when the informal pool is
favourable, increased wages worsen the quality of informal applicants. These results hold also
for any networking scenario with log-concave marginal probability of arrival.
Using this more explicit networking model I revisit the equilibrium results of the two-
channel hiring model and provide additional comparative statics. Finally I discuss two exam-
ples with an alternative structure for networking-based informal arrival probabilities and the
cases of type-dependent costs and type-dependent probabilities of application arrival.
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4.1 Model of Network-Based Informal Arrival
4.1.1 Arrival Probabilities and Cost Structure of Networking
In this section I consider how the endogenous arrival of applications in the informal channel of
the two-channel model presented in Chapter 3 may be network-based. That is, a type q ∈ {h, ℓ}
worker’s endogenous informal arrival probability pIq, and resulting incurred cost γ(pIq), may
be the outcome of that worker’s networking decision. First I discuss the networking scenario,
then I show how workers’ best responses and the pool of informal applicants depend on the
cost parameter of the networking scenario.
I abstract from the graph theoretical approach, focusing on the eﬀects of a worker’s net-
working behaviour rather than modelling an explicit network of links. Suppose that the infor-
mal arrival probability pIq depends on a worker’s network strength, nq. I do not restrict nq to
whole values, so nq ∈ R+ and the probability of the firm receiving a given worker’s application
informally is given by pIq = P(nq) ∈ [0, 1), with P(0) = 0. Therefore the arrival probabilities
in the informal channel will be pIh = P(nh) and pIℓ = P(nℓ). I will assume that P(n) is thrice
continuously diﬀerentiable.
I will focus primarily on the functional form P(n) = 1 − e−λn for λ > 0. This functional
form arises in models of endogenous network formation such as Calvo-Armengol (2004) and
Galeotti and Merlino (2014). In my reduced-form setting, this specification can be motivated
as follows. I will suppose network strength n corresponds to network size, such that n is the
number of contacts (measured continuously) in a given network. Suppose that each contact
fails to be useful with an independent probability which is identical for all contacts. This
probability can be expressed as (1e )
λ, for some λ > 0. The probability that all of the contacts
in a worker’s network fail to convey his informal application to the firm is therefore given by
(1e )
λn, or e−λn and the consequent probability that the worker’s informal application does reach
the firm is equal to P(n) = 1 − e−λn.1
1Alternatively, network strength could be defined as N with change of variables N = λn, so that network
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For this specification we can interpret the probability of a given worker’s informal applica-
tion reaching the firm as follows. Abstracting from the details of how individual contacts lead
to connection with the firm, suppose that the minimum network size required to successfully
connect with the firm through the informal channel is a random variable X which takes values
on the range R+. The cumulative distribution function of this random variable represents the
probability that the minimum network size has a value less than or equal to some given network
size n, P(X ≤ n). Therefore the cumulative distribution function of X represents the informal
arrival probability of a worker with network size n, so it is equal to the worker’s informal ar-
rival probability, P(X ≤ n) = P(n). The density of X is given by the marginal informal arrival
probability P′(n). The functional form P(n) = 1 − e−λn corresponds to the special case where
the random variable X follows an exponential distribution with rate parameter λ > 0.
This parameter gives the “hazard rate” for the exponential distribution, which is the ratio
of the density to the “survival” function Pr(X > n), that is
P′(n)
1 − P(n) . This ratio represents
the probability that, conditional on the failure of the worker’s informal application to arrive
given network size n, the next increment of networking will successfully connect the worker’s
informal application to the firm. The exponential distribution has the “memoryless” property
and therefore this hazard rate is constant,
P′(n)
1 − P(n) = λ. In the scenario above, although the
marginal benefit of networking is decreasing, due to P(n) strictly concave, each contact pro-
vides the same probability of helping a worker to reach the firm, regardless of that worker’s
existing network size. A worker with a large network who has not yet reached the firm infor-
mally has no more or less chance of success from his next (infinitesimal) contact than a worker
with a small network who has not yet reached the firm informally.
Alternatively, there are many plausible scenarios where the hazard rate is not constant. An
increasing hazard rate for the distribution of X would mean that contacts become more useful
toward successfully reaching the firm through the informal channel when the worker’s network
is larger. This could correspond to a scenario in which the networking process allows the
strength comprises the combination of the size of the network and the eﬀectiveness of contacts, and P(N) = 1−eN .
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worker to progressively improve his search. Suppose that some contacts are closer to the firm
than others, oﬀering a higher probability of helping a worker submit an informal application to
the firm. Their identities may be unknown initially, or perhaps they are not directly accessible.
Perhaps starting as an outsider a worker may need to invest substantial time and resources
before acquiring well-connected and powerful contacts. As a worker increases the size of his
network he may be increasingly able to work his way up into more important inner circles, thus
the more contacts he has acquired without connecting to the firm, the greater is the chance that
the next contact he reaches will bring success.
In contrast, a decreasing hazard rate for the distribution of X would describe a situation
where contacts are most valuable toward reaching the firm through informal channel when the
worker’s network is small, reflecting decreasing returns to scale in the search for or use of
contacts because the more promising opportunities are explored or exploited first. For example
this could correspond to a scenario in which the worker is well informed about where best to
devote initial networking eﬀorts. It could also occur when there is a high degree of overlap in
the services contacts oﬀer or whatever means of access to the informal channel potential con-
tacts provide tends to be very similar, and not cumulatively useful. Perhaps contacts improve a
worker’s informal arrival probability because they give a worker inside information about how
to reach the firm, but there is very little diﬀerence in the information the worker will receive
from diﬀerent contacts. This may be plausible when homophily eﬀects are strong in the net-
working process, so that a worker’s networking eﬀorts tend to lead to a network composed of
contacts with little diversity, making it more likely that the contribution from each new contact
will be redundant. In such cases, the conditional probability that an additional contact will
connect the worker to the firm may be smaller the greater is the number of existing contacts
which have already not been helpful.
A particularly tractable class of distributions that allow monotonic hazard rates are Weibull
distributions. This class of distributions is commonly used in a variety of disciplines due to its
flexibility in modelling either increasing or decreasing hazard rates such as may be involved in
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system failure due to component failure, or ageing and diﬀusion processes. If for example the
minimum required network size X follows aWeibull distribution, such that P(X ≤ n) = 1−e−λnk
for some rate parameter λ > 0, the shape parameter k > 0 determines whether the hazard rate is
decreasing (k < 1), or increasing (k > 1). The Weibull distribution reduces to the exponential
distribution, and therefore constant hazard rate, when the shape parameter is precisely k = 1.2
Although I place some focus on the special case of the functional form P(n) = 1 − e−λn,
the main results of this chapter hold for specifications of P(n) which in addition to being
strictly increasing and strictly concave, also have a logarithmically concave first derivative
(corresponding to logarithmic concavity of the probability density function of X). Logarith-
mic concavity of the density function implies that the distribution’s hazard rate is increas-
ing.3 Logarithmic concavity and the implied increasing hazard rate is a very common prop-
erty among well-known probability distributions, although logarithmically convex and non-
logarithmically-concave probability distributions are also not rare.4 Although the Weibull den-
sity, with cdf P(n) = 1 − e−λnk , is logarithmically convex and has a decreasing hazard rate
for k < 1, the main results of this chapter hold for this class of informal arrival probability
functions also. I will demonstrate this and discuss how the lack of the property of logarithmic
concavity of P′ can aﬀect equilibrium results for other functional forms in Section 4.2.2, and
briefly discuss type-dependent costs in Section 4.2.3.
Since a worker’s probability of reaching the informal department depends on that worker’s
network strength, a worker may achieve a desired informal arrival probability by increasing (or
decreasing) his networking activities to an appropriate level. Therefore informal arrival proba-
bilities are endogenously determined by workers through the choice of n, however, developing
2If adopting a Weibull distribution for X with k > 1 in this networking model, care must be taken because the
assumption that P(n) is strictly concave will hold only for n > k
√
k−1
k . However, this is certainly satisfied for all
n ≥ 1.
3For a summary of properties, examples, and applications of logarithmic concave functions and distributions,
see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2004).
4The density of the Weibull distribution satisfies logarithmic concavity when k > 1 and logarithmic convexity
when k < 1, while the density function of the exponential distribution (k = 1) is simultaneously logarithmically
convex and logarithmically concave. Note that it is possible for a density or function to be neither logarithmically
convex nor logarithmically concave.
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a network is costly to workers, according to some function Cq(n) : R+ → R+ with Cq(n) = 0.
In this chapter I will assume a type-independent cost function of the form Cq(n) = cn,
c > 0. Since the informal arrival probability resulting from a network strength of n is P(n),
we have γ(P(nq)) = cnq. The specification of Cq(n) and P(n) together can be understood in
terms of a specification for the cost function γ(p) used in the previous chapters. For example,
a linear cost function cnq together with a specification of arrival probability corresponding to a
Weibull distribution function as previously discussed, with P(n) = 1−e−λnk , could alternatively
be modelled with the benchmark informal arrival probability P(n) = 1 − e−λ˜m through change
of variables m = nk, together with an adjustment to the cost function, with either appropriate
diminishing or increasing returns to the cost of networking.
The primary example throughout this chapter, a linear cost specification Cq(n) = cn to-
gether with informal arrival probabilities of the form P(n) = 1 − e−λn, corresponds to an infor-
mal arrival cost function of the form γ(p) = − cλ ln(1−p). Note that this functional form satisfies
assumptions of previous chapters (it is strictly increasing, strictly convex, continuously diﬀer-
entiable, and logarithmically concave) and the characterization of its equilibria was considered
in the one-channel model in Example 2.2.2.5
This chapter will consider the two-channel model and will focus workers’ strategies in
terms of their choice of networking, nq, rather than their arrival probabilities pIq. It will inves-
tigate the equilibrium eﬀects of the cost parameter c as related to the properties of P(n). Note
that in this treatment of the cost and benefits of networking, a worker’s eﬀort and resource
expenditure is only productive toward the transmission of his informal application and report.
That is, a greater network strength increases the worker’s probability of reaching the firm, but
networking does not oﬀer the worker any way to influence the actual report realization. The
distribution of the informal report is independent from the distribution of the formal report
conditional on the worker’s type. Therefore, through the increase in arrival probability, net-
working does include as a consequence the chance to be considered by the firm on the basis
5This comparison requires an adjustment of the constant c to the constant cλ .
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of a diﬀerent type of information than in the formal channel. Note also that as networking is
modelled here, it is equally diﬃcult for high- and low-quality workers to develop a network.
Nevertheless in the presence of reports of quality on informal applications, choice of network
strength will still vary by type in general due to diﬀerences in the benefits of networking for
each type.
4.1.2 The Pool Eﬀect of Network-Based Informal Arrival
In this section I apply the network-based arrival and cost structure introduced above to the
informal channel of the model in Chapter 3 in order to show the eﬀect of network-based arrival
on the quality composition of the pool of informal applicants. In particular, I show how the
cost of networking relates to the intensity of the pool bias, whether favourable or unfavourable.
The worker’s expected utility in equation (3.14) can be reformulated in terms of his net-
working choice as
(w − b)(pF ·φFq + (1−pF ·φFq)P(nq)·φIq) + b − cnq. (4.1)
where φFq = φFq(dF) and φIq = φIq(dI) for q ∈ {h, ℓ} are determined by formulae (3.18) and
(3.19) for a given firm hiring strategy (dF , dI) = (dFH+dFL, dIH+dIL). A worker of type q
chooses network strength nq to maximize this expected utility.
For strictly increasing and strictly concave informal arrival probability P(n), a worker’s
optimal choice of network strength nq must satisfy
wˆ(1−pF ·φFq(dF))P′(nq)·φIq(dI) ≤ c, (4.2)
with equality if nq > 0, where wˆ=w−b. When convenient I will formulate the workers’ choice
of networking as a best response to the conditional acceptance probabilities φFq and φIq for
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q ∈ {h, ℓ} which are determined by the firm’s chosen hiring strategy (dF , dI), that is, nq(φFq, φIq),
rather than as a best response to the firm’s hiring strategy directly, nq(dF , dI).
Lemma 25. Suppose P(n) is strictly increasing and strictly concave. If φIq > 0 the worker’s
best response is given by:







if wˆ(1−pF ·φFq)φIqP′(0) ≥ c
0 otherwise,
(4.3)
where κ = (c,w, b, εI , εF , pF).
For the functional form P(n)=1 − e−λn with λ > 0 this becomes:







if wˆλ(1−pF ·φFq)φIq ≥ c
0 otherwise.
(4.4)
Note that if networking is too costly, specifically if c is greater than the marginal bene-
fit of networking at zero, c > wˆ(1−pF ·φFq)φIqP′(0), then worker q will not network at all,
nq(κ, φFq, φIq)=0. In the case of the functional form P(n) = 1− e−λn we have P′(0)=1. Thus the
worker does not network if c is above cmax(φFq, φIq) ≡ wˆλ(1−pF ·φFq)φIq.
The firm’s best response in each department can also be reformulated in terms of network-
ing, denoted as dFH(nh, nℓ) and dFL(nh, nℓ) instead of dFH(pFh, pFℓ) and dFL(pFh, pFℓ) in Lemma
9 and Lemma 10, with pIh = P(nh) and pIℓ = P(nℓ). Since P(n) is increasing and has P(0) = 0,
the conditions pIq > 0 and pIq = 0 correspond to the reformulated conditions nq > 0 and nq = 0
for q ∈ {h, ℓ}. The definition of equilibrium in Section 3.2.2 can also be reformulated to address
the worker strategy in terms of networking strengths nh and nℓ rather than arrival probabilities
pIh and pIℓ.
Since P(n) is increasing, the conditions that determine which worker type networks more,
nh ≷ nℓ, will also be the same as the conditions in Section 3.2.1 that determine which worker
arrives more in the informal channel, pIh ≷ pIℓ. Which worker type networks more for each
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dI = 2 dI = 1
dF = 0 nh = nℓ nh>nℓ
dF = 1 nh<nℓ nh>nℓ, nh = nℓ, nh<nℓ
dF = 2 nh = nℓ nh>nℓ
Table 4.1: Comparison of Worker Network Strengths
When non-zero, the possible ranking of workers’ best-response networking strengths,
nh(dF , dI) and nℓ(dF , dI), is shown for each relevant combination of formal and informal
hiring strategies. Note these are best-responses only, (dF , dI) = (0, 2) can not occur in
equilibrium.
hiring pattern (dF , dI) ∈ {0, 1, 2} × {1, 2} is shown in Table 4.1 and corresponds to the ranking
of informal arrival probabilities which were given in Table 3.1.
Now by Lemma 25, when the informal arrival probability P(n) is increasing and concave,
it will be the case that for fixed firm strategy d, an increase in the cost of networking discour-
ages both worker types from networking, that is,
d nq(c, d)
dc
≤ 0 for q ∈ {h, ℓ}. However, an
increase in the cost of networking can not typically be expected to reduce high- and low-quality
worker incentives in such a way as to maintain a constant composition of the pool of informal
applicants.
Let Λ(κ, d) denote the informal pool adjustment factor resulting from the best responses
(assuming they are non-zero) of workers q ∈ {h, ℓ} to φFq(d) and φIq(d) for parameter setting
κ = (c,w, b, εI , εF , pF), so that Λ(κ, d) ≡ P(nℓ(κ, d))P(nh(κ, d)) . The following result describes what
eﬀect a change in the cost of networking c will have on this informal pool adjustment factor
Λ(κ, d), for a certain class of network-based arrival probability functions, P(n), given a fixed
firm strategy and assuming networking best responses are non-zero. For the functional form
P(n) = 1 − e−λn, and also for other forms with logarithmically concave first derivative, it turns
out that an increase in the cost parameter c will have an intensifying eﬀect on the pool of
informal applicants.6 That is to say, any bias in the informal pool adjustment factor, whether
6Note that under the assumptions given for P(n), logarithmic concavity of P′(n) corresponds to logarithmic
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favourable or unfavourable, will become more pronounced for higher cost of networking c.
Lemma 26. Suppose P(n) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and that P′(n) is loga-
rithmically concave. For fixed firm strategy d, and therefore for fixed φFh, φIh, φFℓ and φIℓ with
nh(κ, φFh, φIh)), nℓ(κ, φFℓ, φIℓ)) > 0, we have
dΛ(κ, d)
dc
≷ 0 iﬀ nh(κ, φFh, φIh) ≶ nℓ(κ, φFℓ, φIℓ) (4.5)
Proof. Under the same assumptions, Lemma 38 in Appendix C shows that when networking
is non-zero, whether the informal pool composition will be improved or worsened by a change

























ℓ(c) if and only if nh ≷ nℓ. (4.7)
Since arrival probability is an increasing function of network strength it is also the case that
P(nh(c)) ≷ P(nℓ(c)) if and only if nh ≷ nℓ. (4.8)






if and only if nh ≷ nℓ. (4.9)
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if and only if nh ≷ nℓ. (4.11)














if and only if nh ≷ nℓ. (4.12)













if and only if nh ≷ nℓ. (4.13)










if and only if nh ≷ nℓ, (4.14)
Therefore we have the result that the cost of networking has an intensifying eﬀect on the infor-
mal pool composition, as by condition (4.14), the condition (4.6) becomes
dΛ(κ, d)
dc
≷ 0 if and only if nh ≶ nℓ. (4.15)
#
Note that this Lemma applies when network-based arrival probability is of the form P(n) = 1−
e−λn. In this case P′(n) = λe−λn so the logarithm of P′(n) is ln λ−λn. We have d
2
dn2
(ln λ−λn) = 0,
so the logarithm of P′(n) is (weakly) concave.
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Together with the equilibrium analysis in the previous chapter, the pool eﬀect of a change in
c shown by Lemma 26 makes it possible to understand how the structure of network-based in-
formal arrival probabilities and costs can aﬀect the existence of equilibria with diﬀerent hiring
patterns and functions of the informal channel, as will be discussed in the next section.
4.1.3 Equilibrium Implications of Network-Based Informal Arrival
In this section I will highlight the implications of logarithmically concave P′(n) on the equilib-
rium results of informal channel use from the two-channel model. I will maintain the assump-
tions that P(n) is strictly increasing, strictly concave and thrice continuously diﬀerentiable,
and consider only pure strategy equilibria with non-trivial use of the informal channel. Recall
that there can be no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which the informal channel is used by
one worker type and not the other (see Section 3.3). Therefore only firm strategies such that
φIq(dF , dI) > 0 for both worker types q ∈ {h, ℓ}, and only worker best responses which are
non-zero will be considered here. Qualitative graphical depictions of the regions of existence
of non-trivial equilibria for P(n) = 1 − e−λn are shown at the end of this section in the (exhaus-
tive) cases where (i) εI < εF , (ii) εI > εF with εI − εF < 1−pFpF (1−2εI), (iii) εI > εF with
εI − εF = 1−pFpF (1−2εI), and (iv) εI > εF with εI − εF >
1−pF
pF
(1−2εI), in Figures 4.1-4.4
respectively.
For workers, the non-zero constraint for their choice of networking in equation (4.3) de-
pends on the firm strategy. For a given firm strategy (dF , dI) = (i, j) ∈ {0, 1, 2} × {1, 2} let ci jmax
denote the cost beyond which networking is prohibitively expensive for either worker type,
such that no equilibrium with non-trivial use of the informal channel can be supported for any
c ≥ ci jmax. Then for a given firm strategy this upper limit on the cost of networking will be
ci jmax ≡ min {wˆ(1−pF ·φFh)φIhP′(0) , wˆ(1−pF ·φFℓ)φIℓP′(0)}.
For convenience I will also sometimes write cdmax instead of c
i j
max when firm strategy d is such
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that (dF , dI) = (i, j) ∈ {0, 1, 2} × {1, 2}.
Lemma 27. Suppose P(n) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and P′(n) is logarithmically
concave, and consider fixed parameters κ−c = (w, b, εI , εF , pF) and fixed firm strategy d such
that dI ! 0.
(a) Suppose d and κ−c are such that Λ(κ, d) < 1 for all c ∈ (0, cdmax). Then for any value
Λˆ ∈ (0, 1), a unique cˆ ∈ (0, cdmax) exists such that Λ(cˆ, κ−c, d) = Λˆ.
(b) Suppose d and κ−c are such that Λ(κ, d) > 1 for all c ∈ (0, cdmax). Then for any value
Λˆ > 1, a unique cˆ ∈ (0, cdmax) exists such that Λ(cˆ, κ−c, d) = Λˆ.
Proof. For any fixed firm strategy d, if networking is not prohibitively costly, c < cdmax,
then nh(κ, φFh, φIh) is not zero and Λ(κ, d) is a continuous monotonic function of c. In par-
ticular, when firm strategy and parameters are such that Λ(κ, d) is greater than one, then
nh(κ, φFh, φIh) < nℓ(κ, φFℓ, φIℓ) and by Lemma 26 we know that Λ(κ, d) is increasing in c.
Now whenever nh(κ, φFh, φIh) < nℓ(κ, φFℓ, φIℓ), it must be the case that wˆ(1−pF ·φFℓ)φIℓ >
wˆ(1−pF ·φFh)φIh, so the cost at which networking becomes prohibitively expensive for high-
quality workers is lower than the cost at which networking becomes prohibitively expensive for
low-quality workers. Therefore cdmax = wˆ(1−pF ·φFh(d))φIh(d)P′(0) and limc↑cdmax Λ(κ, d) = ∞.





increases without bound as c goes to zero, thus







= 1. Therefore we also have
limc↓0Λ(κ, d) = 1. Since Λ(κ, d) is strictly increasing in c, for fixed κ−c and d, we know
that Λ(c, κ−c, d) takes every value in (1,∞) for a unique c on the interval (0, cdmax).
Similarly when firm strategy and parameters are such that Λ(κ, d) is less than one, then
nh(κ, φFh, φIh) > nℓ(κ, φFℓ, φIℓ) and by Lemma 26 we know that Λ(κ, d) is decreasing in c.
Now whenever nh(κ, φFh, φIh) > nℓ(κ, φFℓ, φIℓ), it must be the case that wˆ(1−pF ·φFℓ)φIℓ <
wˆ(1−pF ·φFh)φIh, so the cost at which networking becomes prohibitively expensive for low-
quality workers is lower than the cost at which networking becomes prohibitively expensive for
high-quality workers. Therefore cdmax = wˆ(1−pF ·φFℓ(d))φIℓ(d)P′(0) and limc↑cdmax Λ(κ, d) = 0.






increases without bound as c goes to zero for q ∈ {h, ℓ},







= 1, and therefore limc↓0Λ(κ, d) = 1. Since Λ(κ, d)
is strictly decreasing in c, for fixed κ−c and d we know Λ(c, κ−c, d) takes every value in (0, 1)









(dF , dI) = (i, j) ∈ {0, 1, 2} × {1, 2} in Propositions 7-11 in Chapter 3 can be understood as
conditions on the underlying cost of networking c. In the case of network-based arrival proba-
bilities with pIq(i, j) = P(nq(κ, d)) for q ∈ {h, ℓ} and firm strategy d such that (dF , dI) = (i, j), we
have Λi j = Λ(κ, d) =
P (nℓ(κ, d))
P (nh(κ, d))
. Thus for logarithmically concave P′(n), Lemma 27 together
with the pool eﬀect of c given by Lemma 26 allows us to state such conditions on c explicitly.
In particular we have the following equilibrium results:
Corollary 5. Suppose c < cdmax for (dF , dI) = (1, 2). A necessary condition for the existence of
an equilibrium with (d∗F , d
∗
I ) = (1, 2) and non-trivial use of the informal channel is that the cost
of networking be not too high, c ≤ c12 for some c12 ∈ (0, c12max).
According to condition (3.23) in Proposition 7(b), absolute use of the informal channel
while the formal channel is used selectively requires that the informal pool composition in






1−εI . Since nh(dF , dI) < nℓ(dF , dI) for any parameter
setting when (dF , dI) = (1, 2), we know that Λ12 > 1. Therefore by Lemma 27(b) there exists














)) = vh−ww−vl s1−s εI1−εI .
By Lemma 26 we also know that Λ(κ, d) is increasing in c, such that the informal pool compo-
sition worsens with a higher networking cost. This means that for any c > c12 condition (3.23)
will be impossible to satisfy, and the firm can not be willing to hire absolutely in the informal
Chapter 4. Networking in the Informal Channel 119
channel. Therefore the cost of networking must not be too high in order for such an equilibrium
to exist. For the case where P(n) = 1 − e−λn, c12 as a function of vh−w
w−vℓ is represented by the
curved boundary of the region 7b in Figures 4.2-4.4.
Note that Proposition 7(a) does not place any condition on the pool of informal applicants
because in any equilibrium with (d∗F , d
∗
I ) = (2, 2), the pool of informal applicants must be
neutral, Λ22 = 1. Therefore no condition on the cost of networking c is needed to support
absolute formal hiring together with absolute informal hiring in equilibrium except (as always)
that it not be prohibitively expensive, which in this case is the condition that c < c22max. For the
functional form P(n) = 1 − e−λn, we have c22max = wˆλ(1−pF), so this is the upper boundary for
the region 7a in each of the Figures 4.1-4.4.
Now Propositions 8 and 9 cover the existence conditions for equilibria with selective in-












. In each case, the existence of an equilibrium with (d∗F , d
∗
I ) = (i, 1) for
i ∈ {0, 1, 2} requires that the composition of the pool of informal applicants be not too extreme;
either Λ is unfavourable and must not exceed a given threshold (must not be too unfavourable),
or Λ is favourable and must exceed a given threshold (must not be too favourable). In both
cases, the condition that the composition of the informal pool of applicants must not be too
extreme is equivalent to a condition that the cost of networking must not be too high, as the
following result shows.
Corollary 6. Suppose informal reports are decisive and εI − εF ! 1−pp (1−2εI). A necessary
condition for the existence of an equilibrium with selective informal hiring, d∗I = 1, d
∗
F = i ∈
{0, 1, 2}, and non-zero networking, is that the cost of networking be not too high, c ≤ ci1 for
some ci1 ∈ (0, ci1max).
When as in Proposition 8 we have εI − εF > 1−pp (1−2εI), it must be the case that the
firm also hires selectively in the formal channel d∗F = 1, and the pool of informal applicants is
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)) = vh−ww−vl s1−s 1−εIεI ,
and by Lemma 26 we also know that Λ(κ, d) is increasing in c, so that the informal pool
composition worsens with a higher networking cost. Therefore, for any c > c11 condition
(3.24) will be impossible to satisfy and the firm can not be willing to accept high report in-
formal applicants. Therefore the cost of networking must not be too high in order for such
an equilibrium to exist. In the case of P(n) = 1 − e−λn, c11 as a function of vh−w
w−vℓ when
εI − εF > 1−pp (1−2εI) is represented by the curved boundary of the region 8 in Figure 4.4.
Note that when εI − εF = 1−pp (1−2εI), the pool of informal applicants is exactly neutral
Λ11 = 1. Therefore in this case there is no restriction on c for the existence of this equilibrium







so condition (3.24) will certainly be satisfied for any c ∈ (0, c11max). For the functional form
P(n) = 1 − e−λn, we have c11max = wˆλ(1−pFεF)εI , so this is the upper boundary for the region 8
in Figure 4.3. Note that because εI − εF = 1−pp (1−2εI), c
11
max = wˆλ(1−pF(1−εF))(1−εI) also.
On the other hand, when as in Proposition 9 we have εI − εF < 1−pp (1−2εI), for any
d∗F = i ∈ {0, 1, 2} the pool of informal applicants is favourable, Λi1 < 1. Therefore by Lemma














)) = vh−ww−vl s1−s εI1−εI ,
for i ∈ {0, 1, 2} and φFq = φFq(i, 1) for q ∈ {h, ℓ}. Furthermore by Lemma 26 we know that
Λ(κ, d) is decreasing in c, so that in this case the informal pool composition improves with
a higher networking cost. Therefore, for any c > c01 condition (3.25) will be impossible
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to satisfy, for any c > c11 condition (3.26) will be impossible to satisfy, and for any c > c21
condition (3.27) will be impossible to satisfy, so the firm will not be willing to reject low-report
applicants and selective hiring can not be supported. Therefore again, the cost of networking
must not be too high in order for such an equilibrium to exist. In the case of P(n) = 1 − e−λn,
c01, c11, and c21 as functions of
vh−w
w−vℓ when εI < εF are represented by the curved boundary
of the regions 9a, 9b, and 9c respectively in Figure 4.1. In Figure 4.2, c11 as a function of
vh−w
w−vℓ when εI > εF but εI − εF <
1−p
p
(1−2εI) can also be seen, represented by the curved
boundary of region 9b. Note that the equilibria described by Propositions 9 parts (a) and (c)














, both of which would be contradicted














Corollary 7. Suppose informal reports are not decisive. A necessary condition for the exis-
tence of an equilibrium with selective informal hiring, d∗I = 1, d
∗
F = i ∈ {0, 1}, and non-zero
networking, is that the cost of networking be suﬃciently high but not too high, ci1 ≤ c ≤ ci1 for
some ci1, ci1 ∈ (0, ci1max).






1−εI . If as in
Proposition 10(a) formal reports are also not decisive and d∗F = 0, then the pool of informal
applicants is favourable, Λ01 < 1. When as in Proposition 10(b) formal reports are decisive
and d∗F = 1, the pool of informal applicants is also favourable, Λ
11 < 1. Therefore by Lemma














)) = vh−ww−vl s1−s 1−εIεI ,
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)) = vh−ww−vl s1−s εI1−εI
for i ∈ {0, 1} and φFq = φFq(i, 1) for q ∈ {h, ℓ}. By Lemma 26 we know thatΛ(κ, d) is decreasing
in c, so that the informal pool composition improves with a higher networking cost, and it is
the case that ci1 < ci1. Conditions (3.28) and (3.29) will be impossible to satisfy for any c > c01
and c > c11 respectively, because the informal pool composition will be too favourable due
to the high networking cost and the firm will not be willing to reject low-report applicants.
However conditions (3.28) and (3.29) will also be impossible to satisfy for any c < c01 and
c < c11 respectively because the informal pool composition will not be suﬃciently favourable
due to the low networking cost for the firm to accept high-report applicants. Therefore the
cost of networking must be high enough and must also be not too high in order for such an
equilibrium to exist. In the case of P(n) = 1 − e−λn, c01 and c01 as functions of vh−w
w−vℓ are









1−εI , are represented by the curved boundaries of
the region 10b in Figure 4.2. Note however that the conditions of Proposition 10(b) can not be
satisfied when εI − εF ≥ 1−pFpF (1−2εI) (see Remark 3 in Chapter 3), and therefore no region
10b appears in Figure 4.3 or 4.4.







. There can be no
equilibrium with d∗F = 0 in this case, and there can be no equilibrium with d
∗
F = 1 if formal
reports are also not decisive. However, if as in Proposition 11 formal reports are decisive and
d∗F = 1, then the pool of informal applicants will be unfavourable, Λ
11 > 1. Therefore by
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)) = vh−ww−vl s1−s 1−εIεI ,














)) = vh−ww−vl s1−s εI1−εI .
By Lemma 26 we know that Λ(κ, d) is increasing in c in this case, so that the informal pool
composition worsens with a higher networking cost, and it is the case that c11 < c11. Condition
(3.30) will be impossible to satisfy for any c > c11 because the informal pool composition will
be too unfavourable due to the high networking cost and the firm will not be willing to accept
high-report applicants. This condition will also be impossible to satisfy for any c < c11 because
the informal pool composition will not be suﬃciently unfavourable due to the low networking
cost for the firm to reject low-report applicants. Again the cost of networking must be high
enough and must also be not too high in order for such an equilibrium to exist. In the case of







1−εI , are represented by
the curved boundaries of the region 11 in Figure 4.4. Note that this equilibrium described by
Proposition 11 requires εI − εF > 1−pp (1−2εI).





























Figure 4.1: Range of Existence of Equilibria when εI < εF
A qualitative depiction is shown for P(n) = 1−e−λn and assuming εI < 1−pF . Within each region,
the label corresponds to the proposition which describes the non-trivial equilibrium which exists in this
region. Within unlabelled regions, no equilibrium exists with non-zero arrival in the informal channel.




























Figure 4.2: Range of Existence of Equilibria when εI > εF and εI−εF < 1−pFpF (1−2εI)
A qualitative depiction is shown for P(n) = 1−e−λn and assuming εI < 1−pF .



























Figure 4.3: Range of Existence of Equilibria when εI > εF and εI−εF = 1−pFpF (1−2εI)
A qualitative depiction is shown for P(n) = 1−e−λn and assuming εI < 1−pF .




























Figure 4.4: Range of Existence of Equilibria when εI > εF and εI−εF > 1−pFpF (1−2εI)
A qualitative depiction is shown for P(n) = 1−e−λn and assuming εI > 1−pF .
Chapter 4. Networking in the Informal Channel 128
4.2 Additional Analyses
4.2.1 Implications for Comparative Static Results and Welfare
In this section I will compare the pool eﬀect of a change in the cost of networking c with the
eﬀect of a change in other parameters on the composition of the informal pool of applicants,
and implications for comparative static and welfare results.
Lemma 26 showed that an increase in the cost of networking c has an amplifying eﬀect on
the quality composition of the pool of informal applicants when P′(n) is logarithmically con-
cave. Although increased networking costs discourage both worker types from using the infor-
mal channel, it turns out that the reduction is stronger at low levels of networking. Therefore
if one worker type is relatively prevalent in the informal pool, an increase in c will increase the
relative prevalence of that type, while the volume of the informal pool of applicants decreases.
Assuming that the increase in networking costs does not change the equilibrium hiring strategy
of the firm, an increase in c will lower worker utility for both types because decreasing their
arrival probabilities will decrease their acceptance probabilities. For the firm on the other hand,
the change in the cost of networking may increase or decrease profits. For equilibria in which
the informal pool is favourable, the firm will benefit from an increase in the informal pool bias.
For equilibria in which the informal pool is unfavourable, an increase in the informal pool bias
is not desirable for the firm. However, in both cases, the volume of informal applicants will be
reduced. Therefore a rise in networking costs may increase or decrease firm profit.
Lemma 28. Within a given class of equilibria with (d∗F , d∗I ) = (i, j) ∈ {0, 1, 2} × {1, 2} and non-
zero networking, it is the case that
duq
dc
< 0 for q ∈ {h, ℓ}, and profit may increase or decrease
in c. For P(n) = 1−e−λn in particular, dπ
dc






Proof. From the worker utility given in equation (4.1), for fixed firm strategy with dI ! 0
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wˆ(1 − pFφFq)φIqP′(nq) − c
]
n′q(c) − nq. (4.16)
In any equilibrium with non-zero networking, this is negative because it will be the case that
wˆ(1 − pFφFq)φIqP′(n∗q) = c.
On the other hand, firm profit is given by π = πF + πˆI where as in the previous chapter
πF = (vh−w)spFφFh − (w−vℓ)(1−s)pFφFℓ (4.17)
denotes profit from hires through the formal channel and
πˆI = (vh−w)sφIh(1−pFφFh)P(nh) − (w−vℓ)(1−s)φIℓ(1−pFφFℓ)P(nℓ). (4.18)
denotes profit only from “additional” hires through the informal channel.










= (vh−w)sφIh(1−pFφFh)P′(nh)n′h(c) − (w−vℓ)(1−s)φIℓ(1−pFφFℓ)P′(nℓ)n′ℓ(c). (4.19)





for any parameter a ∈ {c,w, b, εI , εF , pF}, where xq= cwˆ(1−pFφFq)φIq for q ∈ {h, ℓ}. Therefore
since x′q(c) =
1
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Thus within any class of equilibria with non-zero networking, we have
dπˆI
dc










so profit may increase or decrease in c. Note that the direction of the second inequality in
(4.22) is due to P′′(n) < 0.
When P′(n) is logarithmically concave, so that
P′(n)
P′′(n)






whenever low-quality workers network (weakly) more than high-quality






whenever high-quality workers network (weakly)
more than low-quality workers in equilibrium. Thus in industries which are generally prof-
itable, an increase in the cost of networking will lower profit in any equilibrium in which
n∗h ≥ n∗ℓ , for example equilibria in which the firm hires absolutely in both channels, or, if infor-
mal reports are more accurate than formal reports, equilibria in which the firm hires selectively
in both channels. In these cases the firm will not benefit from the eﬀect of the amplification of
the (favourable) informal pool bias suﬃciently to outweigh the loss of value from fewer hires
due to a decreased volume of informal applicants.
Now in the case of an arrival probability function of the form P(n) = 1−e−λn, the term P
′(n)
P′′(n)
is constant with respect to n, so condition (4.22) reduces to
dπˆI
dc





. In this case higher networking costs always improve profit in equilibrium in industries
which are generally unprofitable and always decrease profit in equilibrium in industries which
are generally profitable.
Now while networking costs have an amplifying eﬀect on the pool of informal applicants,
the opposite holds for a change in the wage wwhen P′ is logarithmically concave. In particular,
the pool eﬀect of w is negatively proportional to the pool eﬀect of c. Since for fixed firm
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By comparison, since x′q(c) =
1

























. From this observation and Lemma 26,
Lemma 29 follows immediately.
Lemma 29. Suppose P(n) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and that P′(n) is loga-
rithmically concave. For fixed firm strategy d with nh(κ, d), nℓ(κ, d) > 0, we have
dΛ(κ, d)
dw
≶ 0⇔ nh ≶ nℓ.
Thus for logarithmically concave P′(n) the wage has a moderating eﬀect on the informal
pool composition, reducing the intensity of any favourable or unfavourable bias.
In contrast, since x′q(b) =
c
wˆ2(1−pFφFq)φIq , so that x
′
q(b) = −x′q(w), the informal pool eﬀect
of b is exactly the negative of the informal pool eﬀect of w, and within any class of equilibrium
with fixed d and non-zero networking we will have
dΛ(κ, d)
db
≷ 0⇔ nh ≶ nℓ (4.26)
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whenever P′(n) is logarithmically concave. So the unemployment benefit has an amplifying









On the other hand, within a given class of equilibria with fixed firm strategy and non-zero
networking, the eﬀect on the pool of informal applicants of the formal arrival probability pF
can not be generally determined. Of course for equilibria with no formal hiring, d∗F = 0, the
formal arrival probability is irrelevant to worker choices of networking, and the informal pool
is neutral in any equilibrium with absolute hiring in both channels, (d∗F , d
∗
I ) = (2, 2), so again
the formal arrival probability has no pool eﬀect in such a case. Less trivially, for equilibria with
(d∗F , d
∗







. This can be shown by comparison of
equation (4.25) with equation (4.23) for a = pF , because for firm strategy (d∗F , d
∗
I ) = (2, 1), it is






wˆ(1−pF)2ε . Thus for generally profitable
industries where formal reports are not decisive, a change in the formal arrival probability has
a moderating eﬀect on the pool of informal applicants.
















As noted previously in Lemma 38, x′q(b) =
c
















and we can see by comparison with equation (4.21) that the eﬀect of a change in the unemploy-









A change in w also aﬀects informal profits through the eﬀect on the workers’ networking,
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and similarly this eﬀect is proportional to the eﬀect of a change in network cost. However an
increase in w also has a direct negative eﬀect on profit since the firm’s costs go up. The eﬀect of
a change in w on the firm’s profit from formal hires is negative and in proportion to the volume
of formal hires. By diﬀerentiation of equation (4.17) this is given by
dπF
dw
= −pF [sφFh + (1−s)φFℓ] . (4.30)
Now by equation (4.18) the eﬀect on profit from “additional” hires through the informal chan-
nel is given by
dπˆI
dw
= (vh−w)sφIh(1−pFφFh)P′(nh)n′h(w) − (w−vℓ)(1−s)φIℓ(1−pFφFℓ)P′(nℓ)n′ℓ(w). (4.31)
Since x′q(w) = − cw x
′
q(c), we have n′q(w) = − cwn
′
q(c) by equation (4.20). With this substitution







by (4.19). Since the overall eﬀect of a change in w on
















, we therefore have
dπ
dw
= −pF [sφFh + (1−s)φFℓ] − cwˆ dπdc . (4.33)
4.2.2 Alternative Arrival Structures
As seen in Section 4.1.3 the relationship between use of the informal channel in equilibrium and
networking cost depends on how a change in c aﬀects the composition of the pool of informal
applicants. Lemma 26 shows that in the case of logarithmically concave P′, an intensifying
eﬀect holds. However, when P′ is not logarithmically concave, this certainly need not be the
case.
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For example, consider P(n) = δ
√
n for an appropriate δ > 0 chosen such that P(n∗q) ≤ 1
for both types q ∈ {h, ℓ}. This corresponds to the arrival cost function γ(p) = cˆp2 considered
in Example 2.2.1 in Chapter 2 for x = 2 and constant cˆ = c/δ2. This functional form for the
arrival probability satisfies the assumptions that P(n) is strictly increasing and strictly concave,
however P′(n) is not logarithmically concave. This is because ln P′(n) = ln δ2 − 12 ln n so that
(ln P′(n))′ = − 12n , which is increasing in n. For this example, a worker’s optimal networking
choice (when non-zero) satisfies





















Alternatively, it is also possible that a change in networking cost may have a moderating
eﬀect on the pool of informal applicants when P′ is not logarithmically concave. Since con-
cavity of P′ will imply logarithmic concavity of P′, a necessary condition for the occurrence
of a moderating eﬀect is that P′′′ > 0, such that P′ is strictly convex. As an example, consider
an informal arrival probability of the form P(n) = 12 (n +
√
n) where networking intensity is
chosen in the unit interval, n ∈ [0, 1]. I will show in this case that when the informal pool of
applicants has a favourable bias, an increase in the cost of networking c causes the composition
to become less favourable, whereas when the pool has an unfavourable bias, an increase in the
cost of networking c causes the composition to become less unfavourable.
Now as previously shown, for P(n) twice diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly con-
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cave, we will have
dΛ(κ, d)
dc











1−pFφFq)φIq for q ∈ {h, ℓ}. When workers choose networking optimally, it will be
the case that
wˆ(1−pFφFq)φIqP′(nq) = c, (4.38)
assuming that optimal networking is non-zero, and therefore it is the case that x′(c) = P′(nq)/c.
Substituting this into condition (4.37) gives
dΛ(κ, d)
dc







This means that if
[P′(n)]2
P(n)P′′(n)
is decreasing, a change in the cost of networking will have a
moderating eﬀect on the informal pool of applicants, that is, we will have
dΛ(κ, d)
dc
≷ 0 if and
only if nh ≷ nℓ.
For P(n) = 12 (n +
√









is not a decreasing function of n so P′ is not logarithmically concave. This







≤ 0 for this functional
form if and only if (
1 + 12√n








)2 ≤ 0, (4.40)




+ 316n3 − 116n3 , which is positive.


















) = −(1 + 4n + 4√n)√
n + 1
(4.41)
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< 0 if and only if
−(√n + 1)(4 + 2√n) + (1 + 4n + 4√n)( 12√n ) < 0. (4.42)




is decreasing and a change in networking cost c will have a moderating
eﬀect on the informal pool of applicants in this case.
Finally, note that for P(n) twice diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave, log-
arithmic concavity of P′ is a suﬃcient but not necessary condition for the networking cost to
have an intensifying eﬀect on the pool of informal applicants. In particular, consider the arrival
probability function corresponding to the cdf of a Weibull distribution, P(n) = 1 − e−λnk , with
rate parameter λ > 0 and shape parameter k ∈ (0, 1). For this class of Weibull, P(n) is strictly
increasing and concave, but P′ is not logarithmically concave.
For P(n) = 1−e−λnk we have P′(n) = λke−λnk ·nk−1 > 0 and P′′(n) = P′(n)· 1n [k−1−λknk] < 0.
With these substitutions and some cancellation Condition (4.39) reduces to
dΛ(κ, d)
dc
≷ 0 if and only if
λke−λnkh · nkh
(1 − e−λnkh )(k−1 − λknkh)
≶
λke−λnkℓ · nkℓ
(1 − e−λnkℓ )(k−1 − λknkℓ)
. (4.43)
Lemma 39 in Appendix C shows that for k ∈ (0, 1) we have
d
dn
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣ e−λnk · nk
(1 − e−λnk)(k−1 − λknk)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ > 0 if 1 − e−λnk < λnk [1 − kk−1λnk] . (4.44)
For k ∈ (0, 1), it is the case that [1 − kk−1λnk] > 1. Since 1 − e−x < x for all x < 0, we have
1 − e−λnk < λnk and therefore 1 − e−λnk < λnk [1 − kk−1λnk]. Thus e−λnk · nk(1 − e−λnk)(k−1 − λknk) is
increasing in n and we have
e−λnkh · nkh
(1 − e−λnkh )(k−1 − λknkh)
≷
e−λnkℓ · nkℓ
(1 − e−λnkℓ )(k−1 − λknkℓ)
if and only if nh ≷ nℓ. (4.45)
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This means that a change in networking cost c has an intensifying eﬀect on the pool of informal
applicants when the informal arrival probability is of the form P(n) = 1 − e−λnk for k ∈ (0, 1),
even though the Weibull density function fails to be logarithmically concave.
4.2.3 Type-dependent Arrival Probablities and Costs
In addition to the assumption that P′ is logarithmically concave, the networking model of this
chapter has assumed that cost of networking and informal arrival probabilities do not vary by
worker type, other than to the extent that workers have incentive to choose diﬀerent levels of
networking. However, in some scenarios it is plausible that this is not the case.
For example, high-type workers may have a higher opportunity cost of networking, or may
have a lower networking cost if networking skills are related to job-relevant skills. Suppose
that Cq(n) = cqn with cq > 0 for q ∈ {h, ℓ}. In this case, Table 4.1 does not describe which
hiring patterns result in high- or low-quality worker types networking more. For a given firm
strategy we will have







One new implication of diﬀerent networking costs is that for hiring patterns such that the firm
treats both high- and low-report applications the same (that is, with dF ∈ {0, 2} and dI = 2),
worker networking patterns may diﬀer by type. Absolute hiring in both channels will lead to a
biased pool, rather than a neutral pool, with a favourable bias if ch < cℓ and an unfavourable bias
if ch > cℓ. Note that when high types have an advantage in networking such that ch < cℓ, then
absolute hiring in the informal channel does not necessarily lead to an unfavourable informal
pool composition as it does in the model with identical costs (shown in Lemma 12). This means
that in equilibrium selective formal hiring can be possible to support with absolute informal
hiring with a favourable pool, rather than only with an unfavourable pool. It also means that
it can be possible to support a new class of non-trivial equilibria, with absolute hiring in the
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informal channel even when there is no hiring in the formal channel, (d∗F , d
∗
I ) = (0, 2). Finally
it opens the possibility for equilibria in which only the high type networks.
On the benefits side, an alternative way to model the informal arrival process is that contacts
may be more likely to connect high-quality workers to the firm than low-quality workers. Thus
for a given level of networking, high-quality types may have higher informal arrival probability
than low-quality types. For example, suppose contacts who make referrals know the applicant
and have a personal knowledge or opinion about the applicant, and that the probability that a
contact fails to pass a worker’s informal application to the firm is (1e )
λq for λq > 0 for q ∈ {h, ℓ}.
In this case, the informal arrival probability function is type-dependent, with Pq(n) = 1− e−λqn.










provided that c < wˆλq(1−φFq)φIq. I will consider only non-zero networking here.
For this scenario, which worker networks more for a given firm strategy is given by
























ing in λq when λq ∈ (0, e) and decreasing when λq > e.
Suppose that contacts are more eﬀective for high-quality types, with λh > λℓ, such that the
probability that a contact fails to be useful is lower for high-quality types than for low-quality
types, (1e )
λh < ( 1e )
λℓ . When this probability is suﬃciently low for both types, with λh, λℓ > e,






ℓ . Furthermore because x
1
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Now whenever (1−pFφFh)φIh ≤ (1−pFφFℓ)φIℓ, such that conditional on informal arrival, low-
quality types have equal or greater chance of being not accepted formally and accepted infor-





















ℓ , by inequalities (4.49) and
(4.50), condition (4.48) gives nh(φFh, φIh) < nℓ(φFℓ, φIℓ). Thus when contacts are suﬃciently
eﬀective but more eﬀective for high-quality types, λh > λℓ > e, the pool of informal applicants
will necessarily be unfavourable for (dF , dI) ∈ {0, 1, 2} × {2} or for (dF , dI) = (1, 1) when
εI − εF ≥ 1−pFpF (1−2εI). As with type-dependent networking costs, type-dependent informal
arrival probabilities open the possibility for equilibria in which only the high type networks.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
There is a wide variation seen in reports of the use of diﬀerent job search and recruitment
methods by firms and workers. Economic theory tends to suggest that informal methods such as
referrals are good, although empirical evidence on this point is mixed. There is currently little
understanding of how search strategies respond to changes in the environment, for example as
advancing technologies and the internet aﬀect the information and costs associated with social
networking. There has been little focus on the optimal hiring strategies of heterogeneous firms
in particular. In order to improve understanding in these areas I have studied hiring patterns and
workers’ endogenous use of informal methods according to the screening abilities and needs
in diﬀerent industries and under diﬀerent cost structures.
In Chapter 2 have introduced a model of hiring through a single channel in which the noisy
signal received by the firm is accompanied by an additional exogenous signal. This model
oﬀers an endogenous explanation for the positive selection of informal applicants which is
typically assumed in other theories of referral based on homophily in networks. Although
compatible, my result does not rely on the presence of homophily eﬀects.
In Chapter 3 have expanded this model to allow for the availability of an additional hiring
channel, in order to investigate the simultaneous use of informal and formal methods of search.
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This model is able to account for the possibility of negative selection into the pool of informal
applicants which is sometimes observed empirically rather than the typically assumed positive
selection. To my knowledge, such a model of incomplete information has not been previously
studied with heterogeneous worker productivity and endogenous use of the informal channel.
In my treatment of the one- and two-channel hiring models, I found that existence and
uniqueness of equilibria as well as many comparative static assessments were sensitive to the
specification of the cost to workers of using the informal channel. Therefore in Chapter 4 I
also incorporated into the previous models a more explicit scenario of informal networking.
Although I maintain a reduced form approach, it is suﬃcient to provide useful interpretation
and give greater structure to the cost function. This allows for sharper comparative static results
in the one- and two-channel models.
Although my model has shown the role of endogenous arrival and screening technologies
in determining whether informal search methods lead to higher or lower quality job candidates,
it is not well-suited to clarify the present questions and ambiguities concerning the wage eﬀect
of referrals. However, based on my findings, future empirical researchers studying the eﬀects
of formal and informal search methods on wages and other outcomes may find it fruitful to
separate quality-sensitive industries from industries where quality is less crucial, and to pre-
serve the distinction between informal methods which rely on costly contacts and those which
involve family and friends.
Duration of search has also not been addressed by my model. The equilibrium eﬀects that
formal and informal screening technologies have on the applicant pool are likely to remain
relevant when search duration is taken into account and should be important in the trade-oﬀ
firms face between filling a position quickly and filling it well. Therefore further contributions
in this area would be valuable also.
Bibliography
Addison, J. T. and P. Portugal (2002). Job search methods and outcomes. Oxford Economic
Papers 54(3), 505–533.
Andersson, F., M. Freedman, J. Haltiwanger, J. Lane, and K. Shaw (2009). Reaching for
the stars: Who pays for talent in innovative industries? The Economic Journal 119(538),
F308–F332.
Antoninis, M. (2006). The wage eﬀects from the use of personal contacts as hiring channels.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 59, 133–146.
Arbex, M., D. O’Dea, and D. Wiczer (2016). Network search: Climbing the job ladder faster.
Working Papers 1606, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
Bagnoli, M. and T. Bergstrom (2005). Log-concave probability and its applications. Economic
Theory 26(2), 445–469.
Bentolila, S., C. Michelacchi, and J. Suarez (2010). Social contacts and occupational choice.
Economica 77(305), 20–45.
Blau, D. and P. Robbins (1990). Job search outcomes for the employed and unemployed.
Journal of Political Economy 98, 637–655.
Board, S., M. Meyer-ter-Vehn, and T. Sadzik (2017). Recruiting talent. Working paper, UCLA.
142
BIBLIOGRAPHY 143
Brencˇicˇ, V. (2012). Wage posting: evidence from job ads. Canadian Journal of Eco-
nomics 45(4), 1529–1559.
Burks, S. V., B. Cowgill, M. Hoﬀman, and M. Housman (2015). The value of hiring through
employee referrals. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 130(2), 805–839.
Calvo-Armengol, A. (2004). Job contact networks. Journal of Economic Theory 115, 191–206.
Calvo-Armengol, A. and M. Jackson (2007). Networks in labor markets: Wage and employ-
ment dynamics and inequality. Journal of Economic Theory 132, 27–46.
Calvo-Armengol, A. and Y. Zenou (2005). Job matching, social network and word-of-mouth
communication. Journal of Urban Economics 57, 500–522.
Carlsson, H. and S. Dasgupta (1997). Noise-proof equilibria in two-action signaling games.
Journal of Economic Theory 77(2), 432–460.
Casella, A. and N. Hanaki (2008). Information channels in labor markets: On the resilience of
referral hiring. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 66(3-4), 492–513.
Corcoran, M., L. Datcher, and G. Duncan (1980). Information and influence networks in labor
markets. In G. Duncan and J. Morgan (Eds.), Five Thousand American Families: Patterns
of Economic Progress, Volume 7, Chapter 1, pp. 1–37. Institute for Social Research: Ann
Arbor, MI.
Daley, B. and B. Green (2014). Market signalling with grades. Journal of Economic The-
ory 151, 114–145.
Deller, C. and T. Sandino (2016). Who should select new employees, the head oﬃce or the
unit manager? Consequences of centralized hiring at a retail chain. Working Paper 16-088,
Harvard Business School.
DeVaro, J. (2005). Employer recruitment strategies and the labor market outcomes of new
hires. Economic Inquiry 43, 263–282.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 144
DeVaro, J. (2008). The labor market eﬀects of employer recruitment choice. European Eco-
nomic Review 52, 283–314.
Dineen, B. R. and I. O. Williamson (2012). Screening-oriented recruitment messages:
Antecedents and relationships with applicant pool quality. Human Resource Manage-
ment 51(3), 343–360.
Duran, M. A. and A. J. Morales (2014). A moral hazard approach to wage discounts under
informal hiring. Scottish Journal of Political Economy 61(2), 119–128.
Dustmann, C., A. Glitz, U. Scho¨nberg, and H. Bru¨cker (2016). Referral-based job search
networks. Review of Economic Studies 83(2), 514–546.
Faberman, J. and M. Kudlyak (2016). What does online job search tell us about the labor
market? Economic Perspectives (1), 1–15.
Fafchamps, M. and A. Moradi (2015). Referral and job performance: Evidence from the ghana
colonial army. Economic development and cultural change 63(4), 715–751.
Feltovich, N., R. Harbaugh, and T. To (2002). Too cool for school? signalling and countersig-
naling. RAND Journal of Economics 33(4), 630–649.
Fernandez, R. M. and N. Weinberg (1997). Sifting and sorting: Personal contacts and hiring in
a retail bank. American Sociological Review 62(6), 883–902.
Galenianos, M. (2014). Hiring through referrals. Journal of Economic Theory 152, 304–323.
Galenianos, M. (2017). Networks and inequality. Working paper, Royal Holloway, University
of London.
Galeotti, A. and L. Merlino (2014). Endogenous job contact networks. International Economic
Review 55(4), 1201–1226.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 145
Garg, R. and R. Telang (2016). To be or not to be linked on LinkedIn: Online social networks
and job search by unemployed workforce. Working paper, McCombs School of Business
and Heinz College.
Hoﬀman, M., L. B. Kahn, and D. Li (2016). Discretion in hiring. NBERWorking Paper 21709,
Harvard Business School.
Holzer, H. J. (1988). Search method use by unemployed youth. Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics 6(1), 1–20.
Huselid, M., R. B. and B. Becker (2006). “A players” or “A positions”?: The strategic logic of
workforce management. Harvard Business Review 83(12), 110–7, 154.
Igarashi, Y. (2016). Distributional eﬀects of hiring through networks. Review of Economic
Dynamics 20, 90–110.
Ioannides, Y. and L. Loury (2004). Job information networks, neighborhood eﬀects, and in-
equality. Journal of Economic Literature 42, 1056–1093.
Jeitschko, T. D. and H.-T. Normann (2012). Signaling in deterministic and stochastic settings.
Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 82, 39–55.
Kugler, A. (2003). Employee referrals and eﬃciency wages. Labor Economics 10, 531–556.
Lester, B. and R. Wolthoﬀ (2012). Interviews and the assignment of workers to jobs. 2012
Meeting Papers 631, Society for Economic Dynamics.
Loury, L. D. (2006). Some contacts are more equal than others: Informal networks, job tenure,
and wages. Journal of Labor Economics 24(2), 299–318.
Marsden, P. and E. H. Gorman (2001). Social networks, job changes, and recruitment. In
I. Berg and A. Kalleberg (Eds.), Sourcebook of Labor Markets: Evolving Structure and
Processes, Chapter 19, pp. 476–502. Plenum Press.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 146
Matthews, S. and L. Mirman (1983). Equilibrium limit pricing: The eﬀects of private informa-
tion and stochastic demand. Econometrica 51(4), 981–96.
McPherson, M., L. Smith-Lovin, and J. M. Cook (2001). Birds of a feather: Homophily in
social networks. Annual Review of Sociology 27, 415–444.
Michelacci, C. and J. Suarez (2006). Incomplete wage posting. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 114(6), 1098–1123.
Montgomery, J. D. (1991). Social networks and labor-market outcomes: Toward an economic
analysis. American Economic Review 81(5), 1408–1418.
Mortensen, D. T. and T. Vishwanath (1994). Personal contacts and earnings: It is who you
know! Labor Economics 1(2), 187–201.
Mosca, M. and F. Pastore (2009). Wage Eﬀects of Recruitment Methods: The Case of the Ital-
ian Social Service Sector. In M. Musella and S. Destefanis (Eds.), Paid and Unpaid Labour
in the Social Economy: An International Perspective, AIEL Series in Labor Economics,
Chapter 8, pp. 115–141. AIEL - Associazione Italiana Economisti del Lavoro.
Naper, L. R. (2010). Teacher hiring practices and educational eﬃciency. Economics of Educa-
tion Review 29, 658–668.
Osberg, L. (1992). Job search and network composition: Implications of the strength-of-weak-
ties hypothesis. American Sociological Review 57(5), 586–596.
Oyer, P. and S. Schaefer (2011). Personnel economics: Hiring and incentives. In O. Ashenfelter
and D. Card (Eds.), Handbook Of Labor Economics, Volume 4B, Chapter 20, pp. 1769–
1823. Elsevier.
Pallais, A. and E. G. Sands (2016). Why the referential treatment? Evidence from field exper-
iments on referrals. Journal of Political Economy 124(6), 1793–1828.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 147
Pellizzari, M. (2010). Do friends and relatives really help in getting a good job? Industrial and
Labor Relations Review 63(3), 494–510.
Plesca, M. (2010). A general equilibrium evaluation of the employment service. Journal of
Human Capital 4(3), 274–329.
Rees, A. (1966). Information networks in labor markets. American Economic Review 56,
559–566.
Reid, G. L. (1972). Job search and the eﬀectiveness of job-finding methods. Industrial and
Labor Relations Review 25(4), 479–495.
Simon, C. J. and J. T.Warner (1992). Matchmaker, matchmaker: The eﬀect of old boy networks
on job match quality, earnings, and tenure. Journal of Labor Economics 10(3), 306–330.
Spence, M. (1973). Social networks and labor-market outcomes: Toward an economic analysis.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 87(3), 355–374.
Stanton, C. T. and C. Thomas (2016). Landing the first job: The value of intermediaries in
online hiring. Review of Economic Studies 83, 810–854.
Stupnytska, Y. and A. Zaharieva (2015). Explaining U-shape of the referral hiring pattern in a
search model with heterogeneous workers. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organiza-
tion 119, 211–233.
Ullman, J. (1968). Interfirm diﬀerences in the cost of clerical workers. The Journal of Busi-
ness 41(2), 153–165.
Weber, A. and H. Mahringer (2008). Choice and success of job search methods. Empirical
Economics 35(1), 153–178.
Weiss, A. (1983). A sorting-cum-learning model of education. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 91(3), 420–442.
Appendix A
Additional Proof of Results for Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 5. For d ∈ (1, 2) or d ∈ (0, 1), when ph, pℓ > 0 we have Λ(d) = ψ(wˆφℓ(d))
ψ(wˆφh(d))
where φh(d) and φℓ(d) are given by equations (2.31) and (2.32). Now diﬀerentiation on d ∈
(1, 2) or d ∈ (0, 1) gives dΛ
dd
≷ 0 if and only if










= 1−ε, so with this
substitution and rearranging, inequality (A.1) implies
dΛ
dd








If ψ is logarithmically concave, then
ψ
ψ ′
is increasing. Therefore because φh(d) > φℓ(d) for
d ∈ (1, 2) and because ε




Now for d ∈ (0, 1), equations (2.31) and (2.32) give dφh
dd
= 1−ε and dφℓ
dd
= ε. So with this
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substitution and rearranging, inequality (A.1) implies
dΛ
dd









If ψ is logarithmically convex, so
ψ
ψ ′




> 1, condition (A.3) implies
dΛ
dd
< 0. Thus Λ(d) may be increasing or
decreasing in d.
If however ψ has decreasing elasticity, then we have
ψ ′(wˆφh(d))
ψ(wˆφh(d))




because wˆφh(d) > wˆφℓ(d) for all d ∈ (0, 1). Since for any α ∈ (0, 1) we have φh(α) = α(1−ε)
and φℓ(α) = αε, inequality (A.4) is equivalent to
ψ ′(wˆα(1−ε))



















for all d = α ∈ (0, 1). Therefore we have dΛ
dd
> 0. #
Proof of Proposition 1.
Suppose that d∗H = d
∗




ℓ > 0 is an equilibrium. By Lemma 3 it must be
the case that p∗h = p
∗
ℓ = ψ(wˆ) > 0, so we have wˆ > γ
′(0). By conditions (2.17) and (2.18), it
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. Then by condition
(2.14), dH = 1 is optimal for the firm in response to ph = pℓ = ψ(wˆ), while by conditions (2.17)
and (2.18) dL = 1 is (at least weakly) optimal. On the other hand, by Lemma 3, ph = pℓ = ψ(wˆ)
is optimal for the workers in response to dH = dL = 1. Thus d∗H = d
∗





ψ(wˆ) > 0 is an equilibrium. #
Proof of Proposition 2.
Suppose that d∗H = 1, d
∗




ℓ > 0 is an equilibrium. By Lemma 3 it must
be the case that p∗h = ψ(wˆ(1−ε)) > 0 and p∗ℓ = ψ(wˆε) > 0, so certainly wˆε > γ ′(0). Then by

































that wˆε > γ ′(0) implies wˆ(1−ε) > γ ′(0) so that ψ(wˆε)
ψ(wˆ(1−ε)) is well-defined. By conditions
(2.18) and (2.19) , dL = 0 is at least weakly optimal for the firm in response to ph = ψ(wˆ(1−ε))
and pℓ = ψ(wˆε), as by conditions (2.14) and (2.15) dH = 1 is also. On the other hand, by
Lemma 3, ph = ψ(wˆ(1−ε)) and pℓ = ψ(wˆε) are optimal for the workers in response to dH = 1
and dL = 0. Thus d∗H = 1, d
∗
L = 0 with p
∗
h = ψ(wˆ(1−ε)) > 0 and p∗ℓ = ψ(wˆε) > 0 is an
equilibrium. #
Proof of Proposition 3.
Suppose that d∗H = 1, d
∗
L = β ∈ (0, 1) with some p∗h, p∗ℓ > 0 is an equilibrium. By Lemma
3 it must be the case that p∗h = ψ(wˆ((1−ε) + εβ)) > 0 and p∗ℓ = ψ(wˆ(ε + (1−ε)β)) > 0, so







ψ(wˆ((1−ε) + εβ)) .







ψ(wˆ((1−ε) + εβ)) for
some β ∈ (0, 1). Note that wˆ(ε + (1−ε)β) > γ ′(0) implies wˆ((1−ε) + εβ) > γ ′(0), so that
ψ(wˆ(ε + (1−ε)β))
ψ(wˆ((1−ε) + εβ)) is well-defined. By condition (2.14), d
∗
H = 1 is optimal for the firm in
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response to ph = ψ(wˆ(1−ε)β) and pℓ = ψ(wˆ(ε + (1−ε)β)), while by condition (2.18), d∗L = β ∈
(0, 1) is optimal also (at least weakly) . On the other hand, by Lemma 3, ph = ψ(wˆ((1−ε)+εβ))
and pℓ = ψ(wˆεβ) are optimal for the workers in response to dH = 1, and dL = β. Thus d∗H = 1,
d∗L = β ∈ (0, 1) with p∗h = ψ(wˆ((1−ε) + εβ)) > 0 and p∗ℓ = ψ(wˆ(ε + (1−ε)β)) > 0 is an
equilibrium.





















Λ, where Λ ≡ infβ∈(0,1) ψ(wˆ(ε + (1−ε)β))
ψ(wˆ((1−ε) + εβ)) and where Λ ≡
supβ∈(0,1)
ψ(wˆ(ε + (1−ε)β))
ψ(wˆ((1−ε) + εβ)) = 1. #
Proof of Proposition 4.
Suppose that d∗H = α ∈ (0, 1), d∗L = 0 with some p∗h, p∗ℓ > 0 is an equilibrium. By Lemma 3
it must be the case that p∗h = ψ(wˆ(1−ε)α) and p∗ℓ = ψ(wˆεα), so wˆεα > γ ′(0). Then by condition

















ψ(wˆ(1−ε)α) for some α ∈ (0, 1). Note
that wˆεα > γ ′(0) implies wˆ(1−ε)α > γ ′(0), so that ψ(wˆεα)
ψ(wˆ(1−ε)α) is well-defined. By condition
(2.19), dL = 0 is optimal for the firm in response to ph = ψ(wˆ(1−ε)α) and pℓ = ψ(wˆεα), while
by condition (2.15), dH = α is (at least weakly) optimal. On the other hand, by Lemma (3),
ph = ψ(wˆ(1−ε)α) and pℓ = ψ(wˆεα) are optimal for the workers when dH = α and dL = 0. So
d∗H = α ∈ (0, 1), d∗L = 0 with p∗h = ψ(wˆ(1−ε)α) > 0 and p∗ℓ = ψ(wˆεα) > 0 is an equilibrium.





















Proof of Corollary 3.
Note that γ ′(p) > 0 for all p > 0 implies ψ(x) > 0 for all x > 0. By Proposition 4,
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an equilibrium with p∗h, p
∗















ψ(wˆ(1−ε)α) and Λ ≡ supα∈(0,1)
ψ(wˆεα)
ψ(wˆ(1−ε)α) . This is because ψ(wˆεα) > 0 will be
















because ψ(wˆε) > 0 is satisfied. Now



















By Proposition 3 an equilibrium with p∗h, p
∗













where Λ ≡ infβ∈(0,1) ψ(wˆ(ε + (1−ε)β))
ψ(wˆ((1−ε) + εβ)) . This is because for all β ∈ (0, 1) we will have ψ(wˆ(ε +
(1−ε)β)) > 0. Now ψ is continuous and ψ(wˆε)
ψ(wˆ(1−ε)) ≥ infβ∈(0,1)
ψ(wˆ(ε + (1−ε)β))
ψ(wˆ((1−ε) + εβ)) , so an equi-













By Proposition 1 an equilibrium with p∗h, p
∗








cause ψ(wˆ) > 0 is satisfied. Therefore an equilibrium with p∗h, p
∗







Proof of Corollary 4.
For any firm strategy d ∈ (0, 2] there is at most one non-zero best response for each worker
type, which is given by ph = ψ
(
wˆ(dH(1−ε)+dLε)) for high types and pℓ = ψ(wˆ(dHε+dL(1−ε))
for low types. Therefore no equilibria with non-zero arrival coexist in which d∗ is the same.
Under condition (i) any equilibrium with non-zero arrival must be a pure strategy equilibrium
and have d∗ = 1 by Propositions 1-4. Therefore d∗ = 1 with p∗h = ψ
(





is the unique non-zero arrival equilibrium in this case. Similarly under condition (ii),
any equilibrium with non-zero arrival must be a pure strategy equilibrium and have d∗ = 2








is the unique non-zero arrival
equilibrium in this case.
Note that no equilibrium with non-zero arrival and d∗ < 1 can exist under condition (iii)
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by Proposition 4. Now if ψ is logarithmically concave, then by Lemma 5 and because γ′ is










ψ(wˆ(1−ε)) to Λ(2) =
ψ(wˆ)
ψ(wˆ)
= 1. Since by Lemma 2 the firm’s optimal hiring strategy is
decreasing in Λ, there can at most be one equilibrium with non-zero arrival under condition
(iii).
Now when ψ has decreasing elasticity, it must also be logarithmically concave. By Lemma
5(i) Λ(d) is strictly increasing for all d ∈ (1, 2) and by Lemma 5(ii) it is strictly increasing for
all d ∈ (0, 1). Since ψ is continuous it is strictly increasing for all d ∈ (0, 2]. Since by Lemma 2
the firm’s optimal hiring strategy is decreasing in Λ, there can at most be one equilibrium with
non-zero arrival under condition (iv). #
Proof of Lemma 7.
Restricting attention to non-zero arrival equilibria, by Propositions 2, 4, and 1, condition
(i) implies d∗ = 1, condition (ii) implies d∗ = 1+β with β ∈ (0, 1), and condition (iii) implies
d∗ = 2. In each case d∗ > 0 and p∗q = ψ(wˆφq(d∗)) > 0 for q ∈ {h, ℓ}. Under condition (i)
and (iii) there is a unique equilibrium with non-zero arrival because for d∗ = 1 or d∗ = 2 there
is a unique non-zero best response for workers of each type. Under conditions (i) and (iii), a
local change in ε will lead to new arrival probabilities in equilibrium, but will not lead to a












(1−ε) if d∗ = 1





ε if d∗ = 1
1 if d∗ = 2.
(A.9)
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Thus by diﬀerentiation and rearranging we will have
dΛd∗
dε




















1 if d∗ = 1







−1 if d∗ = 1
0 if d∗ = 2.
(A.12)
























> 0 in any equilibrium with d∗ = 1. For





















by Proposition 3. In this setting, logarithmically concave ψ implies that there is a unique
equilibrium with non-zero arrival, by Corollary 4. However, any local change in ε will result
not only in a change in arrival probabilities, but also a change in the firm’s mixing probability,
since an equilibrium can only exist if equation (A.13) is satisfied. Thus an increase in ε requires
an increase in Λd∗ in order to sustain an equilibrium. #
Lemma 30. Any equilibrium with d∗ > 0 and p∗h, p∗ℓ > 0 will have
du∗h
dε





Proof. Suppose there is an equilibrium with d∗ > 0 and p∗h, p
∗
ℓ > 0. For q ∈ {h, ℓ} we have
u∗q(p∗q, ε) = wˆp∗qφ∗q + b− γ(p∗q) with φ∗h and φ∗ℓ given by equations (A.8) and (A.9) above, and so
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Now for q = h, by equation (A.11) we will have
dφ∗h
dε





d∗ = 2. For q = ℓ, by equation (A.12) we will have
dφ∗ℓ
dε





d∗ = 2. Therefore
du∗h
dε









Proof. Suppose there is an equilibrium with d∗ > 0 and p∗h, p
∗
ℓ > 0. Diﬀerentiating equation





























Lemma 32. Suppose there is an equilibrium with d∗ > 0 and p∗h, p∗ℓ > 0. Then we will have
du∗q
dw
≥ 0 for q ∈ {h, ℓ}.
Proof. For q ∈ {h, ℓ} we have u∗q(p∗q,w) = wˆp∗qφ∗q + b − γ(p∗q) with wˆ = w−b, so by the















= ψ(wˆφ∗q) · φ∗q ≥ 0. (A.16)
#
Proof of Lemma 8.
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Restricting attention to non-zero arrival equilibria, by Propositions 2, 4, and 1, condition
(i) implies d∗ = 1, condition (ii) implies d∗ = 2, and condition (iii) implies d∗ = 1+β with
β ∈ (0, 1). In each case d∗ > 0 and p∗q = ψ(wˆφq(d∗)) > 0 for q ∈ {h, ℓ}. Under condition (i) and
(ii) there is a unique equilibrium with non-zero arrival because for d∗ = 1 or d∗ = 2 there is a
unique non-zero best response for workers of each type. Under conditions (i) and (ii), a local
change in w will lead to new arrival probabilities in equilibrium, but will not lead to a change
























Note that ψ and ψ ′ are strictly positive.











by Proposition 3. In this setting, logarithmically concave ψ implies that there is a unique
equilibrium with non-zero arrival, by Corollary 4. However, any local change in w will result
not only in a change in arrival probabilities, but also a change in the firm’s mixing probability,
since an equilibrium can only exist if equation (A.19) is satisfied. Thus an increase inw requires
a decrease in Λd∗ in order to sustain an equilibrium, because
vh−w
w−vℓ is decreasing in w.
#
Lemma 33. Suppose there is an equilibrium with d∗ > 0 and p∗h, p∗ℓ > 0. Then we will have
dp∗q
db
> 0 for q ∈ {h, ℓ}.
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Proof. Since it must be the case that p∗q = ψ(wˆφ∗q) in such an equilibrium, we will have
dp∗q
db
= −φ∗q · ψ ′(wˆφ∗q) < 0. #
Lemma 34. Suppose there is an equilibrium with d∗ > 0 and p∗h, p∗ℓ > 0. Then we will have
du∗q
db
> 0 for q ∈ {h, ℓ}.
Proof. For q ∈ {h, ℓ} we have u∗q(p∗q, b) = wˆp∗qφ∗q + b − γ(p∗q) with wˆ = w−b, so by the













= 1 − ψ(wˆφ∗q) · φ∗q. (A.20)
Now since p∗q = ψ(wˆφ∗q) < 1 and φ∗q ≤ 1, we have
du∗q
db
> 0 for q ∈ {h, ℓ}. #
Lemma 35. Restrict attention to non-zero arrival in equilibrium and suppose ψ is logarithmi-




























































Proof. Restricting attention to non-zero arrival equilibria, by Propositions 2, 4, and 1,
condition (i) implies d∗ = 1, and condition (ii) implies d∗ = 2. In each of these cases d∗ > 0
and p∗q = ψ(wˆφq(d∗)) > 0 for q ∈ {h, ℓ}. Under both conditions there is a unique equilibrium
with non-zero arrival because for d∗ = 1 or d∗ = 2 there is a unique non-zero best response for
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workers of each type. A local change in b will lead to new arrival probabilities in equilibrium,
but will not lead to a change in firm strategy in equilibrium. Therefore under condition (i) or










Condition (35) is then obtained directly from diﬀerentiation and cross-multiplication. Note
that ψ and ψ ′ are strictly positive.











by Proposition 3. In this setting, logarithmically concave ψ implies that there is a unique
equilibrium with non-zero arrival, by Corollary 4. For each b there is a unique d∗ = 1+β(b)
such that Λ(d∗(b)) satisfies equation (A.23). Thus, allowing for adjustment of the firm strategy
















Lemma 36. Let πd denote the firm’s profit given worker best responses ph(d) and pℓ(d) to
d ∈ {0, 1, 2}. We have
(i) π0 = 0,
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Proof. For given worker best responses ph(d) and pℓ(d) to d ∈ {0, 1, 2}, the firm’s profit is
given by
πd = (vh−w)sph(d)φh(d) − (w−vℓ)(1−s)pℓ(d)φℓ(d). (A.27)
(i) For d = 0, we have φh(0) = φℓ(0) = 0 and therefore π0 = 0.
(ii) For d = 1, we have φh(1) = 1−ε and φℓ(1) = ε. So equation (A.27) for d = 1 becomes
π1 = (vh−w)sph(1)(1−ε) − (w−vℓ)(1−s)pℓ(1)ε. (A.28)










(iii) For d = 2, we have φh(2) = φℓ(2) = 1 so equation (A.27) for d = 2 becomes
π2 = (vh−w)sph(2) − (w−vℓ)(1−s)pℓ(2). (A.30)








(iv) By equations (A.28) and (A.30) we have π2 ≥ π1 if and only if
(vh−w)s [ph(2) − ph(1)(1−ε)] − (w−vℓ)(1−s)[pℓ(2) − pℓ(1)ε] ≥ 0 (A.32)
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#
Proof of Proposition 5.
In the model with commitment for a given wage, the firm anticipates the following best
response of workers to hiring strategy d ∈ {0, 1, 2}:
pq(d) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if d = 0
wˆφq(d)
c
if d = 1
wˆ
c
if d = 0,
(A.34)
for q ∈ {h, ℓ} where φh(1) = 1−ε and φℓ(1) = ε.
By Lemma 36, d = 0 is optimal for the firm when inequalities (A.24) and (A.25) both fail






, we see that inequality (A.24)









and substituting ph(2) = pℓ(2) =
wˆ
c

















High-and low-quality workers’ best responses to d = 0 are ph = 0 and pℓ = 0, so d∗ = 0 with
p∗h = p
∗









Again by Lemma 36, d = 1 is optimal for the firm when inequality (A.24) holds but in-
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, we see that inequality
















1 − (1−ε)2 > 1. Therefore d = 1 is optimal










1 − (1−ε)2 . High-and low-quality workers’ best























1 − (1−ε)2 .
Again by Lemma 36, d = 2 is optimal for the firm when inequalities (A.25) and (A.26)
both hold. Substituting ph(2) = pℓ(2) =
wˆ
c






































High-and low-quality workers’ best responses to d = 2 are ph = pℓ =
wˆ
c
















Proof of Proposition 6.
In the model with commitment for a given wage, the firm anticipates the following best
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response of workers to hiring strategy d ∈ {0, 1, 2}:
pq(d) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if d = 0
wˆφq(d) − c
wˆφ∗q
if d = 1
wˆ − c
wˆ
if d = 2,
(A.41)
for q ∈ {h, ℓ} where φh(1) = 1−ε and φℓ(1) = ε.
By Lemma 36, d = 0 is optimal for the firm when inequalities (A.24) and (A.25) both fail
to hold strictly. Substituting ph(1) =
wˆ(1−ε) − c
wˆ(1−ε) and pℓ(1) =
wˆε − c
wˆε
, we see that inequality






wˆ(1−ε) − c , (A.42)
Substituting ph(2) = pℓ(2) =
wˆ − c
wˆ






Since it is the case that
wˆε − c






wˆ(1−ε) − c . High-and low-quality workers’ best responses to d = 0 are ph = 0 and
pℓ = 0, so d∗ = 0 with p∗h = p
∗






wˆ(1−ε) − c .
Again by Lemma 36, d = 1 is optimal for the firm when inequality (A.24) holds but in-
equality (A.26) does not hold strictly. Substituting ph(1) =
wˆ(1−ε) − c










wˆ(1−ε) − c . (A.44)





wˆ(1−ε) and pℓ(1) =
wˆε − c
wˆε
, we see that
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Now in condition (A.44) we have
wˆε − c
















low-quality workers’ best responses to d = 1 are ph =
wˆ(1−ε) − c
wˆ(1−ε) and pℓ =
wˆε − c
wˆε




















Again, by Lemma 36, d = 2 is optimal for the firm when inequalities (A.25) and (A.26)
both hold. Substituting ph(2) = pℓ(2) =
wˆ − c
wˆ
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and low-quality workers’ best responses to d = 2 are ph = pℓ =
wˆ − c
wˆ














Additional Proof of Results for Chapter 3


















1−εF , but it is the case that
εF
1−εF < 1, so dF = 0 can only be optimal in a generally
unprofitable industry. Since for each firm strategy there can be at most one non-zero best
response for workers, parts (a) and (b) cover all possible equilibria with d∗I = 2 and non-trivial
use of the informal channel.







and wˆ(1−pF) > γ ′(0). Then high- and
low-type workers have identical incentives to use the informal channel given (d∗F , d
∗
I ) = (2, 2),
and will choose the same arrival probabilities (see Table 3.1) so that
p∗ℓ
p∗h





wˆ(1−pF)) is an optimal response for high- and low-quality workers to absolute
hiring in both channels. Now in this setting the industry is generally profitable but both infor-







it is optimal for the firm








Lemma 10 it will certainly be optimal to hire absolutely in the informal channel, dI = 2, if
the quality composition of the pool of informal applicants is the same as that of the general
165
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population. Thus (dF , dI) = (2, 2) is also a best response to pIh = pIℓ = ψ
(
wˆ(1−pF)) due to
the neutral pool factor,
pℓ
ph
= 1. Thus (d∗F , d
∗







equilibrium with non-zero use of the informal channel.
On the other hand, suppose that (d∗F , d
∗






wˆ(1−pF)) is an equi-
librium with non-zero use of the informal channel. Thus worker arrival probabilities must be
strictly positive, so informal arrival must not be prohibitively costly, with wˆ(1−pF) > γ ′(0), and
the informal pool composition must be neutral,
p∗ℓ
p∗h








in order for the firm to be willing to hire absolutely in the formal
channel. Thus the stated conditions of this proposition are necessary for this equilibrium.













wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))) ≤ vh−ww−vl s1−s εI1−εI . Then by Lemma 11, pIh = ψ(wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))) and
pIℓ = ψ
(
wˆ(1−pFεF)) are non-zero optimal responses for workers given selective formal hiring
and absolute informal hiring, (dF , dI) = (1, 2). In this setting the industry is generally profitable




















, it will be optimal for the firm to hire absolutely in the
informal channel, dI = 2, provided that the quality composition of the pool of informal appli-



















wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))) . So (d∗F , d∗I ) = (1, 2) and p∗Ih =
ψ
(
wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))), p∗Iℓ = ψ(wˆ(1−pFεF)) is an equilibrium with non-zero use of the informal
channel.
On the other hand, suppose that (d∗F , d
∗







wˆ(1−pFεF)) is an equilibriumwith non-zero use of the informal channel. Then worker arrival
probabilities must be strictly positive, so informal arrival must not be prohibitively costly, for
high-quality workers in particular, with wˆ(1−pF(1−εF)) > γ ′(0) (which implies wˆ(1−pFεF) >
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in order for the firm










in order for the firm to be willing to hire absolutely in the informal






wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))) ≤ vh−ww−vl s1−s εI1−εI . Thus the
stated conditions of this proposition are necessary for this equilibrium. #
Proof of Proposition 8.
Note that εI − εF ≥ 1−pFpF (1−2εI) implies that the formal report is strictly more pre-



























. Thus any equilibrium in this setting must have selective
formal hiring, d∗F = 1. By Lemma 14, an equilibrium with non-trivial use of the informal
channel with d∗I = 2 can not exist in this setting, so any equilibrium here must have selective
hiring in the informal channel also, d∗I = 1. Since for firm strategy (dF , dI) = (1,1) there can be
at most one non-zero best response for workers, the equilibrium described is the only possible
equilibrium with non-trivial use of the informal channel in this setting.












. Then pIh = ψ
(
wˆ(1 − pF(1−εF))(1−εI)), pIℓ = ψ(wˆ(1 − pFεF)εI) are non-zero
best responses of the workers to a firm strategy of (dF , dI) = (1,1) by Lemma 11. Now in
this setting formal reports are decisive, therefore dF = 1 is optimal for the firm by Lemma 9.
And it is also the case that selective hiring dI = 1 is a best response in the informal channel
to pIh = ψ
(
wˆ(1 − pF(1−εF))(1−εI)), pIℓ = ψ(wˆ(1 − pFεF)εI) by Lemma 10. This can be
seen by noting that for εI − εF ≥ 1−pFpF (1−2εI) it must be the case that high types use the
informal channel less than low types, ψ
(
wˆ(1 − pF(1−εF))(1−εI)) < ψ(wˆ(1 − pFεF)εI), so the
informal pool composition is unfavourable,
pℓ
ph






































. Thus by conditions (3.5) and (3.8) selective informal hiring, d∗I = 1, is optimal
for the firm in response to pIh = ψ
(
wˆ(1− pF(1−εF))(1−εI)), pIℓ = ψ(wˆ(1− pFεF)εI). Therefore
(d∗F , d
∗




wˆ(1− pF(1−εF))(1−εI)), p∗Iℓ = ψ(wˆ(1− pFεF)εI) is an equilibrium
with non-zero use of the informal channel.
On the other hand, suppose that (d∗F , d
∗







wˆ(1 − pFεF)εI) is an equilibrium with non-zero use of the informal channel. Then
worker arrival probabilities must be strictly positive, so informal arrival is not prohibitively
costly, in particular for high-quality workers wˆ(1 − pF(1−εF))(1−εI) > γ ′(0) (note that for
εI − εF ≥ 1−pFpF (1−2εI) this also implies wˆ(1 − pFεF)εI > γ







wˆ(1−pF(1−εF)(1 − εI)) ≤ vh−ww−vl s1−s 1−εIεI in order for the firm to be willing
to hire selectively in the informal channel. Thus the stated conditions of this proposition are
necessary for this equilibrium. #
Proof of Proposition 9.
Note that by Lemma 14, an equilibrium with non-trivial use of the informal channel with
d∗I = 2 can not exist in this setting, so any equilibrium here must have selective hiring in the
informal channel, d∗I = 1. Since for each firm strategy (dF , dI) = (i, 1) for i ∈ {0, 1, 2} there
can be at most one non-zero best response for workers, parts (a), (b), and (c) cover all possible
equilibria with non-trivial use of the informal channel in this setting.











1−εF . Then by Lemma 11 we know that pIh = ψ
(
wˆ(1−εI)) and pIℓ = ψ(wˆεI) are best
responses of the workers to a firm strategy of (dF , dI) = (0,1). Now given pIh = ψ
(
wˆ(1−εI))




, we will have a favourable pool of informal applicants,
pℓ
ph
















also, so the condition







wˆ(1−εI)) ≥ vh−ww−vl s1−s εI1−εI , the condition (3.8) is
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1−εF , it is the case that dF = 0 is optimal in the formal
channel by Lemma 9. Therefore (d∗F , d
∗




wˆ(1−εI)), p∗Iℓ = ψ(wˆεI) is an
equilibrium.
On the other hand, suppose that (d∗F , d
∗




wˆ(1−εI)), p∗Iℓ = ψ(wˆεI) is an
equilibrium with non-zero use of the informal channel. Then worker arrival probabilities must
be strictly positive, so informal arrival is not prohibitively costly, wˆεI > γ ′(0) in particular for








wˆ(1−εI)) ≤ vh−ww−vl s1−s 1−εIεI in order for the firm to be willing to hire selectively






1−εF in order for
d∗F = 0 to be optimal in the formal channel. Thus the stated conditions of this proposition are
necessary for this equilibrium.

















wˆ(1−pF(1−εF)(1−εI)) ≥ vh−ww−vl s1−s εI1−εI . Then by Lemma 11 we know that pIh =
ψ
(
wˆ(1 − pF(1−εF))(1−εI)) and pIℓ = ψ(wˆ(1 − pFεF)εI) are best responses of the workers to
a firm strategy of (dF , dI) = (1,1). Now given pIh = ψ
(
wˆ(1 − pF(1−εF))(1−εI)) and pIℓ =
ψ
(
wˆ(1 − pFεF)εI), we have a favourable pool of informal applicants, pℓph < 1, by Lemma 13






















wˆ(1−pF(1−εF)(1−εI)) ≥ vh−ww−vl s1−s εI1−εI ,
the condition (3.8) is also satisfied. So dI = 1 is a best response in the informal channel to pIh =
ψ
(











it is also the case that selective hiring is also optimal in the formal channel, dF = 1, by Lemma
9. Therefore (d∗F , d
∗




wˆ(1 − pF(1−εF))(1−εI)), p∗Iℓ = ψ(wˆ(1 − pFεF)εI) is
an equilibrium.
On the other hand, suppose that (d∗F , d
∗







wˆ(1 − pFεF)εI) is an equilibrium with non-zero use of the informal channel. Then
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worker arrival probabilities must be strictly positive, so informal arrival is not prohibitively
costly, wˆ(1 − pFεF)εI > γ ′(0) in particular for low-quality workers (note that when εI − εF <
1−pF
pF







wˆ(1−pF(1−εF)(1−εI)) ≤ vh−ww−vl s1−s 1−εIεI in order for the firm to be willing











in order for d∗F = 1 to be optimal in the formal channel. Thus the
stated conditions of this proposition are necessary for this equilibrium.











wˆ(1 − pF)(1−εI)) ≥ vh−ww−vl s1−s εI1−εI . Then by Lemma 11 it must be the case that pIh =
ψ
(
wˆ(1−pF)(1−εI)) and pIℓ = ψ(wˆ(1−pF)εI) are best responses of the workers to a firm strategy
of (dF , dI) = (2,1). Now given pIh = ψ
(
wˆ(1 − pF)(1−εI)) and pIℓ = ψ(wˆ(1 − pF)εI), we again
have a favourable informal pool of applicants,
pℓ
ph
















also, so condition (3.5) is satisfied.






wˆ(1 − pF)(1−εI)) ≥ vh−ww−vl s1−s εI1−εI , the condition (3.8) is also satisfied.
Thus dI = 1 is a best response in the informal channel to worker arrival probabilities pIh =
ψ
(











also the case that selective hiring is also optimal in the formal channel, dF = 1, by Lemma
9. Therefore (d∗F , d
∗




wˆ(1 − pF)(1−εI)), p∗Iℓ = ψ(wˆ(1 − pF)εI) is an
equilibrium.
On the other hand, suppose that (d∗F , d
∗




wˆ(1 − pF)(1 − εI)), p∗Iℓ =
ψ
(
wˆ(1 − pF)εI) is an equilibrium with non-zero use of the informal channel. Then worker
arrival probabilities must be strictly positive, so informal arrival is not prohibitively costly,
wˆ(1 − pF)εI > γ ′(0) in particular for low-quality workers (note that this implies wˆ(1 − pF)(1 −






wˆ(1 − pF)(1−εI)) ≤ vh−ww−vl s1−s 1−εIεI
in order for the firm to be willing to hire selectively in the informal channel. By Lemma 9 it






1−εF in order for absolute hiring to be optimal in the
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formal channel, d∗F = 2. Thus the stated conditions of this proposition are necessary for this
equilibrium. #
Proof of Proposition 10.
Note that by Lemma 14, an equilibrium with non-trivial use of the informal channel with
d∗I = 2 can not exist in this setting, so any equilibrium here must have selective hiring in






1−εI implies that the industry is generally
unprofitable, so absolute hiring in the formal channel can not be supported in any equilibrium,
d∗F ! 2. Since for each firm strategy (dF , dI) ∈
{
(0, 1), (1, 1)
}
there can be at most one non-zero
best response for workers, parts (a) and (b) cover all possible equilibria with non-trivial use of
the informal channel in this setting.


























. Then we know that pIh = ψ
(
wˆ(1−εI)) and pIℓ = ψ(wˆεI)
are best responses of the workers to a firm strategy of (dF , dI) = (0, 1) by Lemma 11, and they
are strictly positive. Note that wˆεIγ ′(0) implies wˆ(1−εI) > γ ′(0). Meanwhile, we know that







Furthermore, we know that dI = 1 is a best response to pIh = ψ
(
wˆ(1−εI)) and pIℓ = ψ(wˆεI)






















conditions (3.5) and (3.8) are satisfied.
On the other hand, suppose that (d∗F , d
∗




wˆ(1−εI)), p∗Iℓ = ψ(wˆεI)
is an equilibrium with non-trivial use of the informal channel. In order for this equilibrium
to have non-trivial use of the informal channel it must be the case that workers have strictly
positive arrival probabilities in the informal channel. In particular, this must be true for low-
quality workers, which implies that wˆεI > γ ′(0). In order for this equilibrium to have no
hiring in the formal channel, d∗F = 0, it must be the case that conditions (3.2) and (3.4) are






1−εF . Finally, in order for this equilibrium to have
selective hiring in the informal channel, d∗I = 1, it must be the case that conditions (3.5)
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. Thus the stated conditions of this proposition are necessary
for this equilibrium.































. Then we know that pIh =
ψ
(
wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))(1−εI)) and pIℓ = ψ(wˆ(1−pFεF)εI) are best responses of the workers to a firm
strategy of (dF , dI) = (1, 1) by Lemma 11, and are strictly positive. Note that wˆ(1−pFεF)εI >
γ ′(0) implies wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))(1−εI) > γ ′(0). Meanwhile, we know that selective hiring is opti-













This implies that conditions (3.1) and (3.4) are satisfied. Furthermore, we know that dI = 1
is a best response to pIh = ψ
(






















plies that conditions (3.5) and (3.8) are satisfied. Therefore (d∗F , d
∗





wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))(1−εI)) > 0, p∗Iℓ = ψ(wˆ(1−pFεF)εI) > 0 is an equilibrium.
On the other hand, suppose that (d∗F , d
∗







wˆ(1−pFεF)εI) is an equilibrium with non-trivial use of the informal channel. In order
for this equilibrium to have non-trivial use of the informal channel it must be the case that
workers have strictly positive arrival probabilities in the informal channel. In particular, this
must be true for low-quality workers, which implies that wˆ(1−pFεF)εI > γ ′(0). In order for
this equilibrium to have selective hiring in the formal channel, d∗F = 1, it must be the case that













Finally, in order for this equilibrium to have selective hiring in the informal channel, d∗I = 1, it










wˆ(1−εI)) . This implies





















stated conditions of this proposition are necessary for this equilibrium. #
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implies that the industry is generally profitable, so d∗F = 0 is
not possible to sustain in any equilibrium. However, if the firm hires absolutely in the formal
channel, d∗F = 2, any equilibrium with selective hiring in the informal channel, d
∗
I = 1, will
have a strictly favourable pool of informal applicants (see Table 3.1). Since condition (3.8)










< 1, selective hiring will not be a best
response in the informal channel so such an equilibrium is not possible. Thus any equilibrium
in this setting with d∗I = 1 and non-trivial use of the informal channel must have d
∗
F = 1. Since
for firm strategy (dF , dI) = (1, 1) there can be at most one non-zero best response for workers,
the equilibrium described in this proposition is the only possible equilibrium with d∗I = 1 and
non-trivial use of the informal channel in this setting.




























Then it will be the case that pIh = ψ
(
wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))(1−εI)) and pIℓ = ψ(wˆ(1−pFεF)εI) are
best responses for workers to firm strategy (dF , dI) = (1, 1) by Lemma 11, and they are both
positive because wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))(1−εI) > γ ′(0) implies wˆ(1−pFεF)εI > γ ′(0). Meanwhile























1−εF also. Thus formal reports are decisive in this setting and con-



















, it is also the case that conditions (3.5) and (3.8) are sat-
isfied when pIh = ψ
(
wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))(1−εI)) and pIℓ = ψ(wˆ(1−pFεF)εI). Therefore selective
hiring in the informal channel, dI = 1, is a best response to pIh = ψ
(
wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))(1−εI))
and pIℓ = ψ
(
wˆ(1−pFεF)εI). Therefore (d∗F , d∗I ) = (1, 1) and p∗Ih = ψ(wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))(1−εI)),
p∗Iℓ = ψ
(
wˆ(1−pFεF)εI) is an equilibrium.
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On the other hand, suppose that (d∗F , d
∗







wˆ(1−pFεF)εI) is an equilibrium with non-trivial use of the informal channel. In order
for it to be the case that the informal channel is actually used, we know that workers must have
strictly positive arrival probabilities in the informal channel. In particular, this must be true
for high-quality workers, which implies that wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))(1−εI) > γ ′(0). In order for this
equilibrium to have selective hiring in the formal channel, d∗F = 1, it must be the case that con-








in order for this equilibrium to have selective hiring in the informal channel, d∗I = 1, it must be



















































wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))(1−εI)) . Since in the setting of this proposition we have vh−ww−vl ≥ 1−ss 1−εIεI ,
this condition can only be satisfied if the informal pool is unfavourable Λ11 > 1, which means
that low-quality workers must arrive with a higher probability than do high-quality workers,
so that ψ
(
wˆ(1−pFεF)εI) > ψ(wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))(1−εI)). Since ψ is an increasing function, this
can only be true when (1−pF(1−εF))(1−εI) < (1−pFεF)εI . Rearranging algebraically, this
condition is equivalent to εI−εF > 1−pFpF (1−2εI). Thus the stated conditions of this proposition
are necessary for this equilibrium. #
Proof of Lemma 19.
Within a given class of (non-trivial) equilibria with firm strategy (d∗F , d
∗
I ) = (i, j) ∈ {0, 1, 2}×






, where φ∗Ah = (1−ε)d∗AH + εd∗AL and φ∗Aℓ = εd∗AH +
(1−ε)d∗AL for A ∈ {F, I}.
For d∗I = 2, Λ
i2 is constant with respect to εI because φ∗Ih = φ
∗
Iℓ = 1. Now for d
∗
I = 1
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> 0 if and only if
ψ(wˆ(1−pFφ∗Fh)(1−εI)) · ψ ′(wˆ(1−pFφ∗Fℓ)εI)wˆ(1 − pFφ∗Fℓ)
− ψ(wˆ(1−pFφ∗Fℓ)εI) · ψ ′(wˆ(1−pFφ∗Fh)(1−ε))wˆ(1−pFφ∗Fh)(−1) > 0.
(B.2)
This inequality is certainly satisfied because both ψ and ψ ′ are positive and 1 − φ∗Fq > 0 for
q ∈ {h, ℓ}, so both terms on the left hand side are positive. Thus dΛ
i j
dεI
≥ 0 within any class of
equilibria with (d∗F , d
∗
I ) = (i, j) ∈ {0, 1, 2} × {1, 2}.
For d∗F = 0, Λ
0 j is constant with respect to εF because φ∗Fh = φ
∗
Fℓ = 0. Similarly for d
∗
F = 2,
Λ2 j is constant with respect to εF because φ∗Fh = φ
∗
Fℓ = 1. Now for d
∗
F = 1 we have φ
∗
Fh = 1−εF
and φ∗Fℓ = εF , therefore diﬀerentiation of Λ




if and only if
ψ(wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))φ∗Ih) · ψ ′(wˆ(1−pFεF)φ∗Iℓ)wˆ(−pFφ∗Iℓ)
− ψ(wˆ(1−pFεF)φ∗Iℓ) · ψ ′(wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))φ∗Ih)wˆ(1−pF(1−εF))wˆpFφ∗Ih < 0.
(B.3)
This inequality is certainly satisfied because both terms on the left hand side are negative. Thus
dΛi j
dεF
≤ 0 within any class of equilibria with (d∗F , d∗I ) = (i, j) ∈ {0, 1, 2} × {1, 2}. #
Proof of Lemma 20.
Within a given class of equilibria with firm strategy (d∗F , d
∗
I ) = (i, j) ∈ {0, 1, 2} × {1, 2}, the




I ) − πFI(d∗F , d∗I ) where πF(dF),
πI(dF , dI) and πFI(dF , dI) are given by equations (3.34), (3.35) and (3.36) respectively.
Certainly for any equilibrium with d∗F ∈ {0, 2}, a change in εF has no eﬀect on profits.
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Instead taking (d∗F , d
∗
I ) = (1, j) with j ∈ {1, 2} and grouping like terms, this means that
π1 j = (vh−w)s
[








Recall that the conditional acceptance probabilities for high- and low-quality workers are
φ∗Ah = (1−ε)d∗AH + εd∗AL and φ∗Aℓ = εd∗AH + (1−ε)d∗AL for each application channel A ∈ {F, I}.













Taking γ(p) = cp2 for c > 0 as a simplifying example, we have ψ(x) =
x
2c




























= −(w−vℓ)(1−s)pF + (vh−w)spF . (B.7)
In this case it is easy to see that π1 j may be increasing or decreasing in εF , namely increasing
if the industry is generally profitable and decreasing if the industry is generally unprofitable.




Proof of Lemma 21.
Within a given class of equilibria with firm strategy (d∗F , d
∗
I ) = (i, j) ∈ {0, 1, 2} × {1, 2} we






, where φ∗Ah = (1−ε)d∗AH + εd∗AL. Therefore, diﬀerentiating with
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= ψ(wˆ(1−pFφ∗Fh)φ∗Ih) · ψ ′(wˆ(1−pFφ∗Fℓ)φ∗Iℓ)(1−pFφ∗Fℓ)φ∗Iℓ
− ψ(wˆ(1−pFφ∗Fℓ)φ∗Iℓ) · ψ ′(wˆ(1−pFφ∗Fh)φ∗Ih)(1−pFφ∗Fh)φ∗Ih
(B.8)
where a is a positive constant. Therefore we can have
dΛi j
dw








Proof of Lemma 22.
Recall that within a given class of equilibria with firm strategy (d∗F , d
∗
I ) = (i, j) ∈ {0, 1, 2} ×
{1, 2}, the firm’s overall expected profit is given by πi j = πF(d∗F)+πI(d∗F , d∗I )−πFI(d∗F , d∗I ) where
πF(dF), πI(dF , dI) and πFI(dF , dI) are given by equations (3.34), (3.35) and (3.36) respectively.
Within a given class of equilibria with firm strategy (d∗F , d
∗
I ) = (i, j) ∈ {0, 1, 2} × {1, 2} this
means that
πi j = (vh−w)s
[






pFφ∗Fℓ + (1−pFφ∗Fℓ) · ψ
(
wˆ(1−pFφ∗Fℓ)φ∗Iℓ
) · φ∗Iℓ]. (B.10)
Recall that the conditional acceptance probabilities for high- and low-quality workers are φ∗Ah =
(1−ε)d∗AH + εd∗AL and φ∗Aℓ = εd∗AH + (1−ε)d∗AL for each application channel A ∈ {F, I}. Therefore
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Thus we can have
dπi j
db












Proof of Lemma 23.
Within a given class of equilibria with firm strategy (d∗F , d
∗
I ) = (i, j) ∈ {0, 1, 2} × {1, 2} we






where φ∗Ah = (1−ε)d∗AH + εd∗AL and φ∗Aℓ = εd∗AH + (1−ε)d∗AL for




= −ψ(wˆ(1−pFφ∗Fh)φ∗Ih) · ψ ′(wˆ(1−pFφ∗Fℓ)φ∗Iℓ) · wˆφ∗Fℓφ∗Iℓ
+ ψ(wˆ(1−pFφ∗Fℓ)φ∗Iℓ) · ψ ′(wˆ(1−pFφ∗Fh)φ∗Ih) · wˆφ∗Fhφ∗Ih
(B.13)
where a is a positive constant. Therefore we can have
dΛi j
dpF








Lemma 37. In any equilibrium with p∗Ih > 0, it must also be the case that p∗Iℓ > 0. In any
equilibrium with p∗Iℓ > 0, it must also be the case that p
∗
Ih > 0.
Proof. Suppose there is an equilibrium with p∗Ih > 0 and p
∗
Iℓ = 0. High-quality workers are
willing to incur strictly positive arrival costs, so the firm must be willing to hire at least some
informal applicants in this equilibrium, d∗I ∈ {1, 2}. Any informal application which arrives is
certainly from a high-quality worker, so the firm must hire absolutely in the informal channel,
d∗I = 2. Since the firm is hiring absolutely, we must have p
∗
Ih ≤ p∗Iℓ by Lemma 12. This
contradicts p∗Iℓ = 0.
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Suppose there is an equilibrium with p∗Iℓ > 0 and p
∗
Ih = 0. Low-quality workers are willing
to incur strictly positive arrival costs, so the firm must be willing to hire at least some informal
applicants in this equilibrium, d∗I ∈ {1, 2}. Any informal application which arrives is certainly
from a low-quality worker, so the firm can not be willing to hire in the informal channel, a
contradiction. #
Appendix C
Additional Proof of Results for Chapter 4
Lemma 38. Let a ∈ {c,w, b, εF , εI , pF}. Suppose P(n) is strictly increasing and strictly con-
cave, and P′(n) is logarithmically concave. For any parameter setting and fixed firm strategy



























1−pFφFq(d))φIq(d) for q ∈ {h, ℓ}.
Proof. For fixed d and non-zero networking, the change in the pool composition due to a

























Now for non-zero networking, by Lemma 25 we have nq=P′−1(xq) for q ∈ {h, ℓ} so workers’
180
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Lemma 39. For k ∈ (0, 1), λ > 0, and n > 0 we have
d
dn
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣ e−λnk · nk
(1 − e−λnk)(k−1 − λknk)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ > 0 if 1 − e−λnk < λnk [1 − kk−1λnk] . (C.6)
Proof. Focusing on the numerator of the derivative, we can see by diﬀerentiation that
d
dn
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣ e−λnk · nk
(1 − e−λnk)(k−1 − λknk)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ > 0 if
(1 − e−λnk)(k−1 − λknk)[e−λnk ·knk−1 − λknk−1e−λnk ·nk]
− e−λnk ·nk[(1 − e−λnk)(−λk2nk−1) + (k−1 − λknk)e−λnk ·λknk−1] > 0. (C.7)
Condition (C.7) is equivalent to each of the following:
(1 − e−λnk)(k−1 − λknk)e−λnk ·knk−1[1 − λnk]
− e−λnk ·knk−1[(1 − e−λnk)(−λknk) + (k−1 − λknk)e−λnk ·λnk] > 0, (C.8)
(1 − e−λnk)(k−1 − λknk)[1 − λnk]
− [(1 − e−λnk)(−λknk) + (k−1 − λknk)e−λnk ·λnk] > 0, (C.9)
(1 − e−λnk − λnk + λnk·e−λnk)(k−1 − λknk)
+ (1 − e−λnk)(λknk) − (k−1 − λknk)e−λnk ·λnk > 0,
(C.10)
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(1 − e−λnk − λnk)(k−1 − λknk) + (1 − e−λnk)(λknk) > 0, (C.11)
(1 − e−λnk)(k−1) − λnk(k−1 − λknk) > 0, (C.12)
(1 − e−λnk)(k−1) > λnk(k−1 − λknk). (C.13)
For k ∈ (0, 1) this is also equivalent to




⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣ e−λnk · nk
(1 − e−λnk)(k−1 − λknk)
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